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Low wages in the retail industry in the Netherlands
Abstract
This Working Paper is basically a “source book”, accounting the results of over ﬁ  ve years of research 
into the retail industry and the sources used for that research. It originates from the Future of  Work in Europe 
research project of the New York-based Russell Sage Foundation (RSF), in which the AIAS and STZ advies 
& onderzoek (consultancy & research) carried out the Dutch part, resulting in the monograph Low-Wage 
Work in the Netherlands (RSF, 2008). It also incorporates sources for the retail part of the project that subse-
quently compared low-wage developments in Europe and the US, resulting in the volume Low-Wage Work in 
the Wealthy World (RSF, 2010). 
The Working Paper shows the development of Dutch retailing as an industry in which in the 2000s 
nearly half of all workers earn less than the low-wage threshold, that is, less than two-thirds of the national 
median gross hourly wage. In the 1980s and early 1990s retailing already moved towards low pay in the 
Netherlands. From the mid-1990s on, major factors worked toward the persistence of low pay, in particu-
lar in the supermarkets, where three in ﬁ  ve workers earned less than the threshold: the slowdown or even 
decline of disposable income growth and the low consumer-spending share; price wars and the spread of 
discounting; economies of scale and deregulation of zoning regulations and opening hours, and the devel-
opment of supply-chain management systems. The longer opening hours allowed by the 1996 Opening 
Hours (Shops) Act initiated changes in the logistical chain. The food chains replaced adult shift workers 
with young shelf-stackers; the long “tail” of low youth rates, also applied for prospective checkout opera-
tors, proved to constitute an exit option for employers maintaining a low-wage orientation. The supermarket 
price war of 2003-2006 strengthened employers’ orientation on deploying youngsters, in particular second-
ary and tertiary education students, (initially, in 2003-04) at the expense of adult women and, structurally, at 
the expense of those youngsters who want to earn a living wage after leaving school. The ofﬁ  cial facility to 
combine work and study distorts parts of the youth retail labour market, effectively crowding out the latter 
category. In spite of the domination of “low roads” in product market and human resources strategies of 
food chains, functional ﬂ  exibility proved to be widespread at shop-ﬂ  oor level -- almost inevitable as tight 
ﬁ  nancial and personnel benchmarks do not allow idle hours.
Working time and scheduling issues stood out prominently in workplace relations in the supermarkets. 
Recurrent issues of complaint concerned employer decisions concerning working times and days-off, as 
well as low stafﬁ  ng levels and employers not paying according to hours worked. Discontent on these mat-Page ● 8
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ters rose during the price war. In consumer electronics retail, the other retail sub-sector studied, nearly one 
in ﬁ  ve workers earned less than the low-wage threshold. Yet, workers had to rely to a considerably part on 
bonuses and compensations paid for working overtime or unusual hours to reach an acceptable pay level. 
In consumer electronics the working time issue was much less prominent, partly because of the lower share 
of part-timers, partly because of higher wages, partly because of the compensation system. Without sug-
gesting a too rosy picture, based on an assessment of shop-ﬂ  oor relations we may conclude that consumer 
electronics retailing contrasted indeed to a large extent with the supermarket branch, not least because this 
business is sales-based and knowledgeable salespersons have to be regarded as valuable assets.Page ● 9
Low wages in the retail industry in the Netherlands
1. Introduction 
1.1.  The Low-Wage Project
In 1994, the New York-based Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) inaugurated a major program of research 
on the nature, causes, and consequences of low-wage work and the prospects of low-wage workers, called 
The Future of  Work.1 In the early 2000s, the RSF developed plans to support a cross-national comparison 
of the quality of low-wage employment in Europe and the United States. Having completed and published 
Low-Wage America: How Employers Are Reshaping Opportunity in the Workplace, an extensive series of case studies 
of low-wage industries and jobs in the US carried out in partnership with the Rockefeller Foundation,2  the 
RSF commissioned a set of comparable case studies for ﬁ  ve European Union member states: Denmark, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The Amsterdam Institute for Advanced La-
bour Studies (AIAS) of the University of Amsterdam and STZ advies & onderzoek (consultancy & re-
search) in Eindhoven were chosen to undertake the study for the Netherlands. Wiemer Salverda, director 
of the AIAS, and the current author on behalf of STZ, were to act as national research team coordinators. 
In the Future of  Work in Europe project, AIAS and STZ closely cooperated with research groups in the four 
other European countries. The focus was on ﬁ  ve target industries and related target occupations that were 
low-wage in the USA, notably the hotel industry (room attendants), the retail industry (checkout operators 
and salespersons), the call centre industry (call centre agents), the food industry (food production workers 
like packagers), and hospitals (nursing assistants and cleaners).3 AIAS and STZ have produced a monograph 
on Low-Wage Work in the Netherlands,4 like the monographs for the four other European countries5 
published by the RSF in 2008. Besides chapters on the debate in the Netherlands on low pay, on low-wage 
work and the economy and on Dutch labour market institutions and low-wage work, this Dutch monograph 
includes chapters on the ﬁ  ve industries.
1  For background see Solow, 2008.
2  Appelbaum et al, 2003.
3  From a Dutch viewpoint, partially other choices may have been conceivable, but the retail industry would anyway have been 
selected.
4  Salverda et al, 2008a. 
5  Denmark (DK): Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008a; France (FR): Caroli and Gautié, 2008; Germany (GE): Bosch and Weinkopf, 
2008; United Kingdom (UK): Lloyd et al, 2008.Page ● 10
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In a second research phase the results of the RSF Future of  Work in Europe project have been integrated 
in a wide-ranging international comparison, including the outcomes of Low-Wage America and more recent 
studies initiated by the RSF on wages and job quality in US industries. One of these studies covered the US 
retail industry, not represented in the original Low-Wage America publication.6 In early 2010, the international 
comparative project resulted in the major volume published by the RSF, Low-Wage Work in the Wealthy World.7
This AIAS Working Paper contains a substantially more elaborated version of the retail chapter than 
that included in the Low-Wage Work in the Netherlands monograph.8 Besides treating a number of isues more 
in detail, crucial information on the Dutch retail industry has been updated for the time period November 
2006 – June 2010. Moreover, as the author co-ordinated the European retail research group and ﬁ  nally 
contributed to the Europe – US comparison for the retail industry, including on comparative statistics, it 
also draws on information allowing to compare labour and labour market issues of the development of the 
retail industry in the six countries at stake -- although for most issues at stake such information has been 
gathered latest for 2007. 
The author bears sole responsibility for this text, but the underlying analyses and documentation are to 
a considerable extent result of a collective effort. The author likes to acknowledge a number of colleagues. 
Vyara Dimitrova, after being graduated at the University of Amsterdam on an interesting Master Thesis 
comparing labour markets in Dutch and Danish retail9, in November – December 2009 made a substan-
tial contribution by updating information for the time period between November 2006 and November 
2009. She not only delivered updated statistics but also described recent developments in competition and 
institutions in Dutch retailing, like in vocational training. The general comparative low-wage statistics are 
to a considerable extent based on the work of Wiemer Salverda. Kea Tijdens (research coordinator at the 
AIAS and scientiﬁ  c coordinator of the WageIndicator web-survey) contributed a number of calculations 
with WageIndicator data. In various stages, retail industry drafts have won from the comments of the (then) 
colleagues of STZ, Theo Bouwman, Arjen van Halem, Ria Hermanussen, Wim Sprenger, and Anja van de 
Westelaken; they participated in the Dutch project as well. Anja van de Westelaken also helped with research 
for the ﬁ  rst draft retail report. The same goes for the colleagues of the European retail research group, nota-
bly Dorothea Voss-Dahm (Institute for Work, Skills and Training (IAQ) at the University of Duisburg–Es-
sen), Geoff Mason (National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), London), Lars Esbjerg 
6  Carré et al, 2006;  Carré and Tilly, 2007.
7  Gautié and Schmitt, 2010.
8  Van Klaveren, 2008a.
9 Dimitrova,  2008.Page ● 11
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(Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University), and Jean-Baptiste Berry (Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs and INSEE, Paris). The intensive cooperation in the Europe – US comparative project, with Fran-
coise Carré (University of Massachusetts – Boston), Chris Tilly (University of California – Los Angeles) and 
Dorothea Voss-Dahm sharpened insights in the comparative position of Dutch retail and in the working of 
low-wage mechanisms. A workshop of the four researchers at the University of Massachusetts – Boston, in 
August 2007, proved particularly fruitful. Most recently, continued cooperation with Dorothea Voss-Dahm 
led to a detailed analysis of the role of the Youth Minimum Wage as an “exit option” for Dutch supermar-
ket chains, respectively of the “mini-jobs” performing a similar role in Germany.10 The Dutch part of this 
analysis built on the outcomes of a seminar with an invited audience of union representatives, employers 
and some expert organizations in the supermarket branch that Wiemer Salverda and the author organized 
at the AIAS in July 2008.11 Because of the many conﬁ  gurations of researchers involved in the calculations 
included in this report, we refer to this work mostly under the plural “authors’ calculations”.
Basically, this Working Paper should be regarded as a “source book”, accounting the results of over ﬁ  ve 
years of research into the retail industry and the sources used for that research. The reader should keep in 
mind that, although information on the Dutch retail industry has been gathered until mid-2010, the main 
focus was on contributing to the Low-Wage Work in the Netherlands monograph. 
1.2.  Firm strategies: high road and low road
Like in all ﬁ  ve industries included in the Future of  Work in Europe project, eight establishment case stud-
ies have been central in the Dutch retail part. The selection of the cases has been based on agreement in 
the international RSF retail research group. The aim was to select four cases each in two sub-sectors, in 
supermarkets and in consumer electronics retail, assumed to contrast in employment structures, products 
and services, institutional settings, and ﬁ  rm strategies, the latter especially in the ﬁ  eld of human resource 
management (HRM). As target occupations in these sub-sectors we chose the checkout operator (cashier) in 
the supermarkets and the sales clerk (sales person), showing and demonstrating merchandise, in consumer 
electronics retail. The other contrast chosen internationally was high versus low end market position, with 
the following as indicative yardsticks: product quality, service quality, price levels, and assortment offered. 
The role of the contrasts in the research design was to enable to relate variations in wages and job quality12 
10  Van Klaveren and Voss-Dahm, 2011.
11  Cf. Salverda, 2008c, 316-21.
12  In this Working Paper we use, in line with the use in the US – European research project, “job quality”, instead of “quality of 
work”, although the latter expression is more current in Europe.Page ● 12
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to differences in economic and institutional contexts as well as to differences in ﬁ  rm strategies. In addi-
tion to these international contrasts, some national contrasts were incorporated in the case study selection. 
These were: international / national ownership, high / low levels of process innovation, and tight / soft 
local labour markets. 
Firm strategies provide a crucial link between factors that may inﬂ  uence wages and job quality, in par-
ticular worker characteristics such as union density, collective bargaining coverage, employment contract, 
level of education and length of on-the-job training, tenure and ﬁ  rm size,13 and the outcomes for low-wage 
workers in terms of wages and job quality. In this respect the contrast “high versus low end market posi-
tion” deserves special attention. In the Future of Work in Europe project the “high road” versus “low road” 
distinction in ﬁ  rm strategies and modes of work organisation was a key element. This was connected with 
the debate about the possible existence of different ﬁ  rm strategies within comparable competitive environ-
ments and product and service markets, and about the opportunities that high-road market strategies may 
offer for enhancing work organisations and improving job quality. This debate, in which some of our US 
reviewers and colleagues have played major roles, concentrates on the beneﬁ  ts of new, non-Taylorist forms 
of work organisation. In this respect, the international inﬂ  uence of the Scandinavian experiences cannot be 
overestimated.14 When drafting the European Commission Green Paper Partnership for a New Organization of  
Work (1997), the main author drew considerably on these experiences. The green paper advocated a com-
bination of ﬂ  exicurity, security, and social dialogue in order to develop a high-road strategy for European 
ﬁ  rms. Even though there was no real policy follow-up to this EC initiative, research continued, and that 
allowed us to clarify the relations to be considered.
In the strand of literature dealing with organizational change, high-road market strategies are strongly 
associated with innovation, either in the ﬁ  eld of R & D or in work organization. The outcomes of a UK 
research project, claiming evidence from innovation-based models of change grounded in workplace part-
nership, may typify this: “The high road (….) demonstrated clear beneﬁ  ts in terms of competitiveness, 
employment and quality of working life”.15 High-road forms of organization are supposed to be competi-
tive in global markets, delivering better products faster, unleashing creativity, generating new knowledge, 
and promoting the convergence between improved competitiveness and improvements in job quality.16 The 
argument is that management practices labelled High Performance Work Systems (HPWS) generate supe-
13  See for an overview of data for the ﬁ  ve industries in the Netherlands: Van Klaveren 2008b, 138-9.
14 Deutsch,  2005.
15  UKWON Newsletter 6/2, 2001.
16  Huselid, 1995; Osterman, 1994; Totterdill et al, 2002.Page ● 13
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rior market performance because employees are spurred to greater efforts when they are offered conditions 
of relative autonomy, participation in work decisions, and different material and intrinsic rewards. These 
practices include functional ﬂ  exibility, working in self-directed teams, and investment in workers’ skills. The 
development of high-trust relations between managers, workers, and their representatives eventually leads 
to the “mutual gains enterprise”.17
The empirical evidence concerning the association of HPWS and related approaches with superior ﬁ  rm 
performance, however, is not unambiguous. Some US and UK studies found rather positive outcomes, but 
others showed more negative outcomes.18 Notably researchers from these two countries have suggested that 
the actual economic, social and institutional conditions may work to favour the dominance of the low-road 
path in most industries. In particular, they point to the weakening of organized labour and the weakness of 
shop-ﬂ  oor worker representation. We would add the growing importance of short-term shareholder value 
considerations and related constraints connected with the exposure to global market forces. These condi-
tions may also have a considerable impact on the effects of HPWS in terms of job quality, although here 
the picture is not univocally black.19 Also based on own research,20 we assume that negative effects like high 
work-related stress levels and feelings of job insecurity follow segmented patterns. Their incidence of such 
effects among low-skilled workers may be higher than among the high-skilled. The development of HPWS 
has diverted attention –-including that of researchers-- from the tendency to externalize employment, which 
is often related. By externalizing production, employers can avoid the trade-off between high performance 
and employment protection.21 Indeed, as Arne Kalleberg has pointed out, “Studies of HPWS have tended 
to neglect ﬂ  exible stafﬁ  ng strategies involving non-standard forms of employment”.22 As we will see, in 
particular in the retail industry the claim that a high-performance work system embodies a high-road ﬁ  rm 
strategies offering good job quality including long-term job security seems hard to substantiate. Ar least, 
differentiation between outcomes for various groups of workers seems justiﬁ  ed.
The high-road versus low-road distinction has been a key element in our research. However, ﬁ  elds of 
application, variables, and criteria differed between researchers and practitioners involved, partly depending 
on varying national backgrounds. In Low-Wage America the distinction is particularly used in the last chapter, 
where differences between smaller manufacturing establishments in central New York are analyzed. Derek 
17  Kochan and Osterman, 1994; see also Appelbaum and Batt, 1994, and Appelbaum et al, 2000.
18  Danford et al, 2005, 5.
19  Cf. Milkman, 1998; Freeman et al, 2000; Bauer, 2004.
20  Van Klaveren and Tom, 1995.
21  Altmann, 1994; Sprenger, 1995.
22  Kalleberg, 2001, 482.Page ● 14
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Jones and his co-authors characterize the observed ﬁ  rm strategies as high road if basic wages and employ-
ment policies place the establishment in the top tier of plants in the relevant labour market, with a no-layoff 
strategy and in general low turnover rates; moreover, the incidence of HPWS should be above average, im-
plying high levels of training, job rotation, multi-skilling, employee involvement, teamwork, employee stock 
ownership, and proﬁ  t sharing. Low-road strategies are sought in the opposite direction where “systems of 
performance evaluation and compensation (pay grades) are traditional and quite bureaucratic, and job lad-
ders have few rungs.”23 Most if not all such high-road criteria are accepted in Dutch research, but this seems 
more doubtful for some of the low-road yardsticks. Systems of job evaluation and grading in the CLAs, 
which may be bureaucratic, are regarded as elements of “high roads” by researchers and practitioners in 
the Netherlands, as they supposedly contribute to income security and shield the low-paid against arbitrary 
decisions. Job ladders with few rungs are also valued differently: researchers and unionists tend to recom-
mend such ladders as a means to attain a more equitable organization and a smaller gender wage gap. These 
examples show that, apart from universally acknowledged criteria, some yardsticks ask for a speciﬁ  c national 
(and maybe even industry-based) operationalization. Moreover, it seems to us that the concept of a ﬁ  rm 
strategy as an independent variable needs a deﬁ  nition and criteria of its own, independent from job quality.
Therefore, we differentiate between four aspects of ﬁ  rm strategies with respect to high and low roads, 
with job quality as the dependent variable:
  ● product market strategies: high-road strategies characterized by comparatively high value-added pro-
duction and servicing, aimed at distinctive and high-quality products and services as well ass more 
rapid innovation, versus low cost, low quality production and servicing as well as a slower pace of 
innovation;
  ● work organization: high-road, enhanced forms of work organization versus low-road organization 
based on traditional, strict divisions of labour, with outsourcing and offshoring of tasks and processes 
as a third distinction;
  ● human resource (HR) policies on recruitment, selection, stafﬁ  ng levels, training, contracts, outsourc-
ing, use of temp work agencies, labour turnover, sick leave, maternity and other leave arrangements, 
job quality, and ﬁ  ring; high-road if contributing to sustainable, enhanced forms of work organization 
as well as to job quality by, among other things, challenging workers’ skills and competences, limiting 
work pressure and health and safety risks, and offering ample training, career and “voice” (interest 
representation) opportunities;
23  Jones et al, 2003, 494.Page ● 15
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  ● the job quality of the target groups of workers, by which we refer to skill use, autonomy at work, work 
pressure, risks of work stress, health and safety, working time, wages and compensations, training and 
career prospects, job security, and “voice”.
In this setup, market and HR strategies / policies are the more dynamic aspects, while work organization 
is the restricted one. It is our conviction that mutual relations between these four aspects, as well as those 
with job quality, are often complex and rarely unambiguous. We are inclined to believe that the idea that ﬁ  rm 
strategies share robust common elements that lead to either a high road or a low road is often too simple to 
capture ﬁ  rm behaviour. Our study of the retail industry will deliver ample proof in this direction.
1.3.  Research design and methodology
This Working Paper is partly based on desk research, partly on expert interviews, and partly on estab-
lishment case studies. These case studies were carried out between March 2005 and September 2006. These 
were basically grounded in the international templates for the industry reports and the guidelines for inter-
views with management, employees (individual interviews and focus groups) and employee representatives 
that were developed cooperatively by the ﬁ  ve national teams for Denmark, France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands and that underlie all the country studies.24 These templates and guidelines 
were somewhat adapted to speciﬁ  c national and industry conditions. Starting from here, the research devel-
oped in three phases.
In the ﬁ  rst phase, exploratory desk research was combined with expert interviews to build up the story 
of the industry: the aim was to draw a comprehensive picture of the most signiﬁ  cant characteristics and 
trends in the industry and to relate them to the national economy and the national institutions. Information 
was gathered from topical research reports; from industry, subsector and ﬁ  rm reports; from statistics of 
Statistics Netherlands, from the Industrial and Product Boards, from the WageIndicator and from manage-
ment consultancies and university researchers, as well as from trade journals, union magazines, and related 
websites. Our observation of trends focused on changes in competitive conditions, in institutions, in ﬁ  rm 
strategies, and in low-wage employment and job quality. Already in September this phase resulted in a ﬁ  rst 
24  Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Jérome Gautié (France) and Karen Jaehrling (Germany) made major contributions to the 
international templates and guidelines.Page ● 16
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draft report on the Dutch retail industry.
In the second phase, eight cases were completed in each of the ﬁ  ve industries. In the retail industry, 
however, we met considerable problems in getting research access to establishments (stores). These prob-
lems were partly the result of conﬂ  icts in labour relations at the time of the research, although development 
in product markets also played a role. This diminished the enthusiasm for welcoming outsiders scrutiniz-
ing the industry. First, our research was just starting when the two supermarket CLAs expired on April 1, 
2004; negotiations between the social partners for new CLAs were cumbersome and did not result in a new 
agreement until June 2005. As the supermarket chains dominated the employers’ delegations in collective 
bargaining in retail at large, the deterioration of labour relations emanated to other sub-sectors too. In the 
autumn of 2005, labour relations were only slowly restored. Second, the supermarket price war initiated by 
Albert Heijn in autumn 2003 seriously hampered research access to notably supermarkets for a long time. 
Even simple orientation visits caused problems; repeatedly we were perceived either as union or as competi-
tors’ spies. Third, some consumer electronics chains withdrew earlier promises of access. 
Nevertheless, between April 2005 and September 2006 eight cases were completed, although, unfor-
tunately, not always with the ofﬁ  cial co-operation of ﬁ  rm headquarters. Six establishments studied carried 
the usual full range of products; the exceptions were the soft discount supermarket (SUP A) and the small 
electronic goods store, specialised in small household appliances (CER D). Most establishments cannot be 
located on the tips of the scale “low versus high end”, but this can hardly be attributed to our case selec-
tion: as we will explain, it has more to do with the blurring of “classical” distinctions in market strategies 
and business formats in both sub-sectors. On the other hand, we succeeded to include the three national 
contrasts (concerning ownership, process innovation, and labour market conditions) in our case studies 
fairly well. In total, 47 people were interviewed. In three cases, we interviewed individual workers in the 
target jobs, in four cases we worked with focus groups of shop-ﬂ  oor workers, and in one case we did both.Page ● 17
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Scheme 1 gives an overview of the most important “hard” characteristics of the retail cases.
Scheme 1. Overview Dutch retail cases
Supermarkets Consumer Electronics retail
SUP A SUP B SUP C SUP D CER A CER B CER C CER D
market share NL 5.5% 1.2%  1.8% 7% 11% 7% 2% 3%
























84 87 95 31 93 22 16 10
sales surface
(sq mtrs)
880 1,200 1,400 500 4,500 1,000 900 300
share pt (hc) 86% 89% 85% 84% 20% 36% 38% 40%
share female (hc) 74%*) 88%*) 83%*) 81% *) 14% 4% 13% 0%
share target jobs 
(hc)
45-51% 48-57% ca. 59% 52% 51% 55% 63% 70%
hc = headcount
*) = share of  regular full-time/part-time workforce
The chains owning or franchising the stores in which the supermarket cases have been carried out in 
2005 had a combined market share of about 16%, while the consumer electronics chains had about 23%. 
We should acknowledge that our sample is very small: 8 stores out of 767 in the eight chains covered here, 
and out of about 9,000 supermarkets and consumer electronics outlets in the country as a whole. With so 
small a sample, we must be very careful in generalizing our case results. Especially because of the compara-
tively small sample size, industry and sub-sector information was of considerable importance.
Before proceeding with the interviews we visited the store in question. We tried to gather essential 
facts and ﬁ  gures about it and about the parent chain. Our interviews with managers (general and Human 
Resource) focused on the economic context and ﬁ  rm strategy, work organisation and job design, hiring 
and ﬁ  ring, skills and training, and wages and labour costs, including –if relevant—outsourcing and use of 
temp agency work. The interviews with individual employees and focus groups concentrated on personal 
characteristics, work organisation and job design, job quality, wages, skills, training and career prospects, 
job satisfaction, and collective action. Similar topics were discussed with works councillors and trade union 
ofﬁ  cials. In these interviews, we paid special attention to employee representation, collective bargaining, Page ● 18
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and the perspectives of the parent ﬁ  rm, the establishment, and the employees. Wherever possible, we made 
speciﬁ  c arrangements concerning reporting on results to interviewees and providing them with other forms 
of feedback.
In the third phase of the Dutch research project, the results of the case studies were integrated into 
the draft industry report resulting from the ﬁ  rst phase. Since over a year had passed, we incorporated 
information on the primary changes in economic and institutional contexts and ﬁ  rm strategies, together 
with more recent industry statistics. In this phase information was included gathered until December 2006. 
Agreements on feedback to unions and other experts consulted were fulﬁ  lled, and wherever relevant their 
comments were integrated. As indicated in section 1.1, the author subsequently took part in the Europe – 
US comparison for the retail industry. In this complex and varying research trajectory, the most essential 
information has been updated until the end of June 2010. 
Chapter 2 presents a general overview of the Dutch retail industry, including sections on employment 
(2.2), competitive pressures (2.3), institutions and labour relations (2.4), and external and internal labour 
markets 2.5), ending up in a section on wages (2.6). Chapter 3 deals, in the same order of sections, with our 
ﬁ  rst sub-sector, the supermarkets, Chapter 4 with the second sub-sector, consumer electronics retail. Chap-
ter 5 contains a summarizing evaluation.Page ● 19
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2.  The retail industry
2.1. Retail:  introduction
The regular customer in a Dutch supermarket usually encounters a rather segmented work organisation 
in the store: a lineup of checkout operators, most of them female; at various spots in the store, shelf-stack-
ers, mostly boys, who are busy with physical distribution; and in a glass room or customer greeting area near 
the entry, a gentleman in a suit, the store manager. The visitor to a Dutch electronics store gets a picture of 
a completely different organisation: sales clerks who are nearly well-dressed gents, and all carrying more or 
less the same tasks, and sometimes a few ladies of a similar kind.
A closer look at the reality of the shop ﬂ  oor reveals a slightly different picture. Both WageIndicator data 
and case study evidence reveal that in the supermarkets those in the target occupation, the checkout opera-
tors, make up about half of the head-count supermarket workforce. Yet they are not the only ones carrying 
out checkout tasks. About one-third of the shelf-stackers occasionally also perform checkout duties, while a 
slightly smaller share of the checkout operators also fulﬁ  l shelf-stacking duties.25 This overlap in duties often 
happens informally, however, and is sometimes hardly perceived by the store management. This kind of 
functional ﬂ  exibility (or multiskilling) is ﬂ  ourishing under pressure: it is almost inevitable if the shop-ﬂ  oor 
organisation is pressed and tight ﬁ  nancial and personnel standards do not allow idle hours. Such ﬂ  exibility 
was never really promoted by the HR policies of the supermarket chains. In the late 1990s Albert Heijn took 
some steps toward promoting teamwork and functional ﬂ  exibility in its supermarkets,26 but in 2005-06 it 
looked that this attempt had not survived the supermarket price war. Now that the supermarket chains are 
rediscovering good customer service as a major competitive edge and labour supply problems seem growing 
and already acute, high roads in HR strategy and work organization will get a new change. However, HR 
management in retail generally seems weak and not very responsive to changes in the economic and social 
context.
25  Authors’ calculations, based on interviews with FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cials, case study evidence, and analysis of 
WageIndicator textboxes (September 2004 – September 2006).
26 Horbeek,  2003.Page ● 20
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From the employees’ point of view, the situation in consumer electronics outlets seems much more 
comfortable. In their daily functioning, sales clerks, accounting for 50 to 60% of head-count workforce, 
have built-in functional ﬂ  exibility. Their professional attitudes often inspire them to stand in for colleagues, 
a practice strengthened by the importance of (higher) sales not only for the store but for their personal in-
comes. As in many professional organizations, however, the boundaries of such ﬂ  exibility are often unclear; 
for the sales clerks in our case studies, ﬂ  exibility repeatedly led to high workload and work-related stress. 
Moreover, the wages of electronics retail clerks are strongly dependent on bonuses and compensations, and 
the wage ﬂ  oor offered by the CLA is low. As far as we could trace, the HR policies of the main consumer 
electronics retailers hardly play a role in protecting their employees against excessive ﬂ  exibility. These poli-
cies remain rather weak and mainly concentrate on training aspects.
2.2. Retail:  employment
By the end of 2008, according to preliminary data of Statistics Netherlands the Dutch retail industry 
as a whole27 employed 836,000 persons (headcount), of which 702,000 employees (wage earners, 84%) and 
134,000 employers and cooperating family members.28 Jointly they made up 9.3% of total employment in 
the Netherlands, whereas the employees represented 8.9% of those in wage and salary employment (both 
calculated headcount).29 Table 1, containing comparable ﬁ  gures for retailing in the six countries, shows 
that in 2005 the share of retail in total employment (again headcount, by then 9.0%) in the Netherlands 
was lower than the shares in the UK and the US, slightly higher than the German share and substantially 
higher than the shares in Denmark and France. The picture remains basically the same if calculated in FTEs 
(hours-count, second row). (For the tables, see Appendix.).
After World War II, the retail industry in the Netherlands showed an impressive growth. Between 1947 
and 2008 the country’s total workforce about doubled but the retail workforce more than tripled. Remark-
ably, the share of employers and cooperating family members in retailing grew between 1947 and 1960, 
from 35 to 41%, but from then on a long-term demise of this share begun, to a low of 14.3% in 2003 (Ta-
ble 3). Whereas in 1947 the share of retail employees in the total amount of wage-earners was 4.6%, that 
27  Retail and repair, former NACE industry class 52, since 2008 NACE industry class 47.
28  CBS, Statline. The preliminary numbers presented by HBD, the Industrial Board, in recent years differ considerably from 
those of Statistics Netherlands; for 2008, HBD registered total retail employment of 772,000, of which 658,700 employees 
and 113,300 entrepreneurs and co-operating family members. HBD (2009) mentions for 2009 a retail workforce totalling 
767,600.
29 CBS,  Statline.Page ● 21
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share grew to 8.9-9.0% in 2000-2008.30 In 1947 there were no supermarkets in the Netherlands yet; by 1960 
we estimated supermarkets to have 6,600 employees, growing to 58,000 in 1975 and to 124,000 in 1990. 
Consumer electronics stores also expanded. Whereas the 1947 and 1960 Censuses counted respectively 800 
and 2,100 employees in these stores, we estimated their numbers to increase to 6,000 in 1975 and 16,000 in 
1990.31
From the early 1990s until 2002, Dutch retail experienced a decade of prosperity, with continuous 
growth in sales and employment as well as substantial proﬁ  t margins. The Industrial Board for the Retail 
Trade, Hoofdbedrijfschap Detailhandel (HBD), even characterized the 1990s as the “golden years”.32 Supermar-
kets and consumer electronics retail continued to grow noticeably. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of 
supermarket employees increased by 63%, that of wage earners in consumer electronics by 42%, whereas 
total retail employment grew by 27%, and wage and salary employment in retail by 32%. The growth of 
retail at large was stronger than in the US, Denmark, and France.33 The increasing numbers of wage earners 
–-in particular part-time workers-- were accountable for that growth. From 2005 on, however, according to 
Statistics Netherlands the self-employed and cooperating family members category showed a considerable 
growth in both absolute and relative terms, till 134,000 or 16.0% of the total retail workforce (headcount) 
in 2008 (Table 3).34 Table 1 (third row) displays that in 2005 across the six countries the Dutch share of 
employers and co-operating family members was comparatively high; at the time it was only surpassed by 
the Danish share, equalled by the German share, and considerably higher than the shares in France, the US 
and in particular the UK..35 In particular, the Dutch and German employment structures in retailing show 
remarkable similarities.36
Table 1 also shows that in all six countries under scrutiny the share of part-time employment in retailing 
is much larger than in total employment, varying from shares 1.5 times as much (the Netherlands) to over 
twice as much (Denmark). Yet, even against the backdrop of the relatively large share of part-timers in the 
Dutch economy the dominance of part-time work in the Dutch retail industry remains striking. In 2008, 
30  Authors’ calculations based on CBS, Census 1947, Part 10B; CBS, Statline.
31  See Van Klaveren, 2008b, Table 4.1, also for sources.
32  HBD, 2005e, 5. It has to be noted that even in the 1990s and more pronounced in the 2000s the average margins (return on 
sales) in Dutch retail seem relatively low in international perspective, at least compared with Germany, France and in particular 
the UK (personal communication with authors of RSF national retail chapters; Burt et al, 2008).
33    Authors’ calculations based on data from CBS, Statline, and EU KLEMS.
34 HBD  ﬁ  gures do not show this growth, and indicate for 2006-2008 a near-constant size of the self-employed and cooperating 
family members’ category of about 113,000.
35  Based on EU KLEMS data, in 2005 12.1% on FTE basis. Table 3 shows that Statistics Netherlands ﬁ  gures on headcount basis 
for 2005 allowed to calculate a 14.4% share of employers and co-operating family members, rapidly increasing to 16.0% in 
2008.
36  Cf. Van Klaveren and Voss-Dahm, 2011.Page ● 22
Maarten van Klaveren
the share of part-time jobs in retail employment in our country reached a record 71.0%.37 The FTE retail 
workforce was set for 2008 at 392,100, 55.8% of the number of headcount employees in the industry. Tabel 
6A indicates that the retail FTE/headcount ratio already went down by 4.5%points between 1995 and 2000, 
followed by a decline of 5.2%points from 2000-2008,38 conﬁ  rming the continuous growth of the share of 
part-time jobs. Yet, in the 2000s this growth pattern was not linear. Table 5 reveals that in 2002-2004 the 
yearly decrease in FTE employment was (much) stronger than that in employment calculated in headcounts. 
In 2001 and 2002 headcount wage and salary employment growth in retail had slowed down, while in 2002 
employment measured in FTEs already fell slightly; yet, calculated the decline in employment in 2003 cal-
culated in FTEs was with nearly 6% substantial and came as a shock to retail industry organisations. 2004 
witnessed a further decline in wage and salary employment, of 2.6% in FTEs and 2.0% in headcounts. Over 
2005 the employee workforce grew slightly in FTEs, in headcounts the increase was 1.3%, implying a con-
tinuous increase of the share of part-time employment.
According to the ofﬁ  cial statistics, 2006 and 2007 saw a very strong recovery in wage employment in re-
tailing (besides the substantial growth of self-employed and cooperating family members mentioned above), 
with 3.0% respectively 3.8% growth in FTEs and even twice 5.0% yearly growth in headcount employment. 
Following these statistics, in 2006 the headcount employment increase about equalled the increase of total 
retail sales, while in 2007 it surpassed sales growth by over 1%. Both are unlikely outcomes as ﬁ  rms will be 
hesitating to hire new staff when recovering from a dip. We assume that the employment growth registered 
between 2005 and 2007 was only partly “real”, and partly has to be traced back to changes in the statistical 
deﬁ  nition of employment. Most likely, auxiliary workers employed less than 12 hours a week have been 
included more consistently in the statistics.39 An indication was that in 2006 FTE employment in retail grew 
by 10,900, against 31,400 headcount, implying an additional FTE/headcount ratio of less than 35%; the 
corresponding numbers for 2007 were 13,900 and 33,200, or a 42% ratio. The developments at sub-sector 
level conﬁ  rm the likelihood of an improved counting of short part-time jobs: the largest headcount employ-
ment increases in 2005-2007 took place in sub-sectors with substantial shares of part-time workers, that is, 
in supermarkets and department stores (36,900), clothing and textile sales (13,400), and pharmacy, perfume 
and cosmetics sales (8,200) (see Tables 6A and 6B). The statistics for 2008 and 2009 suggest a return to 
logical patterns. In 2008, retail sales growth in the Netherlands ﬂ  attened to 2.5%,40 against an employment 
37 CBS,  Statline.
38  Authors’ calculations based on CBS, Statline.
39  Our repeated efforts to get an explanation at this point from Statistics Netherlands failed.
40  CBS, Statline; HBD, 2009.Page ● 23
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increase of 1.2% (FTE) respectively 1.1% (headcount). Statistics Netherlands preliminary noted an increase 
in employment that fell down to 0.6% (FTE) and 0.4% (headcount). The 2008 and 2009 employment ﬁ  gures 
indicate a slight decrease in the share of part-time employment in these years.
As Tables 6A and 6B show, the supermarket sub-sector is by far the largest of the retail sub-sectors. In 
December 2008, the supermarkets employed 242,800 workers headcount (103,600 FTEs41): 34.5% of total 
retail employment, calculated headcount, or 26.4% of all FTEs in retailing. In the supermarkets part-time 
employment is even more widespread than in retail as a whole, and the share of part-time until quite recently 
grew. Detailed ﬁ  gures (not shown) indicate that the FTE/headcount ratio for the supermarkets fell drasti-
cally from 49% in 2002 to 41.3% in 2007, before rising to 42.7% in 2008. Thus, individual Dutch super-
markets –-though in international comparison on average rather small-- have a considerable workforce: in 
2004-06 the average headcount number of workers in the stores of the national food chains varied between 
50 and 115. Moreover, a much higher share of supermarket workers is working in shifts than in other retail 
branches.42 As said, our estimate based on both WageIndicator data and case study evidence was that those in 
the main target occupation, the checkout operators, over-all account for about half of the headcount super-
market workforce (42-45% in FTEs). In the four case supermarkets the headcount shares of the checkout 
operators were between 45 and 59% of the respective staff. Managing the often complex co-operation and 
working hours’ patterns of such a workforce is a major challenge for supermarket management.
Our second sub-sector, consumer electronics retail, is much smaller. In December 2008 the sub-sector 
employed 22,000 employees, or 3.1% of the retail workforce in headcount, and 16,500 FTEs (4.2%). Here, 
the incidence of part-time employment is rather limited. With 75%, the FTE/headcount ratio in 2008 of 
consumer electronics retail was the second highest in the retail industry. We estimated that those in the 
target occupation in this sub-sector, the sales clerks, account for 50 to 60% of the headcount workforce in 
consumer electronics; in the four case studies their shares ﬂ  uctuated between 51 and 71%. 
The ﬁ  gures presented for supermarkets and consumer electronics retail underline their different em-
ployment structures and stafﬁ  ng strategies. This was the main reason why these two sub-sectors in the Future 
of  Work in Europe project were chosen as a contrast within retailing.
41  CBS, Statline (Kerncijfers detailhandel).
42  According to WageIndicator data, in 2007 and January-June 2008 73% of respondents from supermarkets worked in shifts, 
against  39% working in furniture and consumer electronics stores, 46% in specialized clothing stores, 48% in clothing and 
footwear stores, 51% in DIY stores, and 17% in “other”; the average for retail was 55%.Page ● 24
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2.3.  Retail: competitive pressures
We identiﬁ  ed four main competitive pressures in the 2000s inﬂ  uencing employment, wages and job 
quality in Dutch retail: 
  ● the slowdown or even decline of disposable income per capita growth, at the backdrop of low con-
sumer spending;
  ● price wars and the spread of discounting;
  ● economies of scale and deregulation of zoning regulations and opening hours;
  ● the development of supply-chain management systems, linked up with front- and back-end innova-
tions.
In the next sections, we will show basically the working of these pressures in Dutch retailing. The reader 
should keep in mind that ﬁ  rm strategies are the essential link between these pressures on the one hand and 
wages and job quality on the other. 
2.3.1. Consumer  spending
Consumption patterns affect the way the retail industry operates and organizes its labour force. The 
industry in the short run has to adapt to largely predictable peak-demand hours and in the long run to less 
predictable cyclical effects on incomes as well as market saturation. Since the early 1980s, real disposable 
household income in the Netherlands has fallen more often and more steeply than Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), more also than in other developed countries. Private consumption per capita has lagged in com-
parison with the ﬁ  ve other countries except Denmark, particularly in the 1980s. By 2006, the Dutch share 
of private consumption in the GDP (46%) was substantially lower than in the US, where it constituted 70% 
of GDP, but also lower than in Denmark (48%), Germany (55%), France (57%), and the UK (61%).43 Such 
differences in per capita consumption partly explain international differences in retail employment levels44, 
though differences in productivity also matter (see below). McKinsey consultants, in a 2007 report for the 
Dutch administration comparing productivity of the Netherlands and US economies, pointed at the mecha-
nism that productivity growth in retail will be limited if consumer spending grows slowly. The American 
consultancy stipulated that in 1998-2004 US personal per capita consumption grew by 3.5% yearly, against 
only 0.9% for consumption in the Netherlands – obviously important in explaining that Dutch retail pro-
43  Salverda et al, 2010. In 2005, the share of consumer spending of food was 13.6% in the Netherlands, lower than in France 
(16.9%) and Germany (15.0%) but higher than in the UK (12.7%) (cf. Kremer, 2008, 27).
44  Glyn et al, 2007.Page ● 25
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ductivity increase (0.8%) came to lag widely behind that of US retailing (4.7%) in the same period of time.45 
We may conclude that the low consumer-spending share of the Netherlands reﬂ  ects consumer attitudes 
affecting the way the domestic retail industry, in particular food retailing, functions.46 Over time, low-con-
sumption patterns may have led to a greater focus on low prices47 and low costs and, in turn, low wages, 
small assortments, and low quality of products and service provision. In the Netherlands the combination 
of rather small-scale supply structures with the prevailing low-price orientation of majorities of customers 
has led to tough competitive conditions with price competition as pervasive feature.48
In the 2000s the mechanism set out here once more affected employment and job quality in retailing. 
The period of abundant retail growth declined in 2002, initially because of the slowdown in disposable 
consumer income growth and hesitating consumer spending, inﬂ  uenced by restrictive government poli-
cies. Retail sales growth halved, from 6.3% in 2001 to 3.1% in 2002. The consumer trust index of Statistics 
Netherlands showed the crisis in consumers’ trust: the index fell from –1 for 2001 to –20 in 2002, and then 
to an all-time low of –35 for 2003. The volume index of consumer spending (2001=100) still went up in 
2002 (101.0), but fell back in 2003 to 100.4.49 It took until the second half of 2005 before consumer spend-
ing started to grow again, and this recovery initially concentrated on durable consumer goods, not on food. 
From May 2006, food sales ﬁ  nally expanded: compared to May 2005, supermarket sales grew by 7%, of 
which volume effects accounted for 6%points.50 Table 16 shows that in the next three years supermarket 
sales continued to grow, with sales each quarter surpassing those of the corresponding quarter of the year 
before. In the course of 2009 growth slowed down. The third quarter of 2009 was the ﬁ  rst quarter in four 
years with diminishing price ﬁ  gures, with only volumes recovering strongly in the fourth quarter. As a result, 
supermarket sales grew in 2009 by slightly over 2%.
2.3.2.  Price wars and the spread of discounting
In 2002-03, the Dutch retail industry was confronted with more than ailing consumer spending. The 
worldwide expansion plans of the largest Netherlands-based retailer, Ahold, ignited a major price war in the 
Dutch supermarket branch — although this war ﬁ  t in the pattern of low-road market strategies that already 
45  McKinsey 2007, 9-10.
46  See in particular Kremer, 2008, for the interplay between the low-price orientation of Dutch consumers and supermarket as-
sortment and servicing in the Netherlands. Kremer, former Communications Director of the Laurus chain, grounds his attack 
on most Dutch food chains on their alleged “price fetishism”. See also Baltesen, 2004b.
47  Eurostat research found for 2007 that the price level of food products in the Netherlands was about 10% below the EU level, 
and even lower compared to neighbouring countries (cf. Kremer, 2008, 23).
48  Cf. Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 144-5.
49  CBS (Statistics Netherlands), Statline.
50  CBS, Statline, Maandstatistiek detailhandel; CBS press sheets, 14-07-2006, 22-12-2006.Page ● 26
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prevailed in Dutch food retail. Albert Heijn (AH), the large Dutch supermarket chain of Ahold, had to 
generate the huge amounts of ﬁ  nance needed for the megalomaniac ambitions of its CEO. In the winter of 
2002, decreasing consumer spending on food in particular turned against AH, as many consumers regarded 
its stores as too expensive. They switched to cheaper alternatives, such as offered by the German hard-
discounters Aldi and Lidl. Shortly afterwards, in February 2003, it was revealed that Ahold’s international 
expansion had partly been built on fraud and sales-boosting practices in the United States, Latin America, 
and Scandinavia. Banks and stock markets reacted strongly. Finally, AH was freed from its role as cash gen-
erator because the CEO was forced to quit. In October 2003 the ﬁ  rm lowered the prices of 1,200 top-brand 
articles to a maximum of 35%, starting a price war that went far beyond the usual price skirmishes in super-
market retailing and without precedent in this branch.51 AH went on until October 2006, with 13 consecu-
tive rounds of discounts, before announcing the end of this war. By then, AH had reached its main goals: 
mid-market positioning, a regained market share, and a record proﬁ  t-margin level. In the three years that 
followed, competition in the supermarket sub-sector continued to be fought on price, but that ﬁ  ght included 
less articles and took the form of offering occasional bargains and baits (See for more details section 3.1).
Under the combined pressure of low or even lacking disposable income per capita growth and price 
wars, total retail sales in the Netherlands fell by 2.1% in 2003, 2.2% in 2004, and 0.4% in 2005. In 2003, 
negative volume effects dominated (a decline of 2.3%), but in the next two years price falls took the lead. 
Consumer food prices still boomed in 2001-2002 with 10%, rose by 1.6% in 2003, but deﬂ  ated by 1.9% 
in 2004 and 0.6% in 2005. Statistics Netherlands suggested that by October 2006 without supermarket 
price war food would have been 8.2% more expensive.52 Anyway, lower food prices mitigated the inﬂ  ation 
rate in 2003-2005 and helped to keep Dutch inﬂ  ation in these years 2%points under the EU average.53 
The effects of the supermarket price war were not limited to food retailing. It was the catalyst for Dutch 
consumers’ preference for low prices, and on the sellers’ side encouraged the practice of discounting for a 
range of goods, from bicycles and kitchens to do-it-yourself (DIY) products. Consumer behaviour, often 
characterized by lack of time for shopping, was paradoxically enough reacting much stronger than before 
on discounts and baits.54 As of November 2005, ofﬁ  cial monthly statistics showed continuous food price 
increases, albeit small, indicating that the epicentre of the storm was left. In combination with consumer 
food spending picking up, this led to a renewed boom in supermarket sales: 2006 showed a rise of 5.2% 
51  Cf. Kremer, 2008, 20, concluding that this war led to huge “collateral damage”.
52  CBS, Statline, Maandstatistiek detailhandel.
53 Baltesen,  2006b.
54  De Volkskrant, 04-11-2003; Baltesen, 2005b; Quix and Hemmer, 2006. Our calculations show a slightly lesser loss, of about 
one quarter (cf. Table 17).Page ● 27
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compared to 2005 (cf. Table 5).
The 2003-2006 supermarket price war has had a strong impact on competitive structures, proﬁ  tability, 
employment, wages and job quality in Dutch retail as a whole. As we will treat more elaborately in Chapter 3, 
in the ﬁ  rst half of the 2000s the competitive structure in the supermarket sub-sector went through impor-
tant changes. The major loser of the price war has been the composite Laurus chain, in 1998 at par with AH 
and cherishing a market share of 28%. Mainly because of badly organised efforts to reposition its Konmar 
formula, Laurus lost a quarter of that share already before 2002.55 In 2004, Groupe Casino took a 51% ma-
jority share, but this French retail giant was not able to prevent Laurus from getting rid of another one-third 
of its market share56, before it was dismantled in mid-2006 when two of its three supermarket chains were 
sold to AH and family company Jumbo Supermarkets. The ﬁ  nal act in the dismantling process took place 
in November 2009, when Laurus sold the activities of its remaining Super de Boer chain to Jumbo.57 In 
particular through the acquisition of 177 Super de Boer stores,58 Jumbo has grown into a major contender, 
owning nearly 350 establishments, even though AH remains on top with over 750 establishments and C1000 
remains in second position, controlling about 450 supermarkets. In 2010, Jumbo is expected to have a major 
job in reconstructing the ailing Super de Boer stores into Jumbo supermarkets.59 
Finally “hard discounters”, notably the German-based Lidl (Schwarz Group) and Aldi, were successful 
in transferring their format in the Dutch market during the supermarket price war. In the Netherlands the 
market share of hard discounters, besides these two ﬁ  rms including a domestic Dutch retail chain using the 
same “big box” store format,60 increased between 2002 and 2006 from 16.5% to 19.5% (Chapter 3). Re-
cently, along with the growth of the Wal-Mart “big box” chain, grocery retail has witnessed the international 
expansion of Aldi and Lidl.61 As we will explain in the next section, the format of large discount grocers is 
well placed to take advantage of economies of scale and of Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) for supply chain magement and optimal staff scheduling. Nevertheless, under the conditions prevail-
ing in the Netherlands in notably 2003-2006, the advance of the hard discounters was just one expression 
of the predominance of “low road” management strategies, with the main supermarket chains in the Dutch 
55 Rutte,  2002.
56  Baltesen, 2005g, 2006c; Tamminga, 2006; Klok, 2006.
57  Haighton, 2009; Van Lent and Voormolen, 2009.
58  The original deal included 300 supermarkets (of which 176 franchised), but Jumbo re-sold 80 stores to Schuitema/C1000 and 
43 to various other food chains, all members of the Superunie buyers’ group.
59  Haighton, 2009; Van Lent and Voormolen, 2009. 
60  Generally, hard discounting has been perceived as characterized by low pricing and minimal service levels, especially by the 
need for customers to unpack cardboard boxes themselves (“big box stores”). Yet, as will see in Chapter 3, in the Netherlands 
in particular between 2003 and 2006 the traditional distinctions between “servicers” and “soft” and “hard” discounters be-
came blurred.
61  In the 2007 ranking of world’s largest grocery retailers, Aldi had raised to the 6th rank (2005: 15th) and the Schwarz Group 
(Lidl) to the 8th (2005: 14th). Sources: 2005: Burt et al, 2008, Table 1; 2007: Van Klaveren et al, 2010.Page ● 28
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market focusing on lowering prices, reducing labour costs, and increasing the numerical and functional ﬂ  ex-
ibility of labour. These strategies were deﬁ  nitely not limited to discounters.
2.3.3.  Economies of scale and deregulation
In the retail trade two kinds of (economies of) scale can be distinguished: scale on the sales side and 
scale on the supply (purchasing) side. The position of the retail employees in the target jobs is most directly 
inﬂ  uenced by economies of scale concerning sales.
In 2005, just over half of the retail workforce (51%) of the Netherlands was employed in ﬁ  rms with 
100 and more employees. In 1980 this share of large-scale ﬁ  rms was only 27%, in 1990 36%.62 The long-
term increase in scale has been clear, in food and non-food retailing alike. In food retailing, the average store 
surface grew from 35 square meters (m2) in 1968 to 172 m2 in 2004; the comparable ﬁ  gures for non-food 
retailing were 85 m2 in 1968 and 253 m2 in 2004;63 the overall retail average in 2004 was 223 m2,, which by 
2008 had increased to 243 m2.64 In 2000-2005 the employment share of retail establishments with 100 and 
more employees increased by 2.9%points, and between 2005 and 2008 by another 2.2%points; in both pe-
riods of time, this went at the cost of both the medium-sized (10-99 employees) and small stores (less than 
10 employees). Concentration in particular affected small establishments in 2004, when employment (head-
count) in this category went down by 21,900. In December 2005, 24.5% of all women in the retail industry 
worked in establishments of 10 or less employees (men: 23.8%), 24.3% in medium-sized establishments 
(men: 25.0%) and 51.1% in establishments with 100 and more employees (men: 51.2%). 65 
We were able to estimate the lower quartile (LQ), median and upper quartile (UQ) employment sizes of 
Dutch retail ﬁ  rms for 2002: LQ 3 employees; median 6 employees, and UQ 10 or more employees. Table 1 
shows that this size distribution was about equal that in Danish retail; the lower quartile size and the median 
about equalized the French, the British and the American values, but the French, German and in particular 
the British UQ sizes were substantially higher – in other words, the stores in the category “large” were much 
larger in France (hypermarkets!), Germany and the UK.. 
Next to the comparatively small national market, a major explanation for the small scale of Dutch 
retail establishments can be found in the detailed retail planning system, based on a functional hierarchy 
of shopping centres, as designed and prescribed by the Dutch authorities after the Second World War. 
The ﬁ  rst goal of this ﬁ  ne-meshed retail infrastructure was to supply consumers with daily products within 
62  HBD, 1999, 2006b.
63  Evers et al, 2005, 31.
64  HBD, 2009, 17.
65 CBS,  Statline.Page ● 29
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walking distance of their residences, the second to preserve city centres. In the early 1970s, the national 
government published zoning and planning guidelines to restrict retail developments in urban peripher-
ies (PDVs), widened in 1993 with guidelines allowing concentrated, large-scale retail locations (GDVs). 
Due to the restrictive   PDV/GDV policy, the spatial retail structure is less decentralised than in most other 
Western European countries.66 In the 1980s, ﬁ  erce competition grew for locations to start new stores, nota-
bly supermarkets, within these limitations. Nevertheless, Dutch-based retailers continued to support these 
limitations, in contrast with property developers and (potential) new-entry international retailers like French 
Carrefour and Belgian Colruyt. Yet, the most outspoken pressure toward liberalization came from interna-
tional consultancies and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In 1997, McKinsey consultants argued that the 
PDV/GDV policy in spite of the 1993 liberalisation frustrated the economic performance of Dutch retail-
ing and claimed that the Netherlands was lagging behind France, Germany, the UK and the USA in terms 
of retail productivity. This line of reasoning was also carried forward in working papers of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and by a deregulation working party of the same Ministry. On behalf of promoting 
dynamism in the retail sector, the working party recommended the decentralisation of planning authority to 
provincial (regional) and local levels.67 
While in the late 1990s and early 2000s governments of various European countries took refuge to 
restrictive regulations for retailing,68 in the Netherlands the political pressure for deregulation continued. 
In anticipating more liberal policies, property developers even constructed new retail formats, like factory 
outlet centres and “mega malls” outside cities.69 The preliminary government viewpoint on spatial planning, 
published in 2002, broadly promoted deregulation. Following this line, in 2005 the governmental Spatial 
Planning Bureau (RPB) suggested that the coming of mega malls, “meadow stores” (hypermarkets) and 
“big box boulevards” was inevitable.70 However, in the meantime the political tide had already changed 
towards re-regulation. The general association of retail employers, Council Netherlands Retail (RND, Raad 
Nederlandse Detailhandel), and the association of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in retail, more 
precisely their lobby organisation National Shop Council (NWR, Nationale Winkelraad), united in arguing 
against the deregulation proposals; on this behalf, they even created the Dutch Retail Platform (Platform De-
tailhandel Nederland, currently Detailhandel Nederland). The Platform argued in favour of the continuation of 
66  Spierings, 2006, 603-4.
67  Evers, 2002, 110-1. Earlier simulations of the effects of liberalization of shop opening hours by the Dutch Central Planning 
Bureau (CPB) delivered rather moderate outcomes: an increase of 15,000 jobs (2.8%); 0.2% growth of sales volume, and 
moderate effects on turnover and price (CPB, 1995). 
68  Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2001.
69  Spierings, 2006, 606.
70  Evers et al, 2005.Page ● 30
Maarten van Klaveren
the existing retail hierarchy, with the careful addition of some new formats, and emphasized the importance 
of maintaining shopping infrastructures in inner cities.71 The Industrial Board even held a plea for continu-
ing the PDV policy while abolishing the GDV guidelines.72 
In 2004 the government view on spatial planning73 persisted to the principle of rough zoning guidelines, 
delegating the formulation of speciﬁ  c guidelines for retailing to the 12 provinces. In 2006 the provincial au-
thorities jointly designed guidelines for the retail industry that were rather restrictive. The provinces argued 
that retail dynamics should only be allowed to take place in new (peripheral) retail centres if no suitable sites 
would be available inside or near existing shopping centres. When planning a large-scale retail location, an 
impact study should be needed to prove that the existing retail structure would not being disrupted.74 These 
guidelines signalled the return to rather restrictive planning, aiming at preserving city centres in particular,75 
although, as the old guidelines have indeed formally been abolished, there is no speciﬁ  c regulation of large 
outlets left.76 Most likely this outcome is not at odds with prevailing consumer preferences: Dutch con-
sumers’ propensity to accept a massive development towards hypermarkets and similar large retail formats 
seems rather low. For example, in a 2006 survey among 500 consumers, over 60% said not to expect to do 
their shopping in hypermarkets.77
In Tables 1 and 2 we present a number of indicators for the performance of the Dutch retail trade that 
allow for international comparison. A major yardstick is gross added value.78 The comparable (PPP con-
verted) value added per hour found for Dutch retail in 2005, €23.34, was considerably lower than the very 
high French retail productivity, somewhat lower than the German, UK and US ﬁ  gures, but higher than the 
ﬁ  gure for Denmark (Table 1). If one includes selling space (store surface) also into the comparison, Dutch 
retail productivity seems comparatively low. In 2002, the Netherlands had the largest selling space per inhab-
itant in the EU15 (nearly 1.5 square metre per inhabitant), leading to the lowest retail turnover per m2 store 
71  Platform, 2001. OECD chief economist Olivier Blanchard has argued along the same lines. In his view, the existing regulation 
of retail establishments in Europe may prevent ﬁ  rms like Wal-Mart pushing small companies out of the market and may mean 
a 20% inefﬁ  ciency effect compared to the US, but also a higher quality of living because of preserved city centres (Jorritsma, 
2006).
72 HBD,  2004h. 
73  Nota Ruimte 2004, deﬁ  nite version agreed in Parliament in 2006 (website VROM).
74  Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO), letter “Perifere detailhandel” to S.M. Dekker, Minister of VROM (Housing, Spatial Planning 
and Environment), 23-02-2006.
75  Spierings, 2006, 607-8.
76  Zoning regulations exist in various forms also in France, Germany, the UK, and Denmark. Sources: FR: Askenazy et al, 2008; 
GE: Wortmann, 2004; Seppelt, 2009; UK: Howe, 2003; Burt and Sparks, 2006b; DK: Esbjerg et al, 2008. For 2008, the OECD 
(website) did not count the Dutch and UK zoning regulations as speciﬁ  cally regulating large outlets; by contrast, it did so with 
the French, German and Danish zoning and related regulations.
77  Website HBD (accessed 29-05-2006).
78  Eurostat publications mostly use the value added per worker as a productivity indicator (cf. Sura, 2006), but in view of the 
relatively large shares of part-timers in retail, that also vary across countries, the value added per FTE or hour worked is a 
better yardstick.Page ● 31
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surface. Yet, the extraordinary amount of space of gardening, DIY and furniture outlets, jointly taking 65% 
of all retail space in the Netherlands, forms a major part of the explanation.79
The relative performance of Dutch retail seemed to have been rather good until around 1990. Yet, 
between 1990 and 2000 the productivity growth per employee in Dutch retail and wholesale has been slower 
than the OECD, EU and US averages.80 Notably the golden years between 1995 and 2000 showed a rather 
“lazy”, extensive growth pattern of retailing in the Netherlands. In these years productivity per FTE hardly 
went up.81 More recently, productivity increases in 2001 and 2002 totalling 5% were more than undone by 
decreases between 2003 and 2006.82 We already noted that McKinsey consultants pointed at the relation 
between limited consumer spending and low productivity growth in retail. Yet, the American consultants 
concentrated on what they called structural reasons why retail productivity in the Netherlands was lagging 
behind that in peer countries after 1995: lack of space for large retail formats; comparatively less stores 
owned by chains; lower diffusion of best practices in distribution, in particular “lean retailing” (see the 
next section) and Information and Communication Technology (ICT). They also returned to the complaint 
about Dutch planning and expansion procedures, which they labeled as long, not transparent and creating 
“distorted competition.” McKinsey recommended the government, by way of test, to allow the construc-
tion of some 50 hypermarkets of over 5,000 square meters in urban peripheries; that alone would speed 
up productivity growth in retail by 0.3% yearly. Because of the assumed economies of scale in sales, the 
growth of “productive chains” and the shrinking of the amount of self-employed would make the largest 
contribution to productivity growth (1.4% yearly), followed by the more rapid diffusion of best practices 
(0.5% yearly).83 The Ministry of Economic Affairs embraced this analysis.84
In 2006, the OECD had also linked the assumed underachievement of the Dutch retail industry with 
the product market regulations for retailing remaining in the Netherlands: less liberalized opening hours 
and relatively high barriers to entry. Although with the 1996 Opening Hours Act (Winkelsluitingswet, June 
1, 1996), also part of the deregulation offensive of the Kok I administration (section 2.4.1), the maximum 
79  Reinhardt and Krägenau, 2003. In 2008, selling space per inhabitant of the Netherlands had increased to 1.6 m2 (authors’ 
calculation, based on HBD, 2009, and CBS, Statline). See for problems of comparing productivity in retail across countries: 
Grifﬁ  th and Harmgart, 2005.
80  Creusen et al (CPB), 2006, 13.
81  Creusen et al, 2006, 27-8. Based on the EU KLEMS Database, we calculated 0.3% yearly productivity growth beween 1996 
and 2000.
82  Authors’ calculations based on EU KLEMS Database.
83  McKinsey, 2007, 11-12. McKinsey estimated labour productivity differentials by scale in food retailing as follows: hypermar-
kets €19 / hour, supermarkets €17 / hour, small-store chains €15 / hour and “traditionals” €11 / hour. By 2002, hypermarkets 
in the Netherlands had no market share in food; McKinsey assigned 67% of total working hours to supermarkets, 4% to 
small-store chains, and 29% to traditionals (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2007, 14, 16).
84  Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2007, 1-2. The economic analysis of McKinsey was rather questionable, for example as it 
focused on productivity growth and neglected the existing high productivity levels in the Netherlands (cf. Kalshoven, 2007).Page ● 32
Maarten van Klaveren
statutory store opening hours were increased from 55 to 96 per week85, the OECD maintained that the 
Netherlands maintains less liberalized opening hours than other OECD countries.86 However, after the 
1997-98 high point most Dutch supermarkets backtraced and reduced their opening hours. As we will see, 
both labour supply problems and consumers’ preferences contributed to a fall of supermarket sales in the 
evening hours, to a low point of 9% of total sales in 2004.87 Concerning entry barriers, the OECD in its 
2006 publication on the Netherlands focused on the planning and zoning regulations discussed before. 
These regulations were suggested to have prevented the development of big box stores in food and general 
merchandise, and thus reduced productivity growth. The OECD maintained in this publication that large 
retail formats, especially for daily shopping providing one-stop shop services and effectively using ICT, 
would offer greater convenience and lower prices.88
It should be noted, however, that the retail overview in the OECD International Regulation Database 
for 2003 rated the Netherlands as having a rather weak regulatory regime in retailing, ranking 10th of 30 
OECD countries. At the time, according to this database the UK, Denmark, the US, Germany and France 
all had stronger anticompetitive regulations. Moreover, the score for the Netherlands had decreased from 
2.0 in 1998 to 1.6 in 2003, indicating less regulation.89 By 2008, the regulation score for the Netherlands had 
gone up somewhat, to 2.1,90 though the country ranked 8th of 30 countries; by then only the UK (7th place) 
with 2.0 showed a slightly less regulatory regime, but the regulation scores attached to Germany (2.4, 11th), 
France (3.1, 27th), Denmark (2.9, 23rd) and the US (2.6, 15th) remained higher. The OECD in 2008 continued 
to attach the highest score on regulation (6.0) for shop opening hours in the Netherlands, but as the weight 
attached to this theme was only 10% (!), this was not quite disadvantageous for the country’s total score.91 
85  Stores are currently allowed to open from Mondays 6 AM till Saturdays 22 PM, and on 12 Sundays a year, unless in tourist 
destinations where shops are allowed to open each Sunday. In the course of the 2000s municipalities of hardly any touristic 
interest, under growing protest of politicians from religion-based parties, stretched the “tourist” regulation as to allow for 
more than 12 Sunday openings. Under pressure of the two Christian coalition partners, the Balkenende IV coalition took a 
restrictive stand on shop opening regulations, and by the end of 2009 launched a Bill with “substantial tourism” as a precondi-
tion for Sunday openings. According to the large retail employers’ organisations and larger retail chains such limitations are 
neither in accord with EU arrangements nor with retailers’ and consumers’ interests, but SME-based MKB-Nederland regards 
the 12-Sundays’ rule as a maximum (EFMI-website; Voormolen, 2009a).
86  OECD, 2006, 92.
87  HBD, 2005b, 6. 
88  OECD, 2006, 94.
89  Conway and Nicoletti, 2003. 
90  Because between 2003 and 2008 the scores on “Licenses and permits needed to engage in commercial activities” and “Price 
controls” went up, whereas that on “Protection of existing ﬁ  rms” fell (OECD PMR website).
91  OECD PMR website; Conway and Nicoletti, 2003. Page ● 33
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2.3.4.  Supply chain management and innovation
At ﬁ  rst sight, a 2006 study of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) supported the positions taken 
by the OECD and McKinsey reports discussed above in concluding to a positive and linear relation between 
competition and innovation in retail, although the CPB experts admitted that measuring innovation is par-
ticularly difﬁ  cult in service-related industries.92 A more fundamental point of criticism may well be that the 
CPB entirely focused on the sales side, while by the time of publication large-scale supply already gave a larger 
competitive edge for retailers than cost savings in sales. Manufacturers and wholesalers have been increas-
ingly internationalized and integrated into buyer-driven global commodity chains, mainly controlled and 
coordinated by large retailers, in particular based in the US, France, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. 
After starting up in the value chains of clothing and textiles and in “tropical” groceries, global sourcing in 
the course of the 1990s pervaded the supply of all kinds of labour-intensive produced consumer goods, in 
notably Germany and the UK speeding up concentration processes already under way in retailing.93 Global 
sourcing has, in particular for Germany, been linked with the trend to replace top / national brands (called 
“A merken” in Dutch) with private labels (“huismerken”), no-name brands that may be regarded as equivalents 
to the more expensive top brands.94 
Control over global supply chains can be fully proﬁ  table if supported by supply chain management sys-
tems with low inventory and just-in-time delivery as ultimate goals, as well as by systems for optimal staff 
scheduling.95 “Lean retailing” is the catchword that encapsulates the technological development currently 
taking place here. Its core logic dictates that production processes should be managed from the end of the 
supply chain, that is, from the point of sale, following the principle of just-in-time production. Maximiza-
tion of economies of scale is the ultimate aim of lean retailing.96 Though internationalisation in retailing is 
comparatively limited and often meets serious difﬁ  culties,97 the cost advantages of controlling supply chains 
are well understood by supermarket chains. They continue to be found among those multinational enter-
prises in the industry most actively pursuing international expansion, developing into global buyers even 
more than into global sellers.98 In the 2007 ranking according to sales, 14 of the world’s 20 largest retail ﬁ  rms 
92  Creusen et al, 2006, 38.
93  Wortmann, 2003; Coe and Hess, 2005.
94  Cf. Wortmann, 2003, 28. Yet, it is difﬁ  cult to establish a causal relation here: instead of being part of an offensive strategy of 
large food retailers, this replacement may reﬂ  ect a more defensive reaction when their margins come under pressure. 
95  Dawson, 2007; Hoopes, 2006; Swoboda, Foscht and Cliquet, 2008.
96  Abernathy et al, 2000; Christopherson, 2001.
97  Giving rise to a considerable amount of literature on retail divestment i.e. on poor performance of retail multinationals’ sales 
in various countries, f.e. Alexander and Quinn, 2002 (on Marks & Spencer); Wrigley and Currah, 2003 (on Ahold); Christo-
pherson, 2007 (on Wal-Mart’s failure in Germany); Aoyama and Schwarz, 2006 (on Wal-Mart in Japan and Germany), and 
Aoyama, 2007 (on Wal-Mart and Carrefour in Japan). See for barriers to global selling in particular Burt et al, 2006a, and 
Aoyama, 2007.
98  Burt et al, 2008.Page ● 34
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were grocery-based. By far the largest of these grocery-based multinationals was Wal-Mart, the giant US 
“general merchandise” retailer, followed by Carrefour (France, 2), Tesco (UK, 3), Metro Group (Germany, 
4), Kroger (US, 5), Aldi (Germany, 6), Costco (US, 7), Schwarz Group (Lidl, Germany, 8), Rewe (Germany, 
9), and Ahold (Netherlands, 10).99
In particular American researchers have linked lean retailing with a high performance model, as suppos-
edly perfected by Wal-Mart. They have emphasized that advances in logistical technologies largely drive the 
supply revolution: scheduling software, data warehousing, use of hand-held scanning computers for taking 
stock, et cetera.100 In a seminal 1997 article, Thomas Bailey and Annette Bernhardt found for US retail that 
these advances, leading to “high-road” productivity in service, did not inﬂ  uence the nature of retail sales 
jobs positively at all; by contrast, wages remained low and opportunities for upward mobility scarce: “The 
high road can be low wage”.101 From their comparison of US and French retail as of 2000, Jean Gadrey 
and Florence Jany-Catrice found that US retail offers “higher quality and more services for the same aver-
age basket of goods sold”, and that the additional value-added is “ﬁ  nanced” by providing lower wages.102 
Thus, going even further than Bailey and Bernhardt to challenge the predicted relationship between high 
market performance and job quality, Gadrey and Jany-Catrice concluded that US high-road service advan-
tage depends on low compensation. This dependency may be deepened with the advance of ICT in the area 
of labour management in retailing.103 
In particular the large European food retailers have integrated the management of logistic chains in 
stock management with labour management, through technologically advanced systems integrating supply 
chain management software with programs supporting stafﬁ  ng strategies and personnel benchmarking. Op-
timal staff scheduling has become vitally important for both headquarters and store managers in order to 
manage the gap between ﬂ  uctuating workloads and individual pay, skills and working hours most efﬁ  ciently. 
The basic principle such computer-aided organization of working time is the exact adjustment of stafﬁ  ng 
levels to both ﬂ  uctuating customer and stock ﬂ  ows. If well organized, this adjustment allows the reduction 
of labour costs to the utmost while increasing numerical ﬂ  exibility and preventing idle hours.104 As we will 
show, our retail cases add proof for the pivotal importance of such benchmarking in managerial decision-
making. The combination of economies of scale on the supply side with intricate stafﬁ  ng and benchmark-
99  Klaveren et al, 2010; see for a 2005 overview of largest grocery retailers worldwide: Burt et al, 2008.
100  Abernathy et al, 2000; Petrovic and Hamilton, 2006; Strasser, 2006.
101  Bailey and Bernhardt, 1997, 195. See also Bernhardt, 1999.
102  Gadrey and Jany-Catrice, 2000, 26.
103  Cf. Wright and Lund, 2006.
104  Cf. Tijdens, 1998; Kirsch et al, 1999; Voss-Dahm and Lehndorff, 2003.Page ● 35
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ing strategies most likely impacts more substantially on job quality then economies of scale concerning sales 
do. Especially the scheduling issue leads to the confrontation between constraints on the employer’s side 
and constraints on the workers’ side. Part-time work allows ﬁ  rms to match stafﬁ  ng to peak days and hours, 
reducing “excess” labour, but various categories of part-timers can be discerned. A useful division is that 
developed by Jany-Catrice and Lehndorff, between “gap ﬁ  llers” and “time adjusters”.105 Gap ﬁ  llers comprise 
those deployed on short-hour contracts but on regular schedules, with predictable time slots accordingly. 
They are particularly likely to be students or women with small children, with schedule constraints in other 
spheres of life. Time adjusters, on the contrary, are deployed at variable times and have variable total work-
ing hours. The Dutch supermarket cases will illustrate the more general outcome that it is the time adjusters 
that bear the main burden of long opening hours and demand ﬂ  uctuations.106
Our more general assumption is that retail ﬁ  rm structures and governance are closely linked with ﬁ  rm 
strategies vis-à-vis both supply and sales markets. It is tempting to make a distinction between ﬁ  rms that 
are supply-based and will most likely be centrally governed regarding the sales side, and sales-based ﬁ  rms 
that are likely to leave more room for decentralised decision-making concerning sales. We will test this as-
sumption in our chapters 3 and 4, assuming that this division runs more or less parallel with that between 
supermarkets and consumer electronics retail. We have to build in the restriction that ﬁ  rm structures in retail 
chains are often multi-layered and rather complex – and that access for researchers to higher layers remains 
difﬁ  cult.
2.4.  Retail: institutions and labour relations
2.4.1.  Wage moderation and the (Youth) Minimum Wage
The Netherlands has a long history of commitment to wage moderation, and in the last three decades 
the statutory minimum wage (SMW) has been used to this effect with considerable success. Between 1945 
and 1964, the government controlled wage negotiations between employers and trade unions. This phase, 
coinciding with extensive economic growth, ended in 1964 under pressure from a tight labour market and 
concomitant strike activity. In that same year, the social partners agreed on a national minimum wage of 
100 guilders a week for “breadwinners”. In 1969 a statutory minimum wage was established, applicable to 
anyone over the age of 24. A few years later, the threshold for the adult minimum wage was lowered to the 
105  Jany-Catrice and Lehndorff, 2005.
106  Cf. Carré et al, 2010, 224.Page ● 36
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age of 23, and ﬁ  nally in 1974 a youth sub-minimum wage (youth minimum wage, YMW) was introduced for 
15-22-year-olds. Originally set at 40% of the adult minimum wage (for 15-year-olds), this rate was lowered 
to 30% of the adult minimum wage in the employment crisis of the early 1980s, rising stepwise to 100% 
of the adult wage at the age of 23. This scheme recalls the 1948 recommendations for youth wages by the 
Labour Foundation, the joint top body of union confederations and employers’ associations in the Nether-
lands; whose reasoning was based on the presumed lower productivity and lower personal needs of younger 
workers.107 The YMW scheme is still in existence. The “long tail” has never been shortened: the minimum 
rate for a 15-year-old currently is about € 2.90 an hour -- so that in the European Union the Netherlands has 
by far the lowest youth minimum wage and the highest age at which the full minimum wage starts to apply. 
This wage structure stimulates mutual wage competition between youths of different ages: and employers 
may feel tempted to reduce labour costs by substituting “younger” for “older” youths. Also, this structure 
till quite recently lacked any reward for experience and additional skill attainment for workers under 23 years 
of age.108 
From 1980 on, the Netherlands entered into a long period of wage moderation. The SMWs were low-
ered even in nominal terms by various “freezes”, lasting for a total of 13 years, most recently between July 
2003 and January 2006. As a result, the ratio of the adult minimum wage to the adult average wage fell from 
62% in 1979 to 45% in 2004, implying that relative to its 1979 value today’s adult minimum wage has lost 
more than 20% of its purchasing power – lagging almost as far behind negotiated wages and 36% below 
actual hourly wages. The average109 minimum wage (which integrates the long youth tail) has fallen even 
more. The steep decline in the minimum wage has stirred remarkably little public debate in the Netherlands, 
neither about the situation of the working poor, nor about the perspectives of young workers in industries 
like retailing or hotels and restaurants. 110 For quite some time, the leadership of the national trade unions 
seemed to go along with the productivity and lower personal needs arguments, in doing so neglecting the re-
peated demands of union youth groups to lower the threshold age for the adult minimum wage (gradually) 
to the age of 18. This lasted until 2005, when the presidents of FNV, the largest union confederation, and 
AbvaKabo FNV, the FNV-afﬁ  liated civil servants’ union, stood up for the 18-years’ YMW threshold111 – to 
date with no result. Thus, the combination of a relatively low adult minimum wage with very low youth rates 
107  Bloemen and Brug, 1982; Salverda et al, 2008b.
108 Salverda,  2008c.
109  Using 1979 weightings for minimum wage earners of different ages.
110  Salverda et al, 2008b; Van Klaveren et al, 2009.
111  Jongerius, 2005; Trouw, 06-09-2005. If wages for the 15-22 of age would had been on the level of the 25-30 of age, the aver-
age labour costs of Dutch supermarkets in 2004 would have been 12-13% higher (authors’ calculations based on CBS, Statline, 
and Deloitte & Touche, 2002-2004; cf. Van Klaveren et al, 2007). Page ● 37
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was well situated to constitute an “exit option” for employers maintaining a low-wage orientation. 
However, for retail employers the ﬂ  exibilisation of working hours was also essential. In 1964 opening 
and working hours started to fall apart in the Netherlands. In 1986, the main CLAs in retail had introduced 
the 36 hours’ working week, but ﬂ  exibilisation of working hours remained rare.112 In 1994 the ﬁ  rst Kok 
administration in the Netherlands announced broad plans for deregulation. Consequently, the large food 
chains and wholesalers united in the Central Bureau Food Trade (CBL) and led by Albert Heijn, lobbied 
intensively for an extension of shopping hours; they were followed by department stores and DIY outlets. 
These efforts were opposed by the associations of small and medium-sized retailers. The CBL argued that 
the proposed changes would offer advantages such as greater sales volumes and better consumer service. 
The large retailers clearly booked a victory when the 1996 Opening Hours (Shops) Act came into force, 
but they aimed at two preconditions still to be met as to fully proﬁ  t from working hours’ ﬂ  exibility and the 
labour supply of young part-timers. First, they wanted the existing core of full-time employees to accept 
evening and Saturday work. Second, they argued for lower compensation levels for unsocial working hours 
in the two supermarket collective agreements. After tough negotiations with the unions, both goals were 
largely accomplished. In exchange for an extra 1% wage increase, compensations for working on Saturdays 
and between six and eight PM were removed from the CLAs between 1998 and 2000. Moreover, full-timers 
were allowed to compress 35 hours in four days – also an employers’ goal, as in this way the core employees 
could be scheduled for evening work.113 
The reorganization processes that followed in the logistical chain allowed the food chains to exploit the 
cost advantages of employing young workers. They integrated order reception and shelf-stacking (replen-
ishment) into regular work schedules, replacing adults with young workers in the process. Previously, shelf-
stacking had been carried out outside opening hours in overnight shifts by adult men114 and in evening shifts 
by adult men and women -- work practices in the mid-2000s still reported from the UK.115 As mentioned, 
the expansion of opening hours as such was not very successful. From 1999 on, supermarkets reduced their 
opening hours, for various reasons. The newly targeted young workers objected to late evening working 
hours, and potential consumers reportedly had feelings of being unsafe in the streets during winter eve-
nings. Moreover, older full-time staff seemed to growingly oppose evening work because of shop theft and 
customer harassment.116 Nevertheless, retailers were pointed the direction of how to use a major exit op-
112 Tijdens,  2005.
113  Miedema, 1998; Tijdens, 1998, 2005.
114  Until the new Working Hours’ Act (1996) was passed, women’s night work was prohibited in retailing.
115 Mulholland,  2009.
116  HBD, 2005b, 6.Page ● 38
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tion: combined with the fragmentation of volumes of work, the YMW allowed to directly reduce the hourly 
rates of pay. Under these conditions, large retailers’ optimal stafﬁ  ng and scheduling strategies fully paid off. 
The implication is that particular (age) categories of workers, mainly part-timers, are treated differently than 
others because of regulation.117 Like in other countries studied, such as the US and Germany, existing ex-
emptions on or the relaxation of labour legislation, combined with a vulnerable workforce, have enhanced 
retailers’ ability to bypass features of national institutions supposed to protect low-wage workers.118
2.4.2.  Employers’ representation and Collective Labour Agreements 
Multi-employer bargaining is important in Dutch retailing. The retail industry is currently covered by 
about 55 CLAs, of which 35 sub-sector based, mostly one for each (small) sub-sector. Some larger retail 
companies, in particular Ahold (ofﬁ  ce staff) / Albert Heijn (for distribution organization and store manage-
ment), Hema, Maxeda / Bijenkorf (both department stores), and Bruna (book retailers) have own CLAs.119 
Normally the branch CLAs are mandatory extended by the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. In 
2005, they covered all but 12,000 retail workers, who were concentrated in some small branches,120 implying 
98% bargaining coverage. The job evaluation system, the basis of the wage structure, mostly is annexed 
to the CLAs; like in many other Dutch industries, the system in retailing is based on the ORBA method. 
The coverage rate is a mere formal ﬁ  gure: according to union representatives, compliance with CLAs in a 
number of retail sub-sectors is a major problem. In our case studies checkout operators mainly complained 
about the calculation of paid working hours, according to union ofﬁ  cers indeed nuisance no. 1. Obviously 
differences in interpretation of “hours worked” were and are abundant (section 3.6.1). 
Various employers’ federations are active in Dutch retail trade. We already mentioned CBL, and RND 
as the central employers’ organization. Retailers are RND members through their branch associations. Rep-
resentatives of large retail ﬁ  rms are well represented in the RND Executive, its Board and its Steering 
Groups. Of the large supermarket chains, Albert Heijn and Dirk van den Broek are represented in the RND 
Executive.121 Since 2000, RND maintains a special Bureau for Labour Affairs (Bureau Arbeidszaken). Besides 
advising the RND membership, this Bureau represents the retail employers at sub-sector level in collective 
117  The ability of employers to take recourse to this exit option is especially problematic since equal treatment of workers is 
anchored in employment legislation at both the national and the European level. In the Netherlands a law passed in 1996 
prohibited different arrangements in employment contracts based on working hours. This also includes contributions to the 
social security and tax systems (Tijdens, 2005). Consequently, within the legal framework wage penalties for part-timers can 
only be implemented through the strategic use of the YMW by retail employers. 
118   Cf. Carré et al, 2010; Van Klaveren and Voss-Dahm, 2011.
119   Sources: websites HBD; FNV Bondgenoten; Department of Social Affairs and Employment; http://www.detailhandelbanen.
nl/cao/detailhandel. 
120   HBD, 2005d.
121   From the large consumer electronics retailers, MediaMarkt Saturn Holding is represented in the RND Board. Source: website 
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bargaining. Thus, the large chains rather dominate the employers’ side in the industry at large. A main goal 
of RND in recent negotiations was the trimming down of collective labour agreements (CLAs) that sup-
posedly contained too many rules. After a ﬁ  rst effort in 2004, RND repeated this plea in April 2006. The 
employers’ organisation suggested agreeing upon CLAs in main lines, but remarkably enough it opposed 
CLAs or other arrangements on wages with works councils.122 The unions have continued to emphasize that 
the vulnerability and low wages of most retail workers left no room for “lean” CLAs.123 
The Dutch organisation of SMEs (MKB Nederland) tries to defend the interests of SMEs in retail. Some 
years ago this organisation founded the National Shop Council (NWR) as a lobby organisation, with cur-
rently 40,000 retailers as (voluntary) members. As noticed, in reaction on the government plans to liberalise 
zoning regulations, RND and NWR jointly created the Dutch Retail Platform (Platform Detailhandel Neder-
land), later on broadened towards their lobby organisation more generally operating in The Hague and Brus-
sels. However, MKB Nederland misses direct access to the collective bargaining table. Already for quite some 
years, this organisation aims at enlarging the numerical ﬂ  exibility of SMEs, suggesting for example that the 
average working time should be calculated over three months. The unions, by contrast, remain strongly in 
favour of enlarging workers’ inﬂ  uence on (short-notice) changes in working schedules, arguing that manage-
ment already determines employees’ working hours to a large extent.124 
2.4.3. Employees’  representation
Unionism is a difﬁ  cult issue in retail – not only in the Netherlands, but also, for example, in Germany 
and the UK. Based on a comparison of these three countries, it has been argued that there is no speciﬁ  -
cally anti-union resentment amongst retail workers, but rather a lack of opportunity to join the unions.125 
The Dutch practice supports the thesis that union organizing meets structural constraints, especially the 
predominance of small workplaces, of part-time and contingent employment, and a high labour turnover. 
Union density in Dutch retail remains about 12%,126 of which two-thirds are organized in FNV Bondgenoten. 
The CNV Dienstenbond may add another 2%. Mostly only the unions afﬁ  liated with the FNV and CNV un-
ion confederations have signed up retail CLAs. Yet, in 2005-2007 De Unie, a union afﬁ  liated with the third 
122   See also website RND.
123   Interviews with FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cers; various articles in Bondgenoten Magazine; De Volkskrant, 28-05-2004.
124   Grünell and Van het Kaar, 2004; interview FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cers.
125   Dribbusch, 2003.
126   In 2005-06, union density in the retail industry could also be estimated at 12% in the UK (Mason and Osborne, 2008, 161); 
with 15% (estimate ver.di union), the German ﬁ  gure was slightly higher, while unionization in retailing in France (2%) (Az-
kenazy et al, 2008, 221) and the US (6.5% in 2007) (US BLS, 2008a) was even less. The Danish density level (in 2006 at least 
50%) at the time was outstanding, not least because of a number of closed-shop arrangements, in 2006 declared illegal by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Esbjerg et al, 2008, 147).Page ● 40
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(MHP) union confederation but with marginal activities in retail, tried to negotiate separate CLAs,  if inevi-
table” without the FNV and CNV unions.127 De Unie may contribute 1,500 – 2,000 unionized retail workers, 
mostly (assistant) store managers.128 Union representation at the establishment level remains weak.
Works councils also have a difﬁ  cult task in Dutch retail. Quantitatively, compliance with the Works 
Councils Law is one of the lowest of all industries: some years ago about 180 councils covered one-third of 
all retail employees, about half of all for which a works council was mandatory.129 In 2004-06 most of the 
approximately 1,200 lay representatives of the FNV Bondgenoten union who were active in retail were works 
councillors, which means that 40-50% of all councillors were Bondgenoten members.130 Well-informed (cen-
tral) works councils are active in Ahold, as well as in the Hema and Bijenkorf department stores. Industrial 
conﬂ  icts mostly concentrate on these companies, mainly during collective bargaining rounds. These obvi-
ously are exceptions; union ofﬁ  cers interviewed said to feel that many works councils in retail are largely un-
der management control. Combined with weak union representation, this gives management a large amount 
of discretion in a majority of retail establishments. 
2.4.4.  The Industrial Board
In retail, as in two of the other Dutch industries studied, hotels (hospitality industry) and meat process-
ing, a classical institution of Dutch corporatism plays a role: the Industrial Board for Retail Trades, Hoofd-
bedrijfschap Detailhandel (HBD), created in 1956. Each retail company is obliged to register as a member and 
pay a compulsory fee to the administrative branch of HBD, Centraal Administratiekantoor (CRK). In HBD 
employers’ associations and the two main trade unions, afﬁ  liated to the FNV (FNV Bondgenoten) and CNV 
(CNV Dienstenbond) confederations, cooperate. HBD has the authority to lay down basic pay and conditions 
of retail workers not covered by a CLA in a regulation, and in the past it did so in the VAD (Verordening 
Arbeidsvoorwaarden Detailhandel). Like other industrial boards in the Netherlands, HBD retreated from wage 
determination; by mid-2004 the VAD mechanism has been abolished. Already before the price war of 2003-
2006, a political debate had started about the usefulness of the Industrial Boards. In our view the price war 
conﬁ  rmed the limited signiﬁ  cance of HBD as a labour relations institution, although notably FNV Bondgen-
oten union ofﬁ  cers that we interviewed did not go along with the suggestion that the price wars as such 
127   In the course of 2005 Mitex, the employers’ federation in fashion and sports goods retail, and De Unie had talks exploring 
“much larger ﬂ  exibility in labour conditions”. In 2007 they jointly (without the unions afﬁ  liated with FNV and CNV) agreed 
a CLA that was extended by the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, but that CLA already expired by January 1, 2008 
(website FNV Bondgenoten).
128   Sources: CBS, Statline, and interviews with union ofﬁ  cers.
129   Dribbusch, 2003; Engelen and Kemper, 2006.
130   Dribbusch, 2003, 96; information FNV Bondgenoten.Page ● 41
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eroded HBD. It is quite understandable that unionists would not give up the opportunities an institution 
such as HBD offers to act as a centre of expertise for the industry, monitoring the labour market and other 
social aspects and exerting some pressure on employers to behave not too short-sightedly.131
2.4.5. Vocational  training
The Dutch national monograph goes into the regular secondary-level vocational education (VET) sys-
tem of the Netherlands and its problems.132 In the autumn of 2004, about 35,000 students followed the two 
dual-learning schemes for retail, about 14,600 the practice-oriented BBL (BeroepsBegeleidende Leerweg, with at 
least 60% “practice”) and about 20,800 the more theory-oriented BOL (BeroepsOpleidende Leerweg, with 20-
60% “practice”) courses. BBL pupils have both a learning and a labour agreement with a teaching company 
(and are included in the retail workforce). In the years preceding 2004 the number of practice-oriented 
students had grown, especially at levels 3 and 4, while those following the theory-oriented curriculum had 
fallen, notably at levels 1 and 2. The vocational training institutions attributed this falloff to the lack of 
available internship posts. Yet, the difﬁ  cult match between the supplied education and pupils’ capacities and 
motivations obviously played a role as well. Drop-out rates were low in the more practice-based scheme 
and higher among theory-based pupils.133 After 2004, the retail VET system has been restructured. Except 
tailor-made courses, courses for the retail trade have been integrated in regular lower- and medium-level 
vocational education, VMBO and MBO. VMBO offers basically three educational programmes aiming at 
the retail trade: commerce & sales; commerce & administration, and fashion & commerce. MBO offers ﬁ  ve 
educational programmes: prospective sales person (level 1): salesperson (level 2); sales specialist (level 3), 
manager retail, and entrepreneur retail (both levels 4).134 Obviously the popularity of the retail VET system 
with both potential students and employers remains rather low. Though the available ﬁ  gures are not fully 
comparable over time, it seems that the number of pupils in the BOL retail courses between 2004 and 2008-
2009 has decreased by nearly 20%, to about 16,800.135
131   Interviews FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cers.
132   Salverda, 2008b, 96-8.
133   Kenniscentrum Handel, 2004; HBD, 2005a, 27.
134   Source: website HBD.
135   Source: website Kenniscentrum Handel.Page ● 42
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The VET system in retail: a short Dutch – German comparison
Based on the RSF Low Wage in Europe project it can be argued that a similar production model is de-
veloping in retail across countries, in the direction of a high performance – low wage model. Yet, here simi-
larities may already end: as the German version is developing into a high performance – skill-oriented – low 
wage model, we have to leave out “skill-oriented” for the Netherlands. Taking the various streams in and out 
the Dutch retail industry into consideration , we estimated that in 2005 about 85,000 retail employees, nearly 
15% of all employees, had a “dual retail learning” background with at least two years of training completed. 
For the time being the coverage of the ofﬁ  cial (tripartite) vocational education (VET) system remains low, 
deﬁ  nitely compared to Germany, where over 80% of retail employees has two to three years of vocational 
training. Moreover, in spite of declining retail employment, the number of newly concluded training con-
tracts has not declined in the last 15 years, and in 2004 the retail programme has been thoroughly modern-
ized.  The main argument in favour of the German VET system is that a broad medium-skilled segment 
allows only relatively small investments in human resources in order to ﬁ  rms adopting new technologies and 
changing product market strategies. A vocational training background may qualify for store management 
functions; stimulate behaviour along lines of responsible autonomy (German: “Rationalisierung in Eigenr-
egie”), bring forward a core staff of “anchor workers” capable of running the daily business, and strengthen 
employees’ positions in the labour market. In contrast, the two HR managers in retail we interviewed argued 
(independently from each other) that already the inﬂ  ux in the third and fourth years of the Dutch VET 
system in retail was too large to be absorbed by employers, and that a “German-type” VET system would 
lead to overskilling and to a too large wage bill.
2.5.  Retail: external and internal labour markets
2.5.1. Gender  distribution
The retail workforce has been feminized in the course of the 1990s, though less strongly than the Dutch 
economy at large. In 2000 64% of the retail workforce was female, against 60% in 1995 and 56% in 1992. 
The feminization process ended rather abruptly at the turn of the century, when the share of women (meas-
ured headcount) stabilized for some years at about 63%. In 2005, it even fell to 62.0%136, before recovering 
in the next years, ending up at 63.3% in 2008 (Table 7). Table 5 shows the yearly changes. The table reveals 
that in 2002 measured in FTEs male retail employment already decreased whereas female employment 
136   Or, according to the EU Labour Force Survey (authors’ calculations), to 60.9% (basis for Table 1).Page ● 43
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still grew. In 2003 the development reversed, with a stronger fall in female employment that continued 
in 2004. While 2005 for men and women alike showed a slight recovery, 2006, in particular 2007 and also 
2008 showed a stronger growth in female employment (though, as FTE data is lacking, only measured in 
headcount employment). In a cross-country perspective, the Dutch 2005 female share in retail was not par-
ticularly high: it was nearly 10%points lower than in Germany, also lower than in France, about equal to the 
UK, and higher than the Danish and US shares (cf. Table 1).
In the Netherlands, the supermarket sub-sector is less feminized than retail at large: with 55.2% female 
workers in 2008, 8%points lower than in retail at large, it ranked only tenth out of 15 branches. In this 
respect, the Netherlands is an outlier: in the other ﬁ  ve countries under scrutiny the female shares in the 
supermarket sub-sector were higher than the retail average, in particular in Denmark (17%points differ-
ence in 2005) and in the UK (15%points difference) (cf. Table 1). With nearly 86% female workers in 2008, 
pharmacy, perfume and cosmetics retail turned out to be the most feminized sub-sector in Dutch retail, 
closely followed by clothing/textiles and shoes/leather sales. By contrast, with 75.0% male workers con-
sumer electronics retail showed up as the sub-sector with the largest male share (Table 7). If this latter ﬁ  gure 
is correct137, this share would be high in international perspective; only the Danish consumer electronics 
stores displayed a higher male share, the others showed shares of 70% and lower (cf. Table 1). According to 
Statistics Netherlands, between 2000 and 2008 the female share in the supermarkets fell by 2.6%points, and 
in consumer electronics retail even by 15.7%points. As we will see, in the supermarkets deliberate policies 
to save on labour costs played a major role in this respect. The causes for the diminishing female share in 
consumer electronics are not fully clear but our case evidence pointed at the more vulnerable position of 
female workers, with a large share of temporary contracts, as a likely explanation.
2.5.2. Age  distribution
Table 8 illuminates that Dutch retail relies heavily on young workers. In 2005138 over one quarter of all 
employees in retail (26.6%) was younger than age 20, and about one in six (17.2%) was between 20 and 24 
of age. Thus, employees under age 25 made up 43.8% of total wage-earner employment in retailing. For 
2006, with 44.7% an EU survey (the Labour Force Survey) found an even higher share of this age group. 
In international perspective, this share was only surpassed by that in Denmark; the other four countries 
studied displayed much lower shares of young retail workers, with the lowest share (less than 16%) found 
137   In particular the Dutch employment data for consumer electronics retail should be interpreted with caution as the ofﬁ  cial sta-
tistics display large differences by gender over time. Nevertheless, with 21% for 2005-2006, HBD data also show a low female 
share for consumer electronics.
138   The last year for which detailed Statistics Netherlands ﬁ  gures are available.Page ● 44
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in Germany (Table 1). Table 8 also shows that the reliance of the Dutch retail industry on young employees 
has remained rather constant over time. In 1995, those younger than 25 of age made up 44.1% of all retail 
workers, in 2000 43.1%, and as said in 2005 they made up 43.8%. At the same time there was a clear shift 
discernible towards the youngest age category, the 15-19-year-olds. Whereas in 1995 they made up just one 
in ﬁ  ve retail employees (20.1%), in 2000 their share had grown to over one in four (25.6%), to end up at 
26.7% in 2005. In the 2000s the share of boys aged 15-19 continued to grow, while the share of their female 
peers fell slightly. The share of the young adults aged 20-24, diminishing in the second half of the 1990s, 
stabilized after the turn of the century, both for males and females. By contrast, the workforce share of the 
25-29-aged continued to diminish, for males and females alike; while their joint share in 1995 was 16%, in 
2005 it had fallen below 10%. Finally, in the decade between 1995 and 2005, the joint share of the female 
cohorts between 35 and 64 of age more than doubled, from 11.8% in 1995 to 24.6% in 2005.
Recent ofﬁ  cial statistics of the age distribution by retail sub-sector are lacking. Table 9 shows for 2004 a 
varying pattern of age distribution by sub-sectors. In that year the supermarket sub-sector employed by far 
the youngest workforce of all retail branches, with 61% under 23 of age against 38% for retail at large. Less 
than one in four supermarket workers (24%) was over 35 years of age; in all other sub-sectors this share 
was at least one in three. Consumer electronics retail with 23% employed a rather low share of the youngest 
workers’ group, but showed the highest concentration of 23-35-aged workers (41%). 
Whereas the long tail of the low youth minimum wage as discussed in section 2.4.1 is one relevant fac-
tor, the high level of youth employment is also related to the increase of student labour during the last two 
decades. Jointly with Denmark, the Netherlands makes up for the highest share of young people combining 
study and work among OECD countries. Whereas participation in education was about the same as else-
where, with 62% in 2005 the Netherlands and Denmark had the highest employment-to-population rates of 
young people aged 15-24 in the OECD.139 The high incidence of student labour cannot be separated from 
the Dutch ﬁ  nancing of education. A national system of public grants is available for students aged over 18, 
with grants subject to a means test of the student’s income, not that of the parents. Since 1986, when the 
system was put in place, the real value of a grant has nearly continuously declined, but subsidized students 
have increasingly been allowed to engage in paid work. In 1996 and 2000, the maximum net earnings al-
lowed in the system (taxed as usual but not deducted from the grant) have been strongly lifted, and in recent 
years amounted to about 70% of the adult SMW.140 In this institutional setting, and despite the relatively low 
139   Mason and Salverda, 2010.
140   Salverda, 2008b, 92-3; Van Klaveren et al, 2009.Page ● 45
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hourly wages mostly earned, many students obviously have to take refuge to work while studying. In 2008, 
19-year-old students in 2008 on average worked 13 hours per week, increasing by age to 23 hours on average 
for 24-year-olds.141 Ofﬁ  cial data in the early 2000s already indicated the popularity of the retail industry as a 
source of employment for students.142 In 2008, this situation still existed, with 24% of the working students 
aged 19-21 and 14% of those aged 22-24 employed in stores.143 
It can be argued that the ofﬁ  cial facility to combine work and study distorts the youth labour market 
for the retail industry, effectively crowding out those who want to build a career and earn a living wage 
after leaving school, in favour of those who work while studying. We calculated144 that the latter category 
amounted to about 60% of all 15 to 19-year-olds and 20% of the 20- to 24-year-olds employed in retail 
in 2005. The fact that students in that year accounted for just a quarter of all newcomers in retail suggests 
that three-ﬁ  fths of the young newcomers were rather low-skilled youngsters who may not regard a retail 
job as temporary.145 The nonstudent category seems to contain predominantly those with no aspirations 
or opportunities for post-secondary education and training. Our case studies and other evidence suggest 
that many of those who turn to retail employment for a full income, particularly in urban areas, are young 
second-generation migrant workers. In Chapter 3 we will go into their position, arguing that they currently 
run a serious risk of getting stuck indeﬁ  nitely in low-wage work. 
Already back in 2004 HBD pointed at the smaller cohorts of youngsters entering the labour market and 
expressed its concern about the future of the retailing labour supply. The Industrial Board indicated that the 
migrant population would be the last main resort for retail, notably in the cities.146  It referred to research 
proving that “ethnic supermarkets” were on average successful and quickly expanding.147 Indeed, there are 
serious labour supply problems ahead, not merely for demographic reasons but also because the HR poli-
cies of retail employers have predominantly chosen low road options. The supermarkets will deﬁ  nitely be 
confronted with these problems; we already noted that their workforce is by far the youngest of all retail 
branches. In our case interviews supermarket (assistant) managers predicted that retail would rather soon 
encounter large difﬁ  culties in competing for (relatively) low-skilled labour supply. They mentioned as main 
competitors in this labour market segment (mobile) home and elderly care, but also security and cleaning 
work. Yet, obviously the HR management of the main chains has not been very responsive to warnings 
141   Lok and Siermann, 2009.
142   Rienstra and Copinga, 2003.
143   Lok and Siermann, 2009.
144   Combining CBS, Statline, and WageIndicator data.
145   Cf. Dribbusch, 2003, 23.
146   HBD, 2005 e.
147   Cf. Van den Tillaart and Doesborgh, 2004.Page ● 46
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about the demographic problems. It was striking that in 2004-05 retail employers concentrated even strong-
er on recruiting youngsters under 20, who ﬁ  lled two-thirds of all retail vacancies (2002-03: 37%). By then, 
employees younger than 17 ﬁ  lled 20% of these vacancies (2002-03: 11%).148 
2.5.3.  Job and educational levels
We now go into the job and educational levels at industry level. Tables 10A and 10B, showing the latest 
available breakdowns by Statistics Netherlands of job levels of the Dutch retail workforce, reveal that in 
2005 a majority of all retail workers were functioning at the two lowest job levels used in these statistics: 
54% of males and 71% of females. Moreover, it is striking that from 1996 to 2005 the average job level 
in retail fell, in particular for men (by 0.18%points), and to a lesser extent for females (by 0.03%points). 
Whereas in 1996 57% of males and 31% of females could be found at levels 3 to 5, in 2005 these shares had 
decreased to respectively 46 and 29% (Table 10B).
It is illuminating to compare job levels with the educational levels of the retail workforce,149 like we have 
done in Tables 11A and 11B. These comparisons suggest the growing underutilization of workers with 
completed secondary and higher education -- in 2005, 62% of the sample) In that year, 57% of those with 
secondary education worked at levels 1 and 2 (double the national average of 27% working at these levels 
with secondary education), and 33% of those with completed higher education, against a national average 
of only 5%. After 2000 the gap with the national averages, already large, has even widened.150 We assume 
that a considerable part of these rather qualiﬁ  ed employees functioning in low-skilled and low-paid jobs are 
working students recruited by the supermarkets between 2000 and 2005, mostly as shelf-stackers (level 1).151 
Lack of labour market prospects may well explain their increase in this period of time, as many of them may 
have continued working in the supermarkets after graduation.
2.5.4. Working  time
As said, a major feature of the Dutch retail industry is its large share of part-time workers. Between 
1995 and 2005 part-time work in retailing has displayed a near-linear growth. In 1995, the share of full-
timers in the male retail workforce was still 62%; in 2000 it was 55%, and in 2005 only 49%. As for the full-
timers among the females, their share similarly went down, from 30% in 1995, via 25% in 2000 to just below 
148   HBD, 2005a, 23-24.
149   Total workforce, as Statistics Netherlands does not specify educational levels at industry level for wage earners.
150   Source: CBS, Statline.
151   Yet, even if all shelf stackers are supposed to have completed secondary education and we leave them out from Tables 11A 
and 11B, the share of those with secondary education carrying out jobs at levels 1 and 2 remains about 33%, 6%points above 
the national average.Page ● 47
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20% in 2005 (Tables 12 and 13). In the boom of 1995-2000, with the 1996 Opening Hours Act allowing for 
longer opening hours, the share of jobs of less than 12 hours per week among the 15-19 and 20-24 of age 
diminished in favour of the 12-19 hours’ category. After 2000 a return to the small jobs pattern could be 
observed, not only among the youngest age groups but also among the males aged 25-34 and the females 
aged 25-29. We have indications that quite often the lowering of working hours took place rather involun-
tarily, under employers’ pressure. Calculations on WageIndicator data for 2000-2005 showed that 30% of the 
respondents 15-24 of age working in retail preferred to work more hours a week, against 13% less.152 In the 
end, the growth of retail employment from 1995 to 2005 can be attributed fully to the growth of part-time 
work for both sexes. By contrast, for both men and women the absolute numbers of full-timers were lower 
in 2005 than a decade earlier.153 
The EU Labour Force Survey indicates that more recently both the Dutch share of part-timers in the 
retail workforce and the countries’ share of part-timers in total employment clearly remain on top compared 
with the other ﬁ  ve countries. Based on this source, for 2007 the Dutch part-time share in retailing could be 
calculated at 70.4%, over 18%points higher than Germany, the country that came next. The total part-time 
share in employment in the Netherlands, in 2007 46.8%, was 21-22%points higher than the corresponding 
shares in Germany, the UK and Denmark, while the differences with France and the US were even larger 
(Table 1). Recent Statistics Netherlands ﬁ  gures on working hours present average working weeks by age, 
but they do not separate retail and wholesale trade. Table 28 shows that for this large sector average work-
ing hours in 2008 were 27.2 per week: 31.7 for males and 22.1 for females. This gender difference was fully 
caused by the larger share of full-timers among male workers; by contrast, male part-timers had shorter 
working weeks (15.4 hours on average) than females in part-time jobs (16.9 hours). The table suggests that 
this is due to a composition effect, that is, from the relatively large share of young males (mainly 15-19 of 
age, but also 20-24-aged) with small part-time jobs. If male workers aged 30 to 55 were part-time employed, 
they worked on average in large part-time jobs, 23-26 hours per week, and in each age cohort on average 
three to ﬁ  ve hours more than females in the same cohorts. 
It is clear that there is a signiﬁ  cant and enduring over-representation of young part-time workers in 
Dutch retail. Yet, it may look surprising that in 2005 working in small part-time jobs -- less than 12 hours 
per week-- was nearly equally distributed among the male (30%) and female wage earners (31% -- Table 
12). It has to be recalled that the workers in question are largely auxiliary workers: the “men” in this age 
152   Data gathered from October 2000 – April 2005 (n=1,901); calculations by Kea Tijdens.
153   Source: CBS, Statline.Page ● 48
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category were mainly shelf-stackers aged 15-19, and the “women” of the same age group were (prospective) 
checkout operators in the supermarkets and sales assistants in other retail branches, in particular in clothing 
sales. Jointly the auxiliary supermarket workers made up 70-80% of all those working less than 12 hours 
in retail.154 The difference in hours worked between men and women in the mid-2000s was mainly caused 
by the fact that nearly half the female retail workforce worked 12-35 hours, against only one-ﬁ  fth of their 
male peers. A closer look at data on working hour patterns (Tables 12 and 13) clariﬁ  es that since the mid-
1990s working less than 12 hours per week has been the dominant pattern for those aged 15-19 years, boys 
and girls alike. These ﬁ  gures conﬁ  rm and reﬁ  ne the picture already derived from table 28 for wholesale and 
retail. Small part-time jobs were also important for the 20-24-aged category. Yet, already in this age bracket 
half of all employees, male and female alike, worked 20 hours per week and more. 85% or more of the male 
employees in the higher age brackets until the age of 60 worked 20 hours and more, while for women large 
part-time and full-time jobs only dominated among the 25-29 of age. Accordingly, the FTE/headcount 
ratios of the male ﬁ  ve years’ cohorts between 30 and 60 of age were oscillating around 90% and those of 
their female counterparts around 60%.
2.5.5.  Flexible contracts and recruitment
At the end of the 1990s retail employers’ strategies towards numerical ﬂ  exibility were not that manifest. 
In 1998-2000, the share of retail employees with ﬂ  exible contracts even diminished from 17 to 14%, only 
slightly above the national average.155 This changed in 2001, when the share of retail staff working on a 
ﬂ  exible contract increased to 21%.156 In that year already 43% of the new entrants in the industry got such a 
contract, a share that went up steeply to 74% in 2004-05.157 The main force behind this trend may well be the 
one more extensively discussed in our report on temp agency work (that was partly derived from the low-
wage research project): the risk-avoiding behaviour of employers.158 The Industrial Board also relates the 
growth of ﬂ  exible contracts in retail to the larger risks for employers in case of sickness and occupational 
disability of permanent staff.159 These risks were recurrent themes in all our interviews with local manage-
ment. Most likely the fear of employers for extra labour costs resulting from sickness and occupational haz-
ard payments based on new legislation has, jointly with newly developing working time and logistic patterns, 
154  Author’s calculations, based on CBS, Statline, and CGB, 2006, 9.
155   Dribbusch, 2003.
156   HBD, 2003, 21.
157   HBD, 2005a, 23. Two types of ﬂ  exible contracts were distinguished: 48% got a ﬁ  xed-term contract, 26% a contract with vari-
able working hours / on call.
158   Tijdens et al, 2006, Chapter 2.
159   HBD, 2003, 24. After 2003, HBD did no longer publish ﬁ  gures concerning types of contracts.Page ● 49
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contributed to a sharper division of labour in notably supermarkets. In our cases we hardly found any temp 
agency workers in the target jobs. Clearly, in Dutch retail the practice to leave logistics and shelf-stacking 
activities to young workers, employed on ﬁ  xed-term contracts and to a considerable extent functioning as 
“gap ﬁ  llers”, provides a functional equivalent for the use of temp workers.160 
As for recruitment channels, in 2004-05 informal channels counted for two out of three moves on 
the retail labour market: 28% of all new entrants came in by spontaneous applications, 20% via retail staff, 
9% by advertisements in or near retail outlets, and also 9% by external relations. The roles of the regular 
intermediaries were quite marginal in retailing: in 2004-05 4% of the applicants came in via the ofﬁ  cial job 
centres (CWI, against 2% in 2003), and the share of temp work agencies was reported to be nil (2003: 1%). 
In 2000, the joint share of the ofﬁ  cial job centres and the temp work agencies still was 10%161. Thus, in the 
Dutch retail industry temp agency work is no longer relevant.
2.5.6. Labour  turnover
According to Eurostat data, in 2006 just over 60% of the Dutch retail workforce had stayed in their cur-
rent job for less than ﬁ  ve years. In that year the percentage of annual leavers was 27% in the Netherlands. 
Across the ﬁ  ve EU countries studied, turnover along this yardstick was highest in Denmark, followed by 
the Netherlands, directly followed by the UK, with France and Germany with the lowest turnover (20%). 
Yet, they were all surpassed by US retail, where half of the retail workforce left each year (table 1162). The 
latest detailed ﬁ  gures of Statistics Netherlands on tenure date from 2005 (Table 15). With 65% these ﬁ  gures 
show somewhat a higher tenure rate shorter than ﬁ  ve years than the more recent EU statistics would show, 
but also with 24% a lower annual leave rate (“tenure 0 years”). This last change may be largely explained by 
the improved labour market situation in the course of 2005-06, giving a boost to labour mobility.163 From 
early 2005 on, the number of open vacancies in Dutch retail and wholesale grew rapidly, and by mid-2006 
this ﬁ  gure reached the record level of 35,000, nearly 6% of the dependent retail workforce, surpassing the 
earlier 2000 top level.164 The higher turnover rate may also reﬂ  ect the growing orientation of Dutch retailers 
on youngsters and the growing use of ﬂ  exible contracts, as indicated above.
160   The same mechanism was found in the other ﬁ  ve countries under scrutiny: Carré et al, 2010, 224.
161   HBD, 2003a, 26; HBD, 2005b, 24.
162   Sources: see under Table 1, Retail: labour turnover.
163   WageIndicator data for January 2004 - September 2006 (calculations: Kea Tijdens) indicated somewhat lower turnover rates 
for retail at large (n = 3,313): 18% tenure less than one year, 37% tenure between one and ﬁ  ve years, 45% ﬁ  ve years and more. 
The difference with the 2005 data of Statistics Netherlands seems largely caused by low turnover rates in 2004.
164   CBS, Statline. Vacatures.Page ● 50
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The inﬂ  uence of the business cycle is clearly traceable over time in labour turnover, that is, in mobility 
patterns. Under the tight labour market conditions of the late 1990s, mobility went up quickly. In 1995, 36% 
of all retail employees had tenures of less than 2 years, a share that had grown to 49% in 2000.165 With the 
economic downturn in the early 2000s this ﬁ  gure fell, and the 2005 tenure level equalled that of 1995. Table 
15 indicates that between 2000 and the end of 2005 especially males ageing 20-24 years tended to stay with 
their employer. In this age bracket the share of those with tenures of 5 years and more grew from 4% in 2000 
to 23% in 2005. The rates for females also showed an increase, but less outspoken. The table also reveals that 
the high labour turnover ﬁ  gures in retail have to be put into perspective: they are nearly fully attributable to the 
large shares of the youngest generations. In 2005, 51% of the boys 15-19 of age and 52% of the girls of the 
same age working in retail quitted their jobs within one year. In the category of 20-24 aged these shares already 
fell to 19 and 24% respectively, and retail ﬁ  gures for the higher age categories do not differ signiﬁ  cantly from 
those for the workforce at large. In Dutch retail the large share of young workers in retail heavily inﬂ  uences the 
industry’s turnover ﬁ  gures. Among their older retail colleagues, patterns of company loyalty and commitment 
seem quite “average”.
2.6. Retail:  wages
We already stipulated that the production model in European retail is developing towards a high perfor-
mance – low-wage model. This deﬁ  nitely holds for production and employment structures in Dutch retail. 
Based on an international comparison covering the 1979-1996 period, Salverda et al concluded: “German 
retailers (and to a lesser extent French retailers) are roughly equally able to beneﬁ  t from paying lower-than-
average wages for particular types of employees. Retailers in the USA, but particularly in the Netherlands 
and the UK, gain more by focusing their labour force on particular categories that are paid less across 
the board, but these have been the inexperienced and particularly part-time workers rather than the least 
skilled”.166 In the period under scrutiny, retailing moved towards low pay in the Netherlands and the UK, 
and away from it in the US and Germany.167 In the Netherlands the incidence of low pay in retail grew in the 
same period, from 34 to 37% under the low-wage threshold used in the RSF research project, that is, under 
two-thirds of the national median gross hourly wage. Moreover, wage inequality in Dutch retail (D9 : D1) 
165   Authors’ calculations, based on CBS, Statline.
166   Salverda et al, 2005, 53.
167   Salverda, 2005, 67.Page ● 51
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increased substantially, from 2.48 in the end-70s to 2.97 in the mid-90s.168 
In the aftermath of the “golden years” of Dutch retail, the industry’s low-wage pattern has deep-
ened. From 1996 to 2005 hourly retail wages lagged behind the national wage trend in the Netherlands, 
by 2%-points for male employees and by 5%-points for females.169 Already by 2002, according to ofﬁ  cial 
statistics the share of those working in retail and earning under the low-wage threshold had increased to 
46%, 9%points up compared with six years before.170 As Table 1 shows, this low-wage share was also quite 
high in international perspective: it was only surpassed by the British retail share for 2003 (49%), but it was 
somewhat higher than the German and American shares (both 42%) and much higher than the low-wage 
shares found in Danish (18%) and French (23%) retailing. The low-wage share among Dutch supermarket 
workers was even 57%, 11%points above the retail average and by far the highest share among the ﬁ  ve 
Dutch industries targeted by our research project. At ﬁ  rst sight it may seem remarkable that, with 53%, the 
share of low-paid females working in supermarkets was somewhat lower, but as we will show the explana-
tion can be found in the large share of low-paid male shelf-stackers. In Dutch consumer electronics a much 
lower share, 19% of males and females alike, earned below the low-wage threshold. Jointly, in 2002 32% 
of all employees (and 31% of all female employees) in the ﬁ  ve targeted industries earned less than the low-
wage threshold. In that year, the overall share of Dutch employees under the low-wage threshold was 17%, 
and 21% of all female employees.171 
For 2005, ofﬁ  cial statistics showed that 37% of the male retail employees and 53% of their female col-
leagues had wages up to 130% of the Statutory Minimum Wage (SMW); 9% of the males and 11% of the 
females earned wages on or lower than the SMW.172 Based on another source, the WageIndicator voluntary 
web-survey, we found also for 2005 that 39% of Dutch retail and wholesale employees jointly were paid under 
the low-wage threshold, a share only surpassed by that of the hotel and restaurant sector. This incidence 
was considerably higher than the shares of low-paid through the WageIndicator survey traced in Danish, Ger-
man and British retail / wholesale.173 Based on WageIndicator data over 2007 and the ﬁ  rst half of 2008, we 
found that 50% of all respondents aged 23 and older working in the retail industry earned under the low-
wage threshold that we estimated for the Netherlands for these years: 48% in supermarkets and department 
stores, and 51% in the other retail branches. The 2007-2008 low-pay incidence was 43% among full-time 
168   Source: DEMPATEM project (courtesy Wiemer Salverda).
169   Authors’ calculations based on CBS, Statline.
170   Authors’ calculations from CBS Microdata EWL/EBB 2002.
171   Authors’ calculations from CBS Microdata EWL/EBB 2002. Cf. Van Klaveren, 2008b, 135.
172   Authors’ calculations based on CBS, Statline.
173   Van Klaveren et al, 2008, 82-3. France and the US were not included in this comparison.Page ● 52
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retail workers; 36% in supermarkets and department stores and 47% in other retail. Among part-timers, 
with 67% the low-pay incidence was much higher, and here the incidence was highest in supermarkets (74%) 
compared with the other retail branches (63%).174 Though this low-pay data is not strictly comparable with 
the outcomes presented earlier and were based on ofﬁ  cial statistics, they contribute evidence suggesting that 
between 2002 and 2008 the share of low-paid in Dutch retail has hardly or not diminished. 
For the time period 2006-2008, based on WageIndicator data median gross hourly wages have been cal-
culated for retailing by age: see Table 27. For the three years, we were able to calculate separate medians for 
supermarkets and department stores, while for 2006 we could add those for consumer electronics retail.175 
The median hourly wage found for retail at large was € 10.69 in 2007 and € 10.79 in 2008. The table shows 
that these medians have been heavily inﬂ  uenced by the youth wage rates paid, in 2007 and 2008 varying from 
slightly over € 5 for the 15-17-year-olds till € 8.74 – 9.36 for the 22-year-olds. For retail at large, WageIndicator 
data revealed a median hourly wage in 2007 and the ﬁ  rst half of 2008 for workers aged 23 years and over of 
€ 10.93, against a median € 4.88 for the workforce younger than 23 of age.176 Similar differences were found 
for the supermarkets (€ 11.19 median hourly wage for those 23 of age and older, against € 4.73 for younger 
than 23 of age) and the rest of the retail (€ 10.77 against € 4.97).177 In sections 3.6.1 and 4.5.1, we will treat 
into detail the respective hourly wages for the supermarkets and consumer electronics.
It is worthwhile to pay attention to the gender pay gap in retail. As recent ofﬁ  cial wage statistics, with 
2008 as last year of observation, only cover the wholesale and retail industries combined, recent data also 
relates to this broad sector. Table 26, based on average wages, shows an unadjusted gender pay gap of nearly 
30%178, composed of 27% for full-time workers and 6% for part-timers – the latter mainly because of the 
large share of youngsters among the part-time workers, and related gaps of less than 4%. According to 
these ﬁ  gures the gap goes up quickly by age, until for age category 50-55 the largest differences have been 
reached. The median hourly wages based on the WageIndicator data for 2007 and January-June 2008 can also 
be divided by gender, thus enabling to calculate the gender pay gap solely for the retail industry. In retail 
174   Van Klaveren et al, 2009, 430. Calculations: Kea Tijdens. Sample size: 6,521, of which 2,496 in supermarkets and department 
stores and 4,025 in other retail sub-sectors. 
175   For 2007/January – June 2008, we had to combine data for furniture and consumer electronics retail.
176   According to WageIndicator data, across sub-sectors the overall median hourly wage in 2007/January – June 2008 was lowest 
in the supermarkets (€ 7.79) , followed by clothing and footwear stores (€ 9.01), furniture and consumer electronics retail (€ 
9.58), DIY stores (€ 9.66), and specialized food stores (€ 9.90), with the highest median in the category “other” (€ 11.79). For 
the workforce younger than 23 of age, median hourly wages in 2007/January – June 2008 were lowest in the supermarkets, 
followed by DIY stores, specialized food stores, clothing and footwear stores, furniture and consumer electronics retail, and 
other retail, with much smaller mutual differences: the lowest median hourly wage was € 4.73 in the supermarkets, the highest 
€ 5.36, in other retail; the median wage for young workers in furniture and consumer electronics retail was € 5.24.
177   Van Klaveren et al, 2009, 430. Calculations: Kea Tijdens. Detailed sample size: 1,495 of 2,496 (60%) younger than age 23 
working in supermarkets, 1,213 of 4,025 (30%) younger than age 23 working in other retail sub-sectors.
178   Using the international standard formula for the gender pay (or wage) gap: ((wage men – wage women) : wage men) x100).Page ● 53
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at large, the median hourly wage for males aged 23 and older was € 12.83, against € 10.09 for females, or a 
21.4% gender pay gap; for those under age 23, the amounts were respectively € 4.90 and € 4.87, or a minimal 
pay gap of 0.6%. In the supermarkets and department stores, the gender pay gap was larger for those aged 
23 and older (26.3%) but non-existent for those under age 23 (3.2% advantage for girls / young women); 
in the rest of retailing, the gaps were respectively 17.9% for workers aged 23 and older and 2.8% for those 
under age 23.179 
The outcomes mentioned are by and large similar to earlier pay gap ﬁ  gures in retailing from Statistics 
Netherlands (latest for 2005) and WageIndicator (2005-2006), be it both based on average wages. The ofﬁ  cial 
statistics found a considerable gender pay gap in retail: in 2005 18.9%, or 0.6%points above the Dutch aver-
age. After diminishing from 1995 till 2003 (but still remaining above the 20% level), the gap in retail grew 
slightly in 2004 but fell by no less than 2.1%-points in 2005. In December 2005, the male average gross 
hourly wage was € 13.96, against € 11.32 for females. Again, according to both ofﬁ  cial and WageIndicator 
statistics the gender pay gap in 2005-06 in retail went up quickly by age; while being quite small for the 15-
19-aged and sometimes even positive for girls over boys, the gap reached 25% and more for females versus 
males aged 40 and older.180 Ironically, the policies of the main supermarket chains during the price war, to 
get rid of low-paid elderly women may offer at least a partial explanation for the decrease of the gap in 
2005. The remaining gap can mainly be explained by the over-representation of women in low-wage sub-
sectors (so-called sectoral sorting) and in particular in low-wage occupations (occupational sorting).181 In 
retailing women, especially if working part-time, tend to be locked in such occupations because of the lack 
of promotion opportunities. Characteristically, in the WageIndicator survey in 2007 and the ﬁ  rst half of 2008, 
only 26% of the part-time workers aged 23 and older in retail indicated to have ever been promoted with 
their current employer, against the double share (52%) among their full-time colleagues. Asked whether they 
had good career opportunities, 31% of the part-timers ticked “yes”, against again 52% of the full-timers.182 
179   Van Klaveren et al, 2009, 430. According to this WageIndicator data, across sub-sectors the overall gender pay gap in 2007/
January – June 2008 (13%) was largest in furniture and consumer electronics retail (20%), followed by clothing and footwear 
stores (18%), DIY stores (17%), other (14%), specialized food stores (10%), and lowest in the supermarkets (3%). 
180   Detailed results in Van Klaveren et al, 2007, 52-60. As shown there, WageIndicator data for 2005-2006 indicated gender pay 
gaps over 30% for the 5-years’ cohorts in the 40-64 of age category, in both supermarkets and other retailing. Surprisingly, it 
turned pout that in Dutch retailing female re-entrants were confronted with a considerable life-time wage penalty.
181   Van Klaveren et al, 2007, 18-24. Gender pay differences within occupations do exist in Dutch retail, but they are likely of 
minor importance.
182   Van Klaveren et al, 2009, 430.Page ● 54
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3.  The supermarkt sub-sector 
3.1.  Introduction: the Price War
Since 1996 Royal Ahold, with their Dutch supermarket chain Albert Heijn (AH) as a solid basis, obvi-
ously following market opportunities rather than a pre-planned strategy based on geographical or cultural 
proximity,183 had taken over seven large US supermarket chains and foodservice suppliers, as well as gaining 
control over grocery chains in a number of Latin American and Asian countries. Its expansion ended up 
in 2000 by gaining a 50% share in the Scandinavian ICA group. In March 2002 the company was ranked 
world’s no. 3 retailer.184 Yet, in this single month large accounting irregularities in its US Foodservice sub-
sidiary were discovered as well as the use of disputable side-letters in the joint-venture arrangements with 
ICA and Disco (Latin America).185 Stock value fell from € 40 billion to 3 billion, and the banks temporarily 
took over power in Ahold’s Zaandam headquarters.186 February 2003 was a disastrous month for the ﬁ  rm. 
CEO Cees van der Hoeven had to resign, but the rumours about a € 10 million bonus for Anders Moberg, 
his successor, ignited a buyers’ strike in the Netherlands. This aggravated the effects of shrinking Dutch 
food spending that came into the open in the winter of 2002-03, and that particularly turned against Albert 
Heijn.187 Still in 2003, AH lost at least 1%-point market share (= € 265 million sales). The consumer and the 
shareholder crises reinforced each other, but the latter postponed the price war that AH had already planned 
for Spring 2003.188 In August-September 2003, AH sales shrunk dramatically, but Ahold cut 450 headquarter 
jobs and bankers allowed the parent ﬁ  rm larger credit facilities.189
183  Burt et al, 2008, 86.
184   Be it based on its overstated turnover. IGD’s global index, taking into account “international competence” factors, even 
ranked Ahold behind only Carrefour, and above Wal-Mart and Tesco (Seth and Randall, 2005, 91).
185   Wrigley and Currah, 2003.
186   Smit, 2004.
187   Algemeen Dagblad, 02-08-2003; Dick Boer, interviewed in Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 241.
188   Mainly based on interviews with union ofﬁ  cers and industry analysts. Clearly the main reason why Albert Heijn wanted to 
start the price war was regaining market share, and in the course of 2003 regaining credibility of Ahold came on top of that. 
“Breaking” Laurus, often mentioned in the popular press as a reason, is highly unlikely as a main goal, as success in this respect 
might have given way to foreign food retailers aiming at penetrating the Dutch market, like Belgian Colruyt (as the Dutch 
Competition Authority would have blocked a full take-over of Laurus by Ahold). An explanation of another University of 
Amsterdam-related institute, SEO, started from the assumption that the Dutch supermarket chains before the war formed a 
“super cartel”, and that Superunie, Aldi and Lidl broke with this cartel before AH did so (Baarsma and De Nooij, 2004). An 
Erasmus University Rotterdam critique questioned the existence of such a cartel, emphasizing that Aldi and Lidl never took 
part in any form of inter-ﬁ  rm co-operation (Van Aalst, 2005). 
189   Smit, 2004.Page ● 56
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Finally, AH was freed from its role as cash generator for the expansion plans of Van der Hoeven, and 
  in October 2003 the ﬁ  rm abruptly lowered the prices of 1,200 top brand articles.190 All competitors re-
acted with discounts. In the ﬁ  rst four months of the price war, about 500,000 households swapped their 
supermarket, and in the next ﬁ  ve months another 200,000 did so.191 AH went on until October 2006 with 
thirteen consecutive discount rounds. In October 2006, the ﬁ  rm announced the end of the price war after 
having reached its main goals: mid-market positioning, a market share of 28%, and a record proﬁ  t margin 
level of 6.3% in the ﬁ  rst half of 2006.192 Moreover, its performance was one of the grounds on which 
the parent company restored credibility for banks and shareholders (Another was the return to the super-
market format as the basis of the ﬁ  rm’s business instead of a rather incoherent operation of various store 
formats193). In 2005, according to sales Ahold still took the no. 5 position among world’s largest grocery 
retailers. Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2005, its number of stores fell by 28%, and the ﬁ  rm had to retreat 
to a considerable extent on its home market: the share of its domestic sales increased from less than 16% 
in 2000 to nearly 33% in 2005. By then, it served 11 national markets on three continents, instead of 27 
markets on four continents.194 In the course of 2006, hedge funds aimed at a split up of Ahold, but the 
ﬁ  rm survived this attack.195 In 2007, the ranking of Ahold among the largest grocery retailers worldwide 
had fallen from the 5th to the 10th position, and the 13th position among all retail ﬁ  rms.196 From then on 
Ahold showed a remarkable recovery, mainly based on renewed expansion in the US; in the course of 2009, 
the autonomous expansion of Albert Heijn in the Netherlands slowed down.197
The supermarket chains succeeded to shift the burden of their lower prices to a considerable extent to 
food suppliers and farmers. Chains in the higher food retail segment, like Albert Heijn, C1000 and Spar, in 
this respect followed the strategies of the hard discounters Dirk van den Broek, Aldi and Lidl. After hav-
ing intensiﬁ  ed the replacement of top / national brands (“A merken”) with private labels (“huismerken”), they 
pushed down the margins of the private-label manufacturers – since 2003 on average from 2.5 to 0.5%.198 A 
major reason for this shift was that the net margins on private label products were much higher, about 10% 
190   As a matter of fact, the recovery strategy of Albert Heijn was broader and included large investments in supply systems and 
in real estate (Boer in Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 243). 
191   Deloitte & Touche, 2004.
192   Baltesen, 2006.
193   Burt et al, 2006b.
194   Burt et al, 2008, also for an overview of Ahold’s entry/exit in/from countries between 1976 and 2005 (Table 5).
195   Baltesen, 2006a.
196   In terms of sales; in terms of employment (headcount), Ahold ranked 20th (Van Klaveren et al, 2010).
197   Trappenburg, 2009; Hofs, 2009. The take-over of C1000 stores mainly attributed to AH’s sales growth in 2009.
198   Koen de Jong, director IPLC consultancy, cited in Baltesen, 2006b. See also website RTL, messages 17-09-2004 and 01-10-
2004.Page ● 57
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instead of 2.5% on top brands like Unox, Pampers and Spa.199 First, food manufacturers tried to survive 
by rigorously cutting labour costs, next they tried to postpone investments and lower R & D expenses. The 
Dutch dairy and meat-processing industries have been severely hit as in the supply chain they were squeezed 
between raw material suppliers and large retailers.200 In 2005-06, the dominant retailers’ strategy even hit 
large top brand suppliers. In the course of the price war, Albert Heijn did no longer maintain good relations 
with major suppliers: its strategy was heavily criticized by the CEOs of large manufacturers such as Unilever, 
Heineken, Friesland Foods, Campina (both dairy, merged afterwards), and Douwe Egberts (Sara Lee), all 
blaming the price war for their diminishing sales in the Netherlands.201 A Dutch cake producer and a Dutch 
brewery, both medium-sized, even temporarily refused to supply Albert Heijn.202
The strategic responses of large Dutch food manufacturers varied. Some, for example CSM, reacting 
on the price war, sold their top brands, while others (Wessanen, Numico) got rid of their private labels and 
concentrated on top brands.203 Unilever followed the strategy of Nestlé and prepared to supply Aldi and 
Lidl with “fantasy labels”.204 The tendency to concentrate on private labels has spread in Dutch retail beyond 
supermarkets and clothing retailers, for example to chemist and DIY chains.205 Yet, it would be wrong to 
conclude that the traditional private label manufacturers beneﬁ  ted in the end. Because of the price reduc-
tions of the top brands, often sold below cost prices, small price differences between top brands and private 
labels were left and the high-end supermarket chains saw their private label “cash cows” endangered. Their 
efforts to enlarge their margins contributed largely to the fall of the margins of private label manufacturers 
mentioned above.206
199   Baltesen, 2005a. Traditionally, private labels jointly had a low market share in the Dutch food retail (2003: 21%, compare: GE 
35%, UK 41%). Sources: HBD, 2004a, 6; Wortmann, 2003, 13; Levensmiddelenkrant, 16-07-2004. 
200   See for effects of and reactions on the squeeze in the Dutch meat-processing industry Van Halem, 2008; also De Raat, 2008.
201   NRC-Handelsblad, 20-09-2004; 08-02-2005; 14-03-2005; website RTL, messages 14-10-2004 and 17-02-2005; Algemeen Dag-
blad, 29-11-2004; De Volkskrant, 08-12-2004; 28-02-2005;  23-03-2005; Groenevelt, 2005; Baltesen, 2006b. Sales of the 100 
largest top brands fell in the Netherlands by 6% in 2004 and 2% in 2005, whereas 2003 had still shown 2% growth. The top-
100 share in supermarket sales went down from 27.5% in 2003 to 25.8% in 2004 (www.zibb.nl/food, message 09-02-2006). 
Some industry analysts suggested that, as a consequence of the price war, the proﬁ  t losses of the top brands were even larger 
than those of the supermarkets. Cf. Laurens Sloot, cited in NRC-Handelsblad, 17-11-2004.
202    Schouten, 2005a (the Peijnenburg case); Thijssen, 2006a (the Grolsch case).
203   NRC-Handelsblad, 28-02-2006.
204   Het Financieele Dagblad, 30-01-2006.
205   Baltesen, 2005 e.
206   Between 2007 and 2009, private labels continued to win market share of top brands. A comparison of IPLC consultancy 
learned that between 2003 and 2009, the price of a basket of 35 top brands increased 22%, whereas the price of its private 
label equivalents fell by 3.5%. As a result, prices in the Netherlands in 2009 differed nearly 40%, according to IPLC director 
Koen de Jong across countries an extremely large difference (NRC-Handelsblad, 16-04-2009).Page ● 58
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3.2.  Supermarkets: industry performance
3.2.1.  Supermarkets: portfolio of the industry
Food retailing in the Netherlands in 2007 took place in majority through 4,330 supermarket selling 
points in 2007 (4,340 in 2008), in which 77% of all food consumption and 67% of all tobacco, alcohol, 
coffee and tea consumption in the market at large were registered, or € 17,778 million for food articles and 
€ 8,970 billion respectively for the second group of goods, totalling € 26,748 million (incl. Value Added 
Tax=VAT).207 Like elsewhere, supermarkets in the Netherlands are characterized by relatively high sales 
per employee (FTE) and sales surface. In 2008 total sales per supermarket reached € 4,926,000, about € 
400,000 or 8% more than in 2005. Sales per supermarket employee (FTE) in 2008 amounted to € 267,000, 
€ 11,000 or 4.3% more than in 2005; this sales level was 11% higher than the average sales per FTE in retail 
at large and 4% higher than the comparable average for food sales at large (cf. Table 2). Supermarket sales 
per square mtr store surface were € 7,600 in 2008, even over 2.5 times the m2 sales level in 2008 of retail at 
large and 12% higher than the average for all food sales.208
The supermarkets are currently the largest retail channel in the Netherlands, attracting 10.7% of total 
consumer spending in 2008.209 More than elsewhere in the EU they have remained predominantly food sell-
ers. In cross-country perspective the share of non-food in Dutch supermarket sales is rather low, in 2005 
only 14%, indicating a share of the supermarkets in total non-food sales of only 5%.210 Already the 1970s 
witnessed efforts of some large Dutch supermarket chains to diversify, with investments in wine merchants, 
restaurants, tour operators, and DIY shops,211 as well as to expand their assortment towards “general mer-
chandise” (consumer electronics, clothing, et cetera). In 1974, Albert Heijn took the lead by starting the 
Miro hypermarkets. Yet, at the time the ﬁ  rm underestimated the societal and notably municipal opposition 
against such large stores: just one Miro store survived the 1970s.212 Efforts of other food chains to diversify 
into non-food also failed. In the 1980s and 1990s, nearly all chains returned to their core business. They 
also outsourced their own manufacturing nearly totally. Albert Heijn, till deep in the 1980s maintaining sub-
207  In 2008 total supermarket sales reached € 29,365 million (CBS, Statline, Maatwerk - arbeids- en ﬁ  nanciële gegevens, per 
branche, 2008).
208   2005 data: HBD, 2006; 2007 and 2008 data: HBD, 2009, 15 and 162-3.
209   Authors’ calculation, based on HBD, 2009, and CBD, Statline Maatwerk 2008.
210   Sources: CBS, Statline; HBD, 2006a. For example, hypermarkets in France in the mid-2000s accounted for about 15% of non-
food sales (Azkenazy, 2008, 212).
211   Notably Albert Heijn and Dirk van den Broek invested in these four categories. The latter chain still owns wine and liquor 
stores, chemists and a tour operator. Albert Heijn also owns a wine and liquor chain, but integrated chemist’s articles in the 
assortment of its supermarkets. 
212   Van Klaveren, 2002, 8; Smit, 2004, 60.Page ● 59
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stantial manufacturing facilities, left the idea that vertical integration would result in substantial competitive 
advantage. As happened on a global scale,213 dependency relations in the supply chain were reversed. The 
major retailers gradually took over power at the cost of food manufacturers, and in the main product mar-
kets the emphasis changed towards supply-based competition, with large proﬁ  ts to be derived from massive 
purchasing (merchandising) and lowering logistic costs.214 Since the early 1980s, the Dutch supermarket 
branch can be characterized as a crowding market, with ﬁ  rm strategies concentrating on efﬁ  ciency and 
economies of scale.215 From 2001 on, a renewed (but rather modest) diversiﬁ  cation move is going on in the 
Netherlands, led by hard discounters Aldi and Lidl, advertising cheap laptops, DVD players, cameras and the 
other non-food items as baits aimed at generating “store trafﬁ  c” and reaching new customer segments. To a 
certain extent they have been followed by Albert Heijn, in its largest outlet format also aiming at a non-food 
share in sales of about one-ﬁ  fth.216 
3.2.2.  Supply chain management and innovation 
From the end of World War II until the early 1990s, major Dutch food retailers were comparatively 
advanced in product and process innovation. Their ﬁ  rst steps were into front-end innovation. In 1948, 
small food retailers in mid-sized towns took over the American self-service formula; when they overcame 
their initial problems, larger competitors followed, like Albert Heijn in 1952. With the broadening of assort-
ment towards fresh, meat, ﬁ  sh and dairy products, the name “supermarkets” was introduced; after smaller 
competitors had to swallow failures, AH opened its ﬁ  rst “supermarkt” (the Dutch wording) in 1955.217 In the 
1960s, adoption of process innovations concentrated on supply and logistical functions, with the develop-
ment of BAR coding based on Uniform Article Coding (UAC, in the USA Universal Product Code or UPC). 
Suppliers were going to produce on the basis of ongoing replenishment orders placed by the retailer, which 
in turn were based on real-time sales information collected via BAR code scanning. Albert Heijn III person-
ally took the lead in spreading the gospel of UAC over Europe.218 
213   Cf. Dawson, 2006, 373; Seth and Randall, 2005, 18-20.
214   Between 1999 and 2001, Albert Heijn sold its central slaughterhouses as well as outsourced the ﬁ  nal manufacturing / pack-
ing of tea, cookies, biscuits, peanut butter, and chips. Most industry analysts took this as the proof that the retail giant had 
deﬁ  nitely reversed the classical dependency relationship with Dutch food manufacturing, even with large but still Dutch-based 
manufacturers (Van Klaveren, 2002, 6). 
215   Sloot et al, 2001. 
216   Both Aldi and Lidl maintained a non-food share in sales of about 20% (Distrifood Nieuwsblad, 20-04-2004). In February 
2002, the ﬁ  rst Albert Heijn XL supermarket was opened, also with a 20% non-food assortment. In 2005, Ahold’s CEO an-
nounced to speed up the expansion of XL stores and double the non-food share in sales within ﬁ  ve years, to 11% (Korteweg, 
2005). In 2009, an AH spokesperson conﬁ  rmed that there were only 30 XL stores and that expansion to the planned level of 
50 XL stores remained difﬁ  cult, partly because of the continuous resistance of municipalities (Voormolen, 2009b). 
217   Rutte and Koning, 1998; De Jager, 1997.
218   De Jager, 1997, 189-90.Page ● 60
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We already pointed at the importance of lean retailing and a number of related back-end innovations. 
In the course of the 1990s UK-based Tesco, French Carrefour, the German Metro Group but also Albert 
Heijn came at par with Wal-Mart in exploiting these innovations. Back in 1997 AH put automated order 
systems in place,219 afterwards reﬁ  ning (as one of the ﬁ  rst Dutch retailers) this system with Bonus Card 
inputs, enabling the tracking of customers’ buying habits and bringing about a leading position as regards 
knowledge on customer behaviour. Linking these systems with frontline operations was the next essential 
step. Electronic Consumer Response (ECR) systems have been implemented in order to develop demand-
led logistic chains, using real-time information from cash scanning terminals. Currently, supply chain man-
agement can be technically perfected by the introduction of Radio Frequency Identiﬁ  cation Device (RFID) 
technology instead of BAR coding. 
RFID technology 
Introduced in the early 2000s, RFID technology is keeping the retail trade on tenterhooks, since this 
technology, which can be used to track and trace individual goods through micro radio-antennae attached 
to them, holds out the promise of quicker and more efﬁ  cient distribution processes than can be achieved 
with BAR coding. RFID tags are able to store much more information than BAR coding does. When RFID 
replaces BAR codes and each good is ﬁ  tted with an RFID chip, customers will go through a gate and the 
goods in their carts or baskets will be registered in a fraction of a second, allowing to establish even more 
labour-saving technologies at checkouts than the self-scanning technology already in place in larger retail 
chains.
Wal-Mart, the Metro Group and UK-based Tesco are leading large retailers in this ﬁ  eld. The Metro Group 
launched RFID applications in November 2004. Through study visits in summer 2005, we saw them in op-
eration in the Metro Future Store i.e. the Extra supermarket in Rheinberg and in Metro’s Innovation Centre 
in Neuss.  In the high-end conditions of the Rheinberg store front-end innovations dominated, not only 
based on RFID but also on wiﬁ   and contentbus technologies, like smart scales, Personal or Mobile Shop-
ping Assistants (PSAs or MSAs) on behalf of “narrowcasting” for customers and connected self-scanning 
stations220, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) or tablet Personal Computers (PC’s) for employees, smart 
shelves, electronic price indicators, and info terminals. Some applications may be of clear advantage for the 
consumer: smart labels based on RFID may be used to guarantee freshness and food safety; help reduce 
219   Kirsch et al, 1999, 23.
220  In Rheinberg three different cashing systems were in use: self-scan stations (four simultaneously controlled by one checkout 
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counterfeiting, and provide links to product information. Based on the Rheinberg experience, it has been 
suggested that consumer acceptance will be high provided that consumers can be assured of their privacy.221  
A number of conditions has to be met in order to realize a break through of RFID technology in the retail 
supply chain, that is to bring about its large potential cost advantages and have the technology ﬁ  tting seam-
lessly in ECR concepts. We derived from the literature the following main preconditions: a. the substantial 
lowering of the prices of the RFID tags in order to be used on all kinds of goods; b. overcoming the limi-
tations of the current ICT infrastructures of user ﬁ  rms, including the setting of new standards; c. techno-
logical improvements, bringing down the sensibility of the tags for metals and ﬂ  uids and “reading” them; 
d. the use of RFID tags by the main manufacturers; e. solutions for distribution of the costs involved over 
the parties (manufacturers, retailers/servicers, consumers) involved, and f. safeguarding for viruses and for 
abuse in “identity management.” The combined impact of these problems is still widely underestimated222.  
Current RFID use is rather broad but remains partial, in frontline operations of Wal-Mart, Metro and other 
retailers, (separately) in logistics and warehousing of these and other retailers, in health care, at airports, in 
passports and domestic ID cards, public transport (chip)cards, et cetera. However, the last decade predic-
tions of a break through with true universal use of RFID have been falsiﬁ  ed time and time again. For ex-
ample, even “realistic” reports in 2005 projecting the full use of this technology in 2008-09 in the logistics 
– warehousing area223, have been too optimistic. Projections of the spread of RFID use continue to vary 
widely; obviously, for many purposes BAR coding continues to be more appropriate and “cost-friendly” for 
another ten to 15 years
A 2003 survey on ICT implementation suggested that the Dutch supermarket branch was not very tech-
nologically advanced. In that year, 91% of the supermarket employers used computers: an increase of 
24%points compared to 1998; yet, 9% still did not use computers. Only 17% of all supermarket companies 
had an own website, a rather low score in the EU. The 2003 I(C)T scan of HBD characterised only 13% of 
the supermarket employers as “technological forerunners” (retail at large: 7%)224.  For the period between 
2002 and 2005, industry analysts suggested that the large Dutch supermarket retailers also lagged behind 
in international perspective, showing a comparatively low use of ICT. The relatively small scale of Dutch 
221  Philips Semiconductors, 2004, 9. However, a 2007 Dutch survey found considerable reservations concerning the use of RFID 
in individual consumer goods. For example, 58% of the consumers that responded wanted RFID tags switched off after the 
related goods being bought (Van den Heuvel et al, 2007). For more sceptical experts’ views on privacy and security risks, see 
also Thijssen, 2004; Persson, 2006a, 2006b; Albrecht, 2008.
222  Cf. outcomes of the EU Bridge project (project website); websites of the Dutch RFID Platform, the German Informations-
forum RFID, RFID Kenniscentrum Fontys Hogescholen, Rathenau Instituut.
223  Cf. Wilhelm, 2005.
224 HBD,  2004a.Page ● 62
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retail, the lack of stimulating government policies, and the negative effects of the price war on the cash-
ﬂ  ow of supermarkets are suggested to have played roles here225.  This assessment may have underestimated 
developments already going on in supply and logistics. As said, Dutch food chains have sought and found 
major cost advantages here, and have developed advanced logistical structures. It is telling that the 2007 Mc-
Kinsey report concluded to more advanced distribution centres in the Netherlands compared to the US and 
the UK, with pre-sorting in place in three-quarters of all226.  In mid-2006 a number of supermarket chains 
(AH, C1000/Schuitema, Jumbo, Hoogvliet) already widely used back-end RFID applications. Though they 
have not been able, like notably Wal-Mart227, to press their suppliers to massively invest in RFID technology, 
based on more co-operative efforts with suppliers they have been forerunners in integrating RFID applica-
tions in their supply chain management systems228.  The McKinsey report cited earlier stated that by 2006 
RFID was fully implemented in 25% of Dutch food chains, against in half of all US chains229.  More recent-
ly, Albert Heijn has gained major competitive advantage in the Netherlands through its advanced “automatic 
store replenishment” programme, most likely saving about 2% on supply costs compared to other chains230. 
Five years after the 2003 assessment of ICT, the picture for the adoption of technology in Dutch retail 
seems to have been reversed or to be on the way of being reversed. In 2008, 93% of all Dutch supermarket 
establishments had more than two computers and used the Internet. In total, 98% of these establishments 
used computers. Between 2006 and 2008, the number of businesses in Dutch retail as a whole using more 
than two computers and an Internet connection grew from 5% to 41%: major progress. In 2008, 37% of 
Dutch supermarkets used an electronic cash register connected to controlling software and cash registers 
with sales registration and calculations, higher than retail in the Netherlands at large (30%), and across 
retail sectors the highest share. All supermarkets surveyed scanned articles at the cash-register. Electronic 
payment was also widely used in the Netherlands: 99% of the supermarkets allowed the use of debit cards 
for such payment. The only technological innovation of which the implementation lagged behind in super-
markets remained the use of an own website (58% in 2008). It is ﬁ  nally worth noting that by 2008 93% of 
all supermarkets used electronic systems for ordering goods, 71% for controlling of supplies, and 90% for 
pricing231.  
225  Cap Gemini’s Van Schaik, cited in Thijssen, 2004; also: NRC-Handelsblad, 22-04-2004; Creusen et al, 2006, 20; Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken, 2007, 20.
226  McKinsey, 2007, 11. Also compared with Belgian supermarkets, well-developed logistics operations contributed considerably 
to the proﬁ  tability of Dutch supermarkets (Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 302).
227  Hoopes, 2006, 93-4.
228  Based on interviews with union ofﬁ  cers and industry analysts, press messages and company websites. In particular Hoogvliet 
has been an early adapter (cf. Libbenga, 2002); Ahold/AH followed suit (Thijssen, 2004).
229  McKinsey, 2007, 11.
230 Sloot,  2010
231 HBD,  2008.Page ● 63
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In the 1990s innovations on the supermarkets’ sales side were rather incremental. They were also less related 
to the implementation of ICT than to work organisation. As said, in the late 1990s Albert Heijn took some 
steps towards a high performance work organisation model in its supermarkets, by promoting teamwork 
and “organized” functional ﬂ  exibility. Frontline operations will constitute the next major rationalization 
area; their problems in recruiting in particular checkout operators push the food chains towards automation 
of the checkout function in the supermarkets – though the price war led to a temporary freeze of invest-
ments in this direction232.  In June 2005, after pilots of C1000, Jumbo and Hoogvliet with self-scanning 
cash registers233,  market leader Albert Heijn announced the large-scale introduction of these devices. The 
ﬁ  rm suggested that the social outcomes would not be very negative because the redundant operators could 
stay on as “advisers”234.  The FNV Bondgenoten union, on the other hand, expected the introduction of self-
scanning to lead to the short-term loss of one-ﬁ  fth of the checkout operator jobs involved. While being 
aware that such technological developments cannot be stopped, the union emphasized that forced lay-offs 
should be avoided235.  An additional reason for the perseverance with which AH has fought the price war 
may well be the ﬁ  rm’s expectation that the frontline in its supermarkets hides a large rationalization potential 
-- to be unleashed by the adoption of self-scanning in combination with RFID technology in each packing – a 
major constraint as long as an RFID tag costs about 10 Eurocents236.  Moreover, a 2006 survey of Ernst & 
Young suggested considerable customer resistance against automation of the checkout: over 60% of Dutch 
consumers answered not to be in need of self-scanning237.  Later experiences indicate that consumer appre-
ciation may be higher if self-scanning is combined with MSAs (or “hand scanners”), allowing the consumer 
larger control over his/her shopping process238. 
A currently promising innovation in the sales ﬁ  eld is the multichannel approach239,  where information 
search and eventually ordering are carried out via the Internet and the purchase is made in-store, or fo-
cusing on online selling / ordering is combined with delivery-at-home services. Most Dutch supermarket 
chains have adopted a waiting attitude vis-à-vis these opportunities, with Albert Heijn as the exception. 
Already in 1990 AH started a home service (Thuisservice) in the Netherlands. The ﬁ  rst ten years only losses 
were accumulated. Concerning Internet selling, in 2000 Ahold acquired a majority share in the US internet-
232  Kremer, 2008, 55.
233  Based on interviews with union ofﬁ  cers, own store visits and company websites.
234  Distrifood Nieuwsblad, cited on www.zibb.nl/food, 06-06-2005.
235  Interview FNV Bondgenoten ofﬁ  cer; website FNV Bondgenoten.
236  Kremer, 2008, 56.
237  Bramer, 2006 (also HBD website).
238  Cf. website Bridge project.
239  Cf. Farah, 2006, 19; Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 109-10.Page ● 64
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supermarket Peapod. Again, initially this was a ‘bleeder’240.  It has recently been argued that Albert Heijn, 
like the other Dutch food retailers, is still slow in developing on-line retailing241. While recently the Internet 
sales of non-food and notably clothing are booming, food in the end remains for over 98% purchased in-
store; in particular in the food branch the Internet continues mainly to be used as a source of information 
and orientation242.
3.2.3.  Sales and margins
Table 16 shows the effects of the 2003-06 price war on supermarket consumer price levels. During two 
years, from January 2004 until January 2006, the quarterly price level remained below the 2003 year level. 
From the start of the war in October 2003 till December 2005 supermarket prices fell by 3.5%. Stimulated 
by these falling prices, sales volumes grew with the same amount, and in 2004-2005 total supermarket sales 
after all remained stable.
According to consultancy reports, the average net margin (net proﬁ  ts: net sales) of the supermarket 
sub-sector throughout the 1990s was 2.75%. These reports show that concerning margins already in 2001 
the “golden years” belonged to the past: by then the net margin had gone down to 0.9%. After a modest 
recovery in 2002 (1.9%), the margin fell again to 1.3% in 2003. The average gross margin rose from 17.5% 
on 1990 to 21% in 2003, but cost levels rose quicker.243 The Industrial Board suggested that in 2005 the aver-
age net margin improved slightly to 2%.244 In 2003-04 the price war certainly was detrimental for the average 
proﬁ  t levels of supermarkets. One calculation indicated that they lost € 690 mln sales in 2004, which meant 
–without extra demand or lower costs-- a direct proﬁ  t fall.245 By contrast, Albert Heijn’s CEO acknowledged 
that his company had gained extra proﬁ  ts through high pricing in the years before.246
A detailed analysis of a sample of ﬁ  ve size groups of supermarkets learns that the two smallest catego-
ries of “neighbourhood supers”, with yearly sales less than € 3 million, did remarkably well in 2003, and 
maintained the highest net margins (2.1 – 2.2%). At the same time, the small and medium-sized “full service 
240 Bosgra,  2002.
241 Sloot,  2010.
242 Website  Thuiswinkel.
243   Source: Deloitte & Touche, 2003, 2004, and website Deloitte & Touche, message 08-09-2004.
244   Website HBD.
245   Pleijster, 2004.
246   Industry analyst Sloot concluded from the growing price gap between top brands sold by Albert Heijn on the one hand and 
chains like Dirk van den Broek, Hoogvliet and Nettorama on the other (3-4% in 1995, 15% in 2002): “The consumers didn’t 
care, as long as they had conﬁ  dence in AH. Moreover, C1000 and Laurus went along”. Consumer trust deﬁ  nitely peeled off 
in 2003. Concerning the price war that followed, Sloot observed “(….) a giant marketing trick: retailers and food suppliers 
loaned huge amounts of money from the consumers and are currently returning it with a lot of fuss”. (Then) Albert Heijn 
CEO Dick Boer by and large conﬁ  rmed this analysis, although he exclusively blamed the top-brand food suppliers (Tijdschrift 
voor Marketing, 18-10-2004). Another leading industry analyst, Spoon, reproached these suppliers to have concentrated on 
short-term proﬁ  ts and to have lost sight on consumer preferences (Tijdschrift voor Marketing, 22-11-2004). Page ● 65
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supermarkets”, with yearly sales of € 3 to 7.5 million, performed a lot worse with net margins of 0.5 – 0.8%. 
With 1.7%, the average margin of the largest supermarket category performed in between, although this 
category showed the largest sales growth. Although as a rule of thumb the largest cost advantages of food 
retailers are derived from lost-cost supply,247 labour costs remain important -- and so does cost leadership 
in this respect. The available information showed that in 2003 labour costs made up for the largest differ-
ences in single cost items between the various supermarket size categories. Yet, the outcomes may be quite 
surprising. In 2003, the labour cost share in total operating costs of the largest Dutch supermarket category 
was with 48% (10.8% of net sales) by far largest, against 43-53% (9.4-10.4%) for the small and medium-
sized full service supermarkets and an even lower share, 39-42% (7.1-7.4%), for the small neighbourhood 
supers.248 The consultancy presenting these ﬁ  gures urged management of the larger supermarkets to focus 
on control over labour costs.249 The question remains why these supermarket chains did not cut their labour 
cost share early in the price war. This may have been caused partly by institutional factors (pressure to live 
up to the CLA, the risk of tough negotiations with the unions and a bad press in case of lay-offs), partly by 
product market strategy considerations like the perceived necessity to maintain existing service levels. 
The cost picture by supermarket size changed radically in the course of the price war. In 2004, the ﬁ  rst 
full year of the war, large supermarkets (yearly sales over € 7.5 million) reduced their staff with 6.4%, against 
3.8% in the middle-sized supermarkets. Staff cuts by the small supermarkets (less than € 3 million sales) 
were much smaller: 1.7%. Compared to a year earlier, sales patterns had developed the other way round 
and economies of scale popped up: sales went 2.1% down in the largest supermarket category, 2.8% in the 
medium-sized supermarkets, but 4.1% in the smallest.250 These ﬁ  gures indicate a differentiation in labour 
productivity growth measured as the development of sales per FTE, with average productivity gains of 
4.2% for the largest supermarkets and 1.0% for the medium-sized, against an average productivity loss for 
the smallest supermarkets of 1.7%. Heavy staff cuts were behind these ﬁ  gures. The leading supermarkets 
now clearly pursued cost-cutting strategies, concentrating on labour costs. From October 2003 till October 
2004, cuts in supermarket staff were estimated to amount to 9,500 FTEs, or 19,000 headcount.251 Over a pe-
riod of 1.5 year –up to April 2005—two leading retail consultants estimated the staff cuts in supermarkets, 
247   Indeed, the small supermarkets in this sample had the largest share of purchasing costs in net turnover (79.4% in 2003) and 
the largest supers the lowest (77.9%). Cf. Deloitte & Touche, 2004.
248   Source: Deloitte & Touche, 2004. HBD ﬁ  gures for 2004 and 2005 showed even larger differences in labour cost: shares of 
35-39% for small and 50-52% for medium/large supermarkets (HBD, 2005b, 13).
249   Deloitte & Touche, 2004. Of course, labour cost cutting is not the only defensive business strategy; another is bringing down, 
postponing or cutting investments. In the ﬁ  rst year of the price war 65% of all supermarkets followed the latter road too 
(Pleijster, 2004, 25).
250   Pleijster, 2004.
251   Pleijster, 2004.Page ● 66
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in distribution centres and food manufacturing establishments related to the price war at 34,000 FTE.252 
Staff cuts in the ﬁ  rst half year of the supermarket war have mainly been realised by the larger stores, with 
the small (family) ﬁ  rms often trying to postpone such measures -- unless in the course of 2004 cuts in the 
small stores’ workforce proved to be inevitable. Union sources calculated that in 2004 Albert Heijn was able 
to cut labour costs by 10%, by national wage moderation, by getting rid of women re-entrants and tempo-
rary workers, and by pressure towards cuts in working hours for the remaining female staff.253 
The above cost analysis does not differentiate adequately between various types of competitors. Grow-
ing competition by hard discounters tends to stress the importance of cost-leadership, focused on bringing 
down labour costs. Long before the price war started Aldi and Lidl were some steps “ahead” of soft dis-
counters by operating with “undressed” outlets, selling from big boxes, but also without staff qualiﬁ  ed in 
safety instructions and having followed safety training – for example, risking ﬁ  nes from the Labour Inspec-
torate. Moreover, in an initial phase of their expansion in the Netherlands they took proﬁ  t from starting new 
stores, with staff in lower CLA scales and with less seniority rights.254 In the early 2000s industry analysts 
estimated the labour costs of the hard discounters per € 1 million sales 30% lower than those of their up-
market, full-service competitors.255
3.3.  Supermarkets: overview of the industrial organization
3.3.1.  Company and establishment size
The degree of concentration in Dutch food retail is much higher than in Dutch retail at large. In 2002, 
80 from 14,260 food retail ﬁ  rms (0.6%) accounted for 48% of employment (in FTEs), 58% of total food 
sales, 67% of investments, but surprisingly for only 40% of proﬁ  ts before taxation.256 For March 2006, we 
calculated that 97% of all Dutch supermarkets were branches and franchisers belonging to large chains, 
so-called voluntary branches or members of buyers’ groups; at the time, 94% belonged to the 20 largest 
chains (with 29 sub-chains). A number of Dutch supermarket chains has been actively franchising stores; by 
March 2006, we counted at least 1,850 outlets franchised by the food chains with 20 or more establishments, 
252   Laurens Sloot and Jan-Willem Grievink (CapGemini), cited in Baltesen, 2005d. Later on, Sloot added that employment for 
30,000 headcount had not been realised in the supermarkets: 5,000 by staff cuts, 25,000 by not ﬁ  lling in planned expansion 
and/or vacancies (Erasmus Magazine, 09-03-2006).
253   Interview with FNV Bondgenoten ofﬁ  cer.
254   Baltesen, 2004a.
255   Rutte, 2002; Baltesen, 2004a.
256    Van der Velden, 2003. These ﬁ  gures concern real ownership relations, not the formally independent legal entities counted by 
Statistics Netherlands.Page ● 67
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making up 44% of all stores (see Table 18). An example is Albert Heijn: after a standstill in the 1990s, in 
the early 2000s AH franchisers were growing in number again.257 Franchising can make a difference from an 
employees’ point of view. For example, in many cases franchising from Albert Heijn meant a worsening in 
the terms of employment of the staff of franchised stores. Although most employees continued to operate 
under the old CLA, they had to abstain from “AH extras” like proﬁ  t sharing, article discounts and premium 
savings – in the “golden years” before 2003 implying a lowering of gross wages of about 10%.258 
As the available statistics show, economies of scale matter in Dutch food sales, deﬁ  nitely among su-
permarkets; analysts predict that they will continue to play a major role. A ﬁ  rst decline in the amount of 
supermarkets of 2% between 1995 and 2000 was followed by a 9% fall from 2000-2005, slowing down to 
1% in 2006-2008, to an amount of 4,340 supermarkets in 2008.259 The larger supermarkets will survive. 
In 2003, supermarket establishments of over 1,000 m2 accounted for 41% of total sales, supermarkets of 
400 – 1,000 m2 for 47% and supermarkets smaller than 400 m2 for 12%. Market researchers expected these 
ﬁ  gures to amount in 2010 to 52, 41 and 7% respectively. Thus, they projected relative growth only to hap-
pen in the largest category. Hypermarkets (over 2,500 m2) were predicted to account for 7% of total sales 
in 2010,260 but by the end of 2009 their actual share is most likely much lower. By 2005, the average surface 
of an Albert Heijn store was 1,165m2, and that of a C1000 store 867m2.261 In the early 2000s both (related) 
chains in the early 2000s had been expanding mainly in the category over 1,000m2.262 The stores of the main 
discounters were smaller, though with mutual differences: the average for Aldi was 546m2, that for Lidl 
719m2.263 The store surfaces that food retailers regard as minimal in efforts to acquire real estate or attract 
franchisers, varied depending on ﬁ  rm strategies and the related store formats: in 2005-06 from 400 m2 for 
a Spar supermarket, 800 m2 for an Aldi, Albert Heijn or Super de Boer outlet, till 1,300 m2 for a Hoogvliet 
store or 2,000 m2 for a Jumbo supermarket.264 The trend in terms of the headcount workforce was similar. 
In 2003 establishments with over 100 employees employed 69.5% of the Dutch supermarket workforce; 
just 4% worked in establishments with 10 or less employees. In 1999-2003, employment in the small and 
medium-sized categories each had lost 1%-point to the “100 and more” category.265 These ﬁ  gures do not 
257   In 2004, the franchised AH supermarkets had on average 40% lower sales than the full AH-owned stores (www.zibb.nl/food, 
message 06-09-2005).
258   Van Klaveren, 2002, 13.
259   1995-2005: CBS, Statline (ﬁ  gures as of January 1); 2006-2008: HBD, 2009.
260   Deloitte & Touche, 2004, using ﬁ  gures of ACNielsen. 
261   Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2007, 17; source: Ruimtelijk Planbureau.
262   Evers et al, 2005, 35.
263   Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2007, 17. These ﬁ  gures indicate that Aldi and Lidl stores in the Netherlands, like in Ger-
many (Wortmann, 2003, 8), are not quite large.
264   Cf. franchise offers on website De Nationale Franchisegids, and company websites.
265   1999: CBS, Statline; 2003: authors’ estimate based on reports of ACNielsen and Deloitte & Touche.Page ● 68
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imply that the prospects of small supermarkets are necessarily bleak. They may even be good on average for 
those run by migrants, actually covering 20% of all food stores.266 
The average establishment workforce also varies widely across supermarket chains. In 2004 these av-
erages (headcount) in a number of chains went from about 50 employees in Coopcodis and Jan Linders 
supermarkets to about 113 in Dirk van den Broek stores.267 We estimated for 2003 the lower quartile (LQ), 
median and upper quartile (UQ) employment sizes (headcount) of Dutch supermarkets as follows:268
LQ    3 employees
median    5 employees
UQ 20  employees
Except the UQ size these ﬁ  gures were equal to the Danish; the French, German and the UK size out-
comes were substantially higher.269 Excluding the supermarkets less than 400 m2, our estimate of the 2003 
size distribution was:270 
LQ    48 employees
median    64 employees
UQ 102  employees
In this category of larger supermarkets, especially LQ is rather high, even higher than in the UK. Most 
likely this high ﬁ  gure is related to the comparatively large share of part-timers employed in Dutch super-
markets.
3.3.2. Main  competitors
In Table 17 we have compiled the available reliable271 information on the development of the market 
shares of the largest supermarket competitors between 2002 and 2006; this compilation asked for a pains-
taking effort and has been based on many sources. There are two issues of varying interpretation here. 
First, since 1993 Ahold owned a 73% share in Schuitema. Schuitema’s former CEO in the early 2000s 
liked to stress that its C1000 chain operated independently from Ahold/Albert Heijn, but in 2005-06 the 
space for own C1000 policies seems to have been limited to the operational level.272 The joint bid, in May 
2006, of Albert Heijn and Schuitema/C1000 on Laurus’ 23 Konmar stores conﬁ  rmed this subordinate 
266   Van den Tillaart and Doesborgh, 2004.
267 The  exact  ﬁ  gures were: Coopcodis 48, Jan Linders 51, C1000 67, Albert Heijn 83, Deen 85, Laurus 86, Jumbo 99, Dirk van den 
Broek 113. Sources: company websites (see Table 18). As far as possible, workforces of headquarters and distribution centres 
have been excluded.
268  Sources: CBS, Statline, and company websites.
269   Personal communications of Lars Esbjerg (DK), Jean-Baptiste Berry (FR), Dorothea Voss-Dahm (GE), and Geoff Mason 
(UK). Sources mainly for 2002; see Table 1, row Retail, establishment size.
270   Partly based on Deloitte & Touche, 2004, partly on more detailed ﬁ  gures per chain as cited.
271   As far as could be judged. Most reliable public data seem data of ACNielsen, published yearly in Distrifood Magazine. Starting 
point were the market shares for June 2002 and 2003, revealed in Baarsma and De Nooij, 2004.
272   Thijssen, 2006b.Page ● 69
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position.273 In 2006, Albert Heijn alone gathered more than a 27% market share, but jointly with C1000 the 
Ahold market share would have been nearly 42% (Table 17), growing to nearly 45% in 2007. Finally, with 
the sale of AH shares of Schuitema to CVC Capital Partners in mid-2008, Schuitema / C1000 succeeded 
in gaining its independence back and got the opportunity to differentiate its format from that of Albert 
Heijn.274
Second, Superunie is a buyers’ group (Dutch: inkoopcombinatie). Buyers’ groups have strongly developed 
in the Netherlands in the 1930s; Superunie is the main survivor, in itself being a “group of groups” (of for 
example Sperwer). If we follow again most analysts and treat Superunie as an entity, the share of the top-5 
in total sales (Albert Heijn, Schuitema, Superunie, Laurus, Aldi) was 87% in 2006,275 and that of the top-7 
(including Dirk van den Broek and Lidl) 97.5% (see again Table 17). This meant that, counted this way, 
the 2005 top-5 share was 2%-points higher than that of 1997,276 although in between the top-5 actors have 
changed drastically. However, there are good reasons to break up Superunie in statistics on market shares, 
because of the fact that its members compete ﬁ  ercely on sales. If we do so, we have to include the largest 
Superunie member, Sperwer Group, the last remaining co-operation of independents in the Netherlands 
exploiting the PLUS and Spar formulas, ranking no. 5 in 2002 and (after the Dirk van den Broek group) no. 6 
in 2003-2005. In 2005 the joint market share of foreign-owned chains in the Netherlands that we calculated 
was 26.4%, and in 2006 24.5%. It concerned Laurus, with the majority share of Groupe Casino, and Aldi 
and Lidl. By the end of 2009, after the divestment of Casino, the latter two are the only foreign food chains 
active in the Netherlands; their joint market share, in 2006 over 13%, at the moment could be estimated at 
nearly 15%. A major event was in October 2009, when Superunie expelled the Jumbo chain from its ranks 
after Jumbo had announced to start a new buyers’ group with Schuitema/C1000.277 After this step, Superu-
nie comprised 15 chains, and –if we continue to count buyers’ groups as entities-- it lost its no. 2 position 
to the Jumbo/C1000 combination.278
Table 18 provides detailed information on the 20 main supermarket chains that were active in the Neth-
erlands in 2004-06. This table shows that in March 2006 31 sub-chains owned or controlled 4,158 establish-
ments, three-quarters of the Dutch total. The chains with the largest numbers of establishments were, in 
273   NRC-Handelsblad, 31-05-2006.
274   Company website Schuitema; Van der Lugt, 2008; Berkeljon, 2008;  Fleischmann, 2008; De Witt Wijnen, 2008. The ﬁ  nal take-
over proved to be complicated, due to minority shareholders’ resistance to the CVC bid, and lingered on till deep in 2009.
275   Concentration in food retail in the Netherlands is comparatively high. If the Dutch top-5 share for 2005-06 is set at 87%, this 
is only surpassed by DK (95%), and higher than the top-5 shares in FR (85%), UK (70%) and GE (69%). Sources: Table 1, 
Food retail, share top-5 ﬁ  rms in sales.
276   Kirsch et al, 1999, 19.
277   De Volkskrant, 06-10-2009.
278   NRC-Handelsblad, 07-10-2009.Page ● 70
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this order, Superunie, Laurus, Ahold, Schuitema/C1000, and Aldi. By then, nine sub-chains (owned by six 
chains) had full national coverage, with stores in all 12 Dutch provinces. In December 2004 32 sub-chains 
owned 4,266 establishments: 2.5% more than 15 months later. By March 2006 approximately 1,850 estab-
lishments, or about 45% of all stores belonging to the 20 largest chains, were either franchised or independ-
ent members of a buyers’ group.
Already in 2004 Albert Heijn regained market share and surpassed its 2002 share. Schuitema/C1000 sta-
bilized its position. From 2002 on the chains co-operating in Superunie jointly rapidly won about 3%points 
market share, but the picture varied: on the one hand losers like Boni, Nettomarkt and De WitKomart279, 
on the other winners like Jumbo, Hoogvliet and Deen. During the price war the latter three expanded their 
numbers of stores substantially. Laurus, once the ambitious result of the 1998 merger between Vendex 
Food Group and De Boer Unigro,280 continued to loose market share. In May 2006, Casino / Laurus sold 
their 223 Edah stores to a consortium of Sperwer Group and Sligro,281 the next day followed by the sale of 
the large Konmar stores to Albert Heijn (23 stores) and Jumbo (12).282 
If the members of Superunie are counted separately, the fall in the shares of the top-5 and the top-7 
ﬁ  rms between 2002 and 2004 has to do with the rapidly eroding share of Laurus and the diminishing shares 
of some Superunie members. The developments in market shares correspond largely with publicly avail-
able evidence on numbers of customers. In 2004, Albert Heijn won about 120,000 new customers, adding 
another 180,000 in 2005. AH took clearly the lead in the share of all Dutch households doing (some) shop-
ping in its stores: 68% in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2006, followed by Aldi (48%), C1000 (46%), and Lidl (45%). 
In 2004-05, nearly half of all Dutch consumers did some shopping in the discount stores of Aldi and 
Lidl.283 Table 17 suggests that in 2004 Aldi lost market share but recovered strongly in 2005 and 2006, while 
from 2003-2006 Lidl expanded more modest but steadily. We traced a market share of over 6% for a third, 
genuine Dutch discounter: the parent ﬁ  rm of the “Dirk”-related chains.284 According to our data, the joint 
market share of the food discounters increased by nearly 3% points between 2002 and 2006, from 16.5% to 
19.4%. This share remained lower than that of discounters in Germany and Denmark, but came at par with 
279   In May 2005, DeWitKomart (31 shops) split up and was taken over by CoopCodis (11 shops), Deen (12) and Hoogvliet (8).
280   Rutte, 2002. 
281   Analysts suggested that Lidl and the Belgian discounter Colruyt were also candidates (Van Lent, 2006; De Volkskrant, 30-05-
2006). Sperwer and Sligro are both voluntary branch organisations with a background in wholesale. 
282   The transaction enlarged AH’s market share by 1.1 % (NRC-Handelsblad, 31-05-2006).
283   Sloot in Erasmus Magazine, 09-03-2006; De Volkskrant, 30-05-2006 (based on data of AC Nielsen and GfK).
284   The parent company claimed for 2004-2006 a market share of 7.5 % (company website), but this seems exaggerated.Page ● 71
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that in the UK and was higher than that in France around 2006.285 
Yet, the relevance of this ﬁ  nding diminished because in the price war the traditional distinctions be-
tween the various supermarket formats, notably between “servicers” and “soft” or “hard” discounters, be-
came blurred. In the two years before the price war the distance in price levels of top brands between Albert 
Heijn and the cheapest chain selling these articles (mostly Dirk van den Broek) grew from 8 to 16%points286 
-- a distance that Ahold management came to regard as too large. As a consequence, the price war that AH 
initiated in the beginning started as a “top brand war”. In the ﬁ  rst year, AH lowered the prices of (samples 
of) both top brand articles and (to a lesser extent) private label articles with 11%.287 However, by the end of 
2004 AH still had the smallest price differences between top brands and private labels, whereas Nettorama, 
Dirk van den Broek, Aldi and Lidl offered discounts up to 40% on baskets of comparable private label 
products. Thus, with 16%points the gap between the AH price level and that of the cheapest in the com-
parison at the time, Dirk van den Broek, remained the same.288 Faced with this situation, the next step of 
the up-market supermarket chains was predictable. In the course of 2005 AH and other servicers followed 
the strategies of the discounters, eating into their assortment and replacing top brands by private labels with 
their much higher margins. As a consequence, by January 2006 the gap between the price levels of AH and 
Dirk van den Broek had decreased to 11%points.289
The outcomes of the comparisons of supermarket article prices, undertaken from time to time by 
the Dutch Consumers’ Union, adds proof to the observation of most retail analysts that in the course of 
the price war Albert Heijn succeeded in getting rid of the position of most expensive chain and achieved 
a middle-market position. Based on October 2009 price levels290, we divided the supermarket chains into 
3 leagues (A, B, and C), where League A stands for the most expensive in the market; league B represents 
those with middle-range positions, with league C offering the lowest average price levels for all categories of 
products. The prices observed by the Dutch Consumers’ Union included those of 80 top brands, 65 private 
labels, and 30 products at bottom prices. We compiled the data and produced the averages for all products 
285   Sources: GE: EHI, 2007 (41%); DK: Esbjerg et al, 2008, 144 (30%); UK: Burt and Sparks, 2006b (“about 20%”); FR: Askena-
zy et al, 2008, 217 (13%).
286   Consumentengids, April 2001, May 2001, March 2003, August 2003.
287   Research of IPLC (International Private Label Consult), from September 2003 – September 2004 (www.iplc.nl/persbericht, 
09-09-2004).
288   Consumentengids, March 2003, November 2004; www.iplc.nl/persbericht, 09-09-2004. Yet, regional price differences be-
tween private label articles within the same chain showed up much more frequent than with top brands. This points to heavy 
regional competition, often strengthened by discounters providing “lowest price guarantees”.
289   Authors’ calculations based on Consumentengids, March 2006.
290   Consumentengids, December 2009.Page ● 72
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and supermarkets, with the following outcomes291:
  ● League A (4% or more above average price level): Poiesz and Coop (both 8%); Sanders (6%); Super de 
Boer (5%); MCD and Em-Té (both 4%);
  ● League B: Super Coop and Plus (both 2% above average price level); C1000, Jan Linders and Albert 
Heijn (all at average price level);
  ● League C (4% or more below average price level): Boni and Nettorama (both -4%); Dekamarkt (-5%); 
Jumbo (-6%); Hoogvliet, Deen, Dirk van den Broek, and Vomar (all -8%). 
Aldi and Lidl seem to have a comparatively high price position vis-à-vis their competitors. They shared 
the same place with Nettorama with lowest priced products 8% below average. Yet, in a cross-reference 
Vomar, the cheapest contender, offered products positioned 12% below the average. Still, a basket of pri-
vate label products will cost the customers here 20% more than similar products in Aldi and Lidl.292 
In the October 2004 price comparison of the Consumers’ Union, Albert Heijn still had the highest aver-
age price level, falling to the no. 2 position in January 2006.293 Between 2006 and 2009, Poiesz, Super de Boer 
en Coop remained in League A; C1000 and Linders maintained their positions in League B; Vomar, Deen 
and Dekamarkt went from League B to League C, whereas Hoogvliet, Jumbo, Nettorama and Dirk van den 
Broek maintained their positions in that “low price” League. Evidently, in the Netherlands the low end of 
the supermarket competitive structure has become rather crowded.
Service levels and job quality
The RSF European retail group early in the research project decided that a common distinction in 
market strategies of retail ﬁ  rms should be high service versus low service. It turned out to be far from easy to 
develop yardsticks in this respect. At least in the Netherlands the blurring of product market strategies in 
the supermarket sub-sector has not been helpful. In the end we divided between ﬁ  ve yardsticks, which are 
partly related to service density, partly to service quality:
1)  service in the sense of convenience: easy to park, easy to ﬁ  nd what you want (part of service quality), 
adequate product information (part of service quality), short queues at the checkout stand (part of 
service density);
2)  lots of  assistance: many sales clerks and assistants on the ﬂ  oor (part of service density);
3)  quality of  assistance (part of service quality): knowledgeable staff;
291   Lidl and Aldi are not included since they hardly sell top brands.
292   Authors’ calculations based on Consumentengids, December 2009.
293   These comparisons only included top brands (“A merken”). Page ● 73
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4)  good price – quality relationship (good value for money);
5)  broadness of  assortment (part of service quality).
It may be relevant that single service yardsticks relate to job quality. In particular the ﬁ  rst factor can 
be of relevance for the job quality of checkout operators: shorter queues can diminish work-related stress. 
There is empirical evidence as well that these operators often derive motivation from direct customer con-
tacts, which short lines may allow. 
Clearly a number of service aspects have to be included, such as broadness of assortment. Before the 
price war, assortments varied from 24,000 to 32,000 articles in the large Albert Heijn and Jumbo stores, 
12,000 to 18,000 articles in the full-service supermarkets of for example Super de Boer and Plus, 5,000 in 
the small Coop or Spar shops, to 700-900 food articles in the Aldi outlets and 1,400 in those of Lidl.294 
In the second year of the war restrictions on assortments became part of the sales strategies of all major 
supermarket chains. Obviously, the interplay between demand and supply pushed in the same direction. 
The preferences of most Dutch consumers seemed to match with this strategy: consumers felt encouraged 
to strengthen their price-conscious behaviour. In 2004 many middle-class consumers started visiting other 
shops just to buy a few discount articles. By the time consumer loyalty in the Netherlands, in cross-country 
perspective already low, seemed to have arrived at an absolute minimum. Buying patterns were crossing 
socio-economic divisions to an extent most likely only equalled by Germany.295 However, the low price / 
lean assortment sales strategy reached its limits rather soon. The (assistant) store managers we interviewed 
gave indications in this direction, saying that more and more customers explicitly showed their discontent 
when it turned out that products were no longer available. Indeed, the Industrial Board stated that in the 
course of 2005 growing numbers of customers were annoyed that supermarkets were reducing their range 
of products.296
A debate is going on among retail watchers whether or not the “low road” in food retailing, that is in the 
ﬁ  rst place. the low price / lean assortment orientation, may be reversible. The growth of consumer spend-
ing in 2007-08 seemed to leave room for a strategic reorientation. Some food chains seemed to counteract 
recent consumer displeasure by strategies that combined comparatively low prices with good quality and 
broad assortment, especially focusing on fresh products and ready-to-eat meals, the product groups with the 
294  Sloot et al, 2001; Rutte, 2002; Kremer, 2008; for Aldi: Brandes, 2005 (1998), 20; Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 40; various 
messages in Distrifood.
295   Van der Velden, 2004, 49, supported by AC Nielsen, 2004, and Deloitte & Touche, 2004.
296   HBD, 2005b, 5-6.Page ● 74
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highest margins.297 With varying intensity, AH, C1000, Jumbo, and Super De Boer followed this road. The 
outcomes of the pilot store that AH opened in December 2005 were a ﬁ  rst major test; there were watched 
Argus-eyed by company headquarters, competitors, and analysts. In the pilot store an assortment of private 
labels was offered twice as large as normally in AH stores; top brands, stacked near comparable private label 
articles, were sold with an average discount of 4%, and the non-food share was considerably enlarged.298 
The internal evaluation of the ﬁ  rst four months of the pilot store showed a lot of criticism; the number 
of clients was much lower than envisaged. In the course of 2006 AH amended the concept, in particular 
softening its “low price” image.299 C1000, according to one manager provoked by the low price levels in the 
AH pilot store, opened a similar store but explicitly aimed at labour cost saving300 -- indicating one of the 
inherent contradictions still in this kind of strategic reorientation. Jumbo seems to pursue the high product 
quality – high service skills orientation more consistently.301
A crucial prerequisite for the success of a high road strategy will be heavy investment in up-grading the 
sales and product expertise of staff. If such strategies gain ground, they may –under the pressure of the 
unions, training institutes, and so on-- generate positive effects on the quality of supermarket jobs, including 
improved career opportunities for checkout operators. From this perspective, the announcement, in 2006, 
of Albert Heijn that the customer service skills of its front-line staff needed improving and that the com-
pany for that purpose was launching training programs for 50,000 Dutch employees,302 was an interesting 
sign. Yet, at the same time the market leader made clear that it would drive back functional ﬂ  exibility be-
tween checkout operators and shelf stackers maintaining, as it clariﬁ  ed later in 2006, the goal to curtail their 
wages.303 This is just one example of the inherent contradictions that still make it far from clear whether the 
leading retail companies’ headquarters will give full weight to high road HR policies. 
297   Cf. AH’s CEO Boer, cited in NRC-Handelsblad, 24-12-2005. Notably these product groups meet the needs of two-earner 
families with perceived shortages of time.
298   Baltesen, 2006f, and author’s store visits.
299   Baltesen, 2006b, 2006g, 2006h; Boer in Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 244. 
300   Six of 12 C1000 checkouts were self-scan registers. Cf. Baltesen, 2006g; Stoker, 2006.
301   Baltesen, 2006i, and store visits of the author.
302   Baltesen, 2006h.
303   Featuring prominently in the new AH store control model was that shelf-stackers would have to operate in greater isolation 
from the customers (Baltesen, 2006i).Page ● 75
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3.4.  Supermarkets: institutions and labour relations
3.4.1. Labour  relations
Eighteen large supermarket chains, including all major nation-wide operating ﬁ  rms, maintain their own 
employers’ organisation, VGL (Vereniging Grootwinkelbedrijf  in Levensmiddelen, Association of Grocery Mul-
tiple Stores). Over the years, VGL has transferred most of its activities to the Central Bureau Food Trade 
(CBL, Centraal Bureau Levensmiddelenhandel), of which the major retail chains and wholesalers are members. 
This Bureau is carrying out programs concerning food security, including the maintenance of food stand-
ards; labour supply, and maintains lobbies in The Hague and Brussels. VGL negotiates the CLA Large 
Grocery Retail Companies (CAO Grootwinkelbedrijf  in Levensmiddelen) or “VGL-CLA” with the two unions 
involved, FNV Bondgenoten and CNV Dienstenbond. More recently smaller, independent grocery retailers 
have started an organization of their own, Vakcentrum, with as main goals improving the image of the in-
dependents and enlarging their innovative capacities. Sometimes the Vakcentrum explicitly clashes with their 
larger competitors of VGL; Vakcentrum and the Dutch farmers’ organisation LTO were the ﬁ  rst to start a 
lobby against the supermarket price war. However, in collective bargaining they follow VGL closely. With 
the same FNV and CNV unions, Vakcentrum and the older Nederlandse Vereniging van Cooperatieve Werkgevers 
(Dutch Association of Cooperative Employers) negotiate the CLA for Grocery Companies (CAO voor het 
Levensmiddelenbedrijf). Smaller ﬁ  rms follow this CLA, which is mandatory extended. Actually, the two CLAs 
are nearly identical; the VGL-CLA has a few extras for early retirement and child care and contains an ad-
ditional protocol on changes in employment and a (small) training fund.
Although he characterized the main supermarket chains as tough opponents, one union ofﬁ  cer pointed 
out that more than more than other retail employers they are inclined to maintain a minimum level of regu-
lated labour relations.304 Their backgrounds and interests work in this direction. First, they have reached 
higher levels of professionalism than other retail businesses, employing quite some professionals in ﬁ  elds 
like HR management, Public Relations and technology, and providing an infrastructure for branch activi-
ties. Second, for the chain owners and larger franchisers the golden years 1995-2000 led to high personal 
incomes and related societal standing, resulting in widespread aversion and even public scorn of the “greedy 
grocers”. As a result, all food chains worry about their public image. It is not inconceivable that a bad im-
age results in lower sales. In 2004 several clashes occurred between Aldi and the unions, for example over 
dismissals of “talkative” workers, and a leading industry analyst saw the related negative publicity reﬂ  ected 
304   Interviews with FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cer.Page ● 76
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in the lowering of Aldi’s market share.305 In 2005 and 2006, Aldi’s Dutch headquarters avoided conﬂ  icts with 
the unions. A third factor contributing to regulated labour relations at the supermarket chains is the outside 
threat of the potential penetration of the Dutch food market by foreign competitors.
3.4.2. Employee  representation
Within the food retail sub-sector, union membership is unevenly distributed. In the small and medium-
sized enterprises in food retail union density in 2005-06 could be estimated at about 5%. Within the scope 
of the CLA for the large supermarket chains density was 9 - 10%, of which FNV Bondgenoten density reached 
6-7%.306 This union acknowledges considerable differences in density between outlets, with 40-50% of 
the workforce organized in some supermarkets and others without any members. These differences have 
largely been attributed to the activities of lay activists. In large retail ﬁ  rms union density is between 15 and 
20%; here the well-organised distribution centres –-strategic points in the logistical chain-- add considerably 
to union membership and the deployment of union power.307 The Ahold distribution centres repeatedly 
functioned as union spearheads, like in mid-July 2006, with strike threats before a new CLA was agreed.308 
Yet in the majority of supermarkets and electronics outlets, union consciousness is low, as the eight cases 
we investigated conﬁ  rmed. Representative seems here what one supermarket checkout operator in a focus 
group said: “We don’t have any contacts eith union ofﬁ  cials, and nobody here is a union member – if any-
body is a member, she better keep ot secret. About a year ago, a union guy visited our store. He only spoke 
with the manager and was not allowed to contact us. Yet we would like to discuss some pressing problems 
with unionists, if necessary ouside the store, especially the short-notice messages on our working hours.”
Indeed, at the time of our research, a recurrent worker complaint was that of unilateral employer de-
cisions concerning working times and days-off, low stafﬁ  ng levels, high work pressure, and in particular 
employers who did not pay according to hours worked. As we well argue in section 3.6.1, the latter practice 
is essential to keep hourly wages of adult supermarket workers low. Union ofﬁ  cers and laypeople also got a 
lot of complaints about violations of the strict terms of notice for changes in working hours laid down in 
the CLAs. These practices could not be separated from inconsistencies in the instrumentation of HR man-
agement between the various management layers in most Dutch food chains. They often seem to neglect 
policies and procedures to link formal HR strategies with their implementation, that is, with compliance at 
local level. The obvious outcome is that, without much guidance, they pass on the burden of ﬁ  nding work-
305   GfK director Joop Holla, cited in Thijssen, 2005.
306   Information from the responsible FNV Bondgenoten ofﬁ  cer.
307   Dribbusch, 2003, 249; information from the responsible FNV Bondgenoten ofﬁ  cer.
308   Website FNV Bondgenoten.Page ● 77
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able HR arrangements to local management.309
Under pressure of a union mobilization campaign and after 11 rounds of negotiations, in June 2005 
new supermarket CLAs were agreed upon for the period April 1, 2004 - April 1, 2007310; the 15 months 
in between were ‘CLA-less’, meaning that only the basic regulations in the CLA were pending.311 Devel-
opments in labour relations mirrored the positions taken in product markets, and old distinctions were 
blurred.312 Since 2003, Albert Heijn, for many years the “social face of Dutch retail”, has lost this aura. 
Labour relations in and with AH deteriorated, partly because of the unions blamed the ﬁ  rm for starting 
the price war. Even the chairman of the moderate CNV confederation called the role of AH in this respect 
“outright disgusting”.313 The market leader still maintained professional HR policies and related standards in 
matters of pay, training and working conditions, but between 2003 and 2006 the gap between expectations 
and reality has widened. Headquarters’ demands for strict cost control often clashed with practices that AH 
store managers wanted to pursue.314
On the other side of the spectrum, union – management relations at discounters Aldi and Lidl seemed 
to have left the low point behind. In April 2005, the responsible FNV Bondgenoten ofﬁ  cer charged Aldi to 
neglect arrangements allowing lay union activists to act without managerial impediments, arrangements that 
were agreed after a strike in the Aldi distribution center.315 Being interviewed, he argued that the strictly 
hierarchical, near-military Aldi structure hardly allowed for any co-determination or employee participation. 
We noted that Aldi’s Dutch branch had been confronted with the negative effects of a bad public image. 
By the time, Lidl also seemed to have learned from the Aldi experience, and –adapting to the prevailing 
Dutch labour relations-- entered into some dialogue with the Dutch unions.316 Union ofﬁ  cers characterized 
the union – management relationships in other Dutch supermarket chains as “rather laborious.” They said 
that union activism in some family-owned chains, notably Dirk van den Broek, Hoogvliet and Vomar, met 
quite some management obstruction. Other family companies, such as Jumbo, scored considerably better 
on labour relations.317
309   Interviews FNV Bondgenoten ofﬁ  cers. Cf. Brouwer and Borsboom, 2006, 26.
310   Sources: FNV Bondgenoten website; union leaﬂ  ets.
311   As during the same time period the government had frozen the national SMW, the gap between CLA wages and SMW re-
mained the same.
312   Sources: interview FNV Bondgenoten ofﬁ  cer, case studies.
313   Doekle Terpstra, cited in NRC-Handelsblad, 29-12-2004.
314   Sources: interview FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cer, union leaﬂ  ets.
315   Bondgenoten Magazine, April 2005.
316   In Germany the labour relations reputation of Aldi and Lidl varies. Aldi is frequently said to be a reliable employer, but Lidl 
is notorious for its ruthless treatment of employees (cf. continuous campaign on Lidl of the Verdi union, see www.lidl.verdi.
de and www.verdi-blog.de/lidl). Yet, both have a proven record of union hostility (cf. Wortmann, 2004, 435).
317   Interview FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cers.Page ● 78
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Irrespective of the speciﬁ  c labour relations at ﬁ  rm level, two impediments for unionization continue to 
be highly relevant within the supermarkets: the prevalence of part-time and contingent employment, and 
high labour turnover. Like in retail at large, the high churning rates cannot be separated from the large share 
of young employees. Anyway, that share proved to be a bottleneck in the Shopping Center Project, an effort 
of the FNV Services Union (Dienstenbond) and its successor FNV Bondgenoten to organize supermarket staff 
(1992-98). With union teams in 122 centers, consisting of 250 activists, this project reached its limits.318 In 
2006, FNV Bondgenoten started an organizing campaign aiming at youngsters working in the supermarkets, 
partly connected to the “supermarket learning job” scheme described earlier. VET pupils up till 19 of age 
were offered a membership for free, older pupils major discounts on the membership fee.319
Finally, it should be mentioned that in the early 1990s the FNV Services Union initiated a project aiming 
at improving the working conditions of supermarket checkout operators, focusing on organization develop-
ment and ergonomic improvements of cash registers.320 With the support of the Labour Inspectorate and 
some “leading edge” cash register suppliers, some improvements turned out into a reality. However, in our 
ﬁ  eld research we got quite some indications that in the course of the price war management attention for 
job quality and ergonomics faded away to a considerable extent. 
3.4.3. Vocational  training
Vocational training activities for the supermarket sub-sector are undertaken by the branch organisa-
tion CBL. CBL takes a more active stand concerning vocational training than the industry training fund 
SOD. CBL has developed close ties with especially the medium vocational education institutions to prepare 
students for their regular MBO diploma and at the same time for the CBL retail diploma, delivering about 
10,000 graduates annually.321. Training manuals produced by the CBL Educational House (Opleidingenhuis) 
are used for in-company training by commercial training institutes as well as by the ROCs for regular vo-
cational training. All Dutch chains recognize these manuals. The ROCs provide the majority of secondary-
level courses. CBL courses, additional to the ROC courses, cover the four job levels to be distinguished in 
retail at large as well as in supermarkets:
318   Dribbusch, 2003.
319   Union leaﬂ  ets Welkom op het werk! Welkom bij FNV Bondgenoten! and Tijdelijke contracten en leeftijdsdiscriminatie (Tem-
porary contracts and age discrimination).
320   Meerman and Huppes, 1993.
321   Source: website CBL.Page ● 79
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  ● checkout operator / sales assistant (level 1), duration 1,5 - 2 years.  The competencies achieved at this 
level encompass selling products and providing service for the clients; receiving of the products, if 
necessary, processing and displaying them; and performing as a check-out operator. To follow this 
course, a candidate is required to have a minimum of VMBO thinking and educational level; 
  ● salesperson, assistant department manager (level 2). Entry requirement is to have attained CBL Level 
1 or ROC 2. Previously completed education at the ﬁ  rst CBL level shortens the duration from three 
years to one year. The students acquire skills and knowledge which allow them to carry the responsi-
bility for employees in a particular store department and coach them. Competencies here are some-
what broader compared with the level 1 course. Apart from receiving and processing articles as well as 
selling, and providing services for the clients, salespersons at the second level are supposed to be able 
to be in operational control of a department;
  ● assistant supermarket (store) manager / department manager (level 3). The entry requirement is grad-
uation as a CBL assistant department manager or ROC level 3. The aims here are acquiring knowledge 
in managing a part of the store, like the fresh products department. Main competencies learned are 
carrying out the policy of the organisation, controlling the ﬂ  ow of goods and supplies, and perform-
ing operational tasks in the store. Course duration depends on the tracks chosen by the learners. If 
the previous level has been reached, it takes only a year; if not, the educational track rounds up to four 
years.
  ● entrepreneur/manager, store manager: higher vocational education in retail management (level 4). 
This education is performed at HBO level. The learners are required to be able to successfully per-
form tasks in personnel management, ﬁ  nancial, strategic, operational and commercial activities at 
establishment level. Course duration is four years, but if a student has completed the third level, his/
her years of study are taken into account.322
In April 2006, the FNV Bondgenoten union, the CBL employers’ federation and CWI, the ofﬁ  cial em-
ployment agency body, launched the “supermarket learning job” -- a dual learning-working scheme for 
youngsters under 20 of age without certiﬁ  cate, based on a two years’ contract. One day per week the pupils 
have to follow ROC courses, enabling them to obtain a level 2 certiﬁ  cate. The supermarkets involved are 
paying for the education, receiving subsidies amounting to €4,000 per trainee. CWI is offering support to 
apply for a job if after two years the supermarket job may end. Although the goals do not seem to be overly 
322   Sources: website CBL; CBL, w.y.Page ● 80
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ambitious,323 the project looks highly interesting from both a labour market and a labour relations viewpoint. 
FNV Bondgenoten stresses the need to reduce the substantial number of dropouts that do not complete basic 
vocational training, while the employers’ federation emphasizes the importance of the scheme as one of 
the solutions for their labour supply problems. Both feel the need to improve the image of the industry.324
The CBL end terms are certiﬁ  ed, and are growingly also used by ROCs for their daytime education. 
Some chains are known to be active users of CBL manuals, notably Albert Heijn, C1000, Dirk van den 
Broek, Coop, DekaMarkt, Super de Boer, and Jumbo. According to the CBL website, the educational offeris 
gradually gaining in popularity among supermarket workers; obviously, the programmes have proven their 
practical relevance.325 Moreover, the Industrial Board offers e-learning opportunities. Additionally, the board 
mediates subsidies from the European Social Fund (ESF) for employees willing to follow HBD training 
courses. These subsidies account for at least 32% of the training fees. 326
Vocational training in supermarket chains
In recent years various supermarket chains have taken own initiatives concerning vocational training, 
that go beyond on-the-job training. In April 2005, Jumbo announced ambitious plans for starting an Acad-
emy of its own, with 15 permanent teachers. These plans have been realised, and the numbers of teachers 
and establishments involved have grown. The programme includes three tracks, and completion is certiﬁ  ed 
by a diploma. In addition to this rather ambitious set-up, Jumbo offers to every new employee an introduc-
tory training plan. Tailor-made courses for speciﬁ  c educational or training needs are also available. Super de 
Boer, the chain recently largely acquired by Jumbo, owns an educational institute promoting programmes 
for functions in its stores, logistics and administration taught in over 100 modules. C1000 offers 2, 3 and 
4 level medium-level vocational education; students obtain the so-called C1000 diploma. The pride of this 
programme is its fully digitalised learning environment; every learner receives a laptop which remains in the 
student’s possession after education is completed.. Sligro Food Group’s Em-Té chain seems to have taken 
a different approach, with training efforts partly run by specialised bureaus. In all its establishments, intern-
ships are possible for learners in MBO programmes. Similarly, Albert Heijn is actively supporting workers 
following MBO or HBO studies in retail, including offering internship opportunities Aldi and Lidl seem 
323   The main goal was to have 1,400 – 1,700 youngsters employed under this scheme by the end of 2007. At the start, nine super-
market chains were involved, including Albert Heijn, C1000, and Lidl (De Volkskrant, 12-04-2006).
324   Interview FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cer; Kester, 2006; www.jeugdwerkloosheid.nl; leaﬂ  et Welkom op het werk! Welkom bij 
FNV Bondgenoten! In this leaﬂ  et and on the FNV Bondgenoten website, the union rather explicitly claims to have negotiated 
the supermarket learning job scheme – although correct, a rather uncommon practice for Dutch unions.
325   Website CBL; also: www.supermarkt.nl. Unfortunately, these sites lack statistical overviews.
326   Website HBD.Page ● 81
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outliers concerning vocational training in the Netherlands. Both German chains concentrate at supporting 
high-level careering, by targeting higher vocational education leavers and other young professionals. Shop-
ﬂ  oor workers merely receive on-the-job training.327
3.5.  Supermarkets: external and internal labour markets
3.5.1. Gender  distribution
The food price war clearly went at the cost of female employment, for a short while in absolute ﬁ  gures 
and for a longer term relatively. The largest share of women was attained in December 2000 (57.7%). After 
a low of 53.5% in December 2006, by the end of 2008 this share returned at 55.2% (Table 19). In the heat 
of the price war most supermarket chains preferred any young workers, in particular over “expensive” adult 
women.328 Notably women re-entrants have been victimized. Already in the spring of 2004, many elderly 
female checkout operators in an FNV Bondgenoten survey complained that they were “bullied away” and re-
placed by youngsters. Women with family responsibilities reported that employers often made unilateral de-
cisions about days off and holidays, frustrating them and sometimes forcing them to give up their jobs. Over 
the course of 2004-2005, store managers admitted these practices, stating that they “had to do this in order 
to survive”.329 We did not ﬁ  nd any counter-efforts from HR managers at company headquarters. Moreover, 
many supermarket chains till deep on 2006 continued concentrating their hiring policies on the youngest 
workers, for example through the practice of not renewing the ﬁ  xed-term contracts of 18- to 22-year-olds. 
These rather ruthless hiring and ﬁ  ring policies generated bad press and accusations of age discrimination 
(See below, under “Labour turnover”).
Another employers’ strategy of bringing down labour costs is to urge for the individual lowering of 
working hours. During the 2003-06 price war, a number of supermarket chains clearly practised this strat-
egy. Statistical evidence at this point supports our case study evidence and experience of union ofﬁ  cers. 
In 2003-2005 the headcount number of supermarket workers fell by 1.8%, while the number of FTEs 
decreased considerably more, with 4.5% -- implying a lowering of the FTE/headcount ratio from 48.5 to 
47.1% and growing part-timisation.330 At the same time, the female share in the supermarket workforce fell 
by 2.0%, three-quarters of the total decrease of this share taking place between 2000 and 2008 (see section 
327   Sources: company websites, see Table 18 (accessed 25-11-2009). 
328   The same shift in recruitment pattern has been reported from food retailing in Denmark. Cf. Esbjerg et al, 2008.
329   De Volkskrant, 24-06-2004; NRC-Handelsblad, 01-05-2004; Bondgenoten Magazine, July 2004. 
330   Authors’ calculations, based on CBS, Statline (headcount ﬁ  gures) and website HBD (FTE ﬁ  gures).Page ● 82
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2.5.1).331 We have good reasons to assume that, like in retail at large (section 2.5.4), the lowering in working 
hours took place rather involuntarily, and that this lowering mainly took place among females. In the Neth-
erlands, employers may prefer this practice as neither the unions nor the works councils are endowed with 
adequate means to counteract it. 
In a cross-country perspective, the share of women in Dutch supermarkets is not particularly high. At 
ﬁ  rst sight, this is astonishing considering the female share in the target occupation: in the Dutch supermar-
kets 85 to 88% of the checkout operators turn out to be female332, or 5 to 10%points higher than in the 
UK, France, Germany, and Denmark.333 The conclusion seems inevitable that Dutch supermarket chains 
allow themselves a comparatively large male staff in management and logistics; the shop-ﬂ  oor workforce is 
predominantly female. In our four case stores, women accounted for 74 to 88% of that workforce.
3.5.2. Age  distribution 
The supermarket price war led to an even stronger impetus on employing youngsters, more precisely: 
younger youngsters. In 2004, over three in ﬁ  ve supermarket workers were younger than 23 of age, with 
wages based on the youth wage scales of the CLAs (61%, Table 9), the same share as in 2001.334 In both 
years, also three-ﬁ  fth of all employees younger than age 23 and working in retail could be found in the su-
permarkets.335 The 2004 ﬁ  gures clarify that the shares of the other three age groups were relatively small: 
15% in the age group 23-35, 12% aged 36-45, and 12% over 45 of age. All three shares were much smaller 
than those employed in the other sub-sectors.
WageIndicator data allowed for combining occupations and age groups in the supermarkets over Septem-
ber 2004 - September 2006 (Table 20). This data indicated that 65% of the supermarket respondents was 
under 25 of age: 63% of the checkout operators, 52% of the sales assistants and 78% of the shop assistants 
/ shelf stackers. Accordingly, 59% of the supermarket workforce resorted under the CLA youth wage scales 
(38% being 15-19 of age): 56% of the checkout operators (36% aged 15-19), 43% of the sales assistants 
(only 14% aged 15-19), and 74% of the shop assistants / shelf stackers (54% being 15-19 of age). The data 
supported the HBD ﬁ  gures cited in chapter 2, indicating that employers from 2003 on have been shifting 
recruitment towards the 15-17 years of age. Combining the available sources, we estimated for 2005 the su-
permarket workforce aged 15-19 on 74,000 headcount (37%), those aged 20-22 on 44,000 (22%), and those 
331   Authors’ calculations, based on CBS, Statline.
332   Authors’ calculations, based on WageIndicator data and case studies.
333   UK: Mason and Osborne, 2008; FR: personal communication of Jean-Baptiste Berry; GE: personal communication of Doro-
thea Voss-Dahm; DK: Esbjerg et al, 2008.
334   Rienstra and Copinga, 2003.
335   2001: Rienstra and Copinga, 2003; 2004: authors’ calculations based on Table 9 and CBS, Statline.Page ● 83
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aged 23-24 on 12,000 (6%) – totalling 130,000 or 65%. Thus, approximately 118,000 or 59% were under 23 
of age, with wages on the youth wage scales of the CLAs. A large majority of about them, about 110,000 
or 55% of the headcount workforce, formally functioned as auxiliary workers.336 It is relevant to note our 
ﬁ  nding here that a substantial minority of these auxiliary workers did not only carry out shelf-stacking du-
ties; about one-third of them may have functioned under an internal ﬂ  exibility regime, occasionally also 
performing checkout duties. This regime may to a considerable degree have informal features. It seems 
characteristic for co-operation patterns at shop-ﬂ  oor level that more recently in the WageIndicator survey a 
high share of Dutch retail workers indicated that they could swap shifts with colleagues. In 2007 and the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2008, 69% of respondents working in supermarkets ticked this possibility (retail at large: 67%). 
3.5.3. Educational  levels
The WageIndicator data also enables a division over September 2004 - September 2006 of supermarket 
occupations by educational level (Table 21). Striking are the relatively high educational levels. In this sample, 
66% of the supermarket staff at large had at least completed medium-level secondary education (level 4): 
63% of the checkout operators, 69% of the sales assistants and 68% of the shop assistants / shelf stackers. 
These outcomes conﬁ  rmed once more that substantial shares of the supermarket workers were students; 
if these outcomes would be representative, most likely 40% or more of the shop assistants / shelf stackers, 
but also at least one in three checkout operators. 
3.5.4.  Working time and contracts
According to HBD, in 2003 15% of the headcount supermarket workforce had a full-time contract, 
slightly over 50% a regular part-time contract and 33% a ﬂ  exible (ﬁ  xed-term) contract.337 We derived from 
these ﬁ  gures that in 2003 80% of the supermarket workforce worked part-time.338 Yet, from then on super-
market employers growingly offered part-time contracts, and consequently the share of part-timers in the 
supermarkets has increased further, most likely to 83% in 2005-6. The share in our four case supermarkets 
was even higher, with part-timers making up 84-89% of their respective headcounted workforces. In terms 
of FTEs, in 2005 one-third of the 94,500 FTEs in the supermarkets was related to full-timers, one-third to 
336   Authors’ calculations, based on CBS, Statline; CGB, 2006; HBD, 2005a; WageIndicator data, September 2004-September 
2006.
337   WageIndicator survey outcomes over 2000-2004 suggest that the share of those on ﬂ  exible contracts  was higher than average 
for checkout operators and shop assistants / shelf stackers, and average or lower for salespersons / sales assistants. Among 
checkout operators, 53% had a ﬁ  xed-term contract (n = 321), as had 64% of the shop assistants / shelf stackers (n = 103); by 
contrast, 31% of salespersons / sales assistants had a ﬁ  xed-term contract (n = 304) (calculations: Kea Tijdens).
338   Authors’ calculations based on HBD, 2005a, 20, assuming that 10% of the workers with ﬂ  exible contracts worked full-time.Page ● 84
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regular part-timers and one-third to auxiliary workers.339 Cross-country comparative studies found for the 
early 2000s that in many Dutch supermarkets 50% or more of the employees worked less than 12 hours per 
week.340 Dutch case studies gave the same indications. For example, the share working less than 12 hours 
was even over 60% in the 10 Albert Heijn supermarkets Horbeek analyzed in the late 1990s.341 A survey in 
early 2010 indicated that 10% of the supermarket staff 23 of age and younger worked full-time (32 hours 
per week or more), 35% part-time (13-31 hours), 50% as auxiliary workers (2-12 hours), whereas 4% worked 
on call. Four in ten (41%) of these young workers had a permanent contract, just over half (51%) a ﬁ  xed-
term contract;342 six in seven of the ﬁ  rst group had “deserved” their permanent position via one or more 
temporary contracts; only one in six (17%) got a permanent contract directly when entering the ﬁ  rm.343 
As we already noted in Chapter 2, the supermarket workforce younger than 23 of age is in majority 
made up of second-generation migrants, notably in the large cities in the Randstad conurbation.  Most of 
this group run the risk of being stuck in the low-wage segment, but it would be too simple to connect that 
risk simply with the discrimination issue. Discrimination of youngsters from ethnic minorities applying on 
vacancies has been reported, and in the past at least one HR ofﬁ  cer openly argued that the supermarket 
staff of his chain in the large cities was going to be “too black”.344 Yet, especially general managers of food 
retailers have denied that this is valid reasoning and have claimed that their ﬁ  rms promote career oppor-
tunities for migrant workers and minorities.345 In our case study interviews, the store managers of the two 
supermarkets located in areas with a large migrant population emphasized that their workforces should as 
far as possible mirror the composition of the local customer population. We estimated that between 50 and 
60% of these workforces were second-generation migrant workers.
3.5.5. Labour  turnover
As might be expected, the dominance of the youngest age groups and the magnitude of labour turnover 
are closely linked. Moreover, hiring and ﬁ  ring of the large, young “auxiliary army” is a rather haphazard and 
highly cyclical process: ﬁ  erce hiring efforts in the economic upswing, followed by ﬁ  ring efforts of the same 
magnitude if business goes downhill.346 In the case supermarkets, yearly turnover in the target job in the low 
339   Authors’ calculations, based on CBS, Statline, and CGB, 2006, 9, assuming that the auxiliary workers on average worked 10 
hours per week and the “regular” part-timers on average 23 hours per week.
340   Voss-Dahm and Lehndorff, 2003; Dribbusch, 2003.
341   Horbeek, 2003.
342   “Don’t know” scored 7%.
343   MWM2/CNV Dienstenbond, 2010.
344   Cf. Dirk van den Broek’s HR manager: Stielstra, 2004. 
345   Cf. Ahold’s CEO Moberg, though he added that career opportunities for ethnic minorities in Ahold’s US subsidiaries were 
better than in his Dutch organisation (Korteweg, 2005).
346   Rightly observed by Kremer, 2008, 49-50.Page ● 85
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tide of 2004-2005 varied between 20 and 35%. This is rather low, as since the mid-1990s its national level 
has been about 40%. The Industrial Board attributed the latter ﬁ  gure largely to the ﬂ  exible labour market 
behaviour of the youngsters working as shelf stackers.347 Yet, one may wonder whether such behaviour re-
ﬂ  ects their free will. The unions maintain that from 2003 on they have received many complaints of young 
supermarket checkout operators and shelf stackers, ﬁ  red after three temporary contracts.348 Supermarkets 
were allegedly systematically withholding new ﬁ  xed-term contracts to auxiliary workers over age 18. In May 
2005, ﬁ  ve dismissed young supermarket employees instituted proceedings at the national Equal Treatment 
Commission concerning age discrimination. In February 2006, the Commission judged the dismissals at 
stake unlawful and issued a general judgment against such discrimination in the supermarkets. The employ-
ers’ federations argued in favour of the need for cost control and ﬂ  exibility, but the Commission responded 
that these goals could also be attained in offering auxiliary workers permanent contracts.349 Nevertheless, 
union ofﬁ  cers have argued that this verdict does not per se mean an improvement for young employees: it 
may well be that employers offer them only one or two temp contracts or take refuge to contracts on call, 
practices that can be legal in the Netherlands.350 Most recently, a survey covering supermarket workers aged 
15-23 found that 13% had stayed with their employer less than six months, 19% between six months and 
one year, 25% between one year and two years, and 44% two years or more.351 These outcomes come close 
to the ofﬁ  cial statistics for retail at large in 2005 (Table 15) – surprisingly, as one might have expected tenures 
of young supermarket workers to be shorter.
3.5.6.  The young workers
Since young workers are so important for the supermarket branch, we devoted a special analysis of 
WageIndicator data on their situation and preferences.352 Basic questions were: why are the supermarkets a 
rather attractive source of employment for these workers? Do they earn more in the supermarket, do work-
ing hours ﬁ  t them better, or is it that supermarkets are located so nicely close to home? Between January 
2002 and April 2005 9,323 youngsters between ages 16 and 23 ﬁ  lled out the WageIndicator questionnaire; 621 
347   Dribbusch, 2003, 64; HBD, 2004a.
348   The Dutch Flexicurity Act allows this practice after the third half-year contract, but under certain conditions this can be 
judged as age discrimination (CGB, 2006).
349   CGB, 2006; website CGB. Also Schouten, 2005b; De Volkskrant, 31-05-2005.
350   Interviews FNV Bondgenoten ofﬁ  cers. In a 2010 judgement based on the complaint of a young supermarket worker, the 
Equal Treatment Commission concluded that discrimination by age is allowed under certain conditions, for example if the 
employer is able to prove that it concerns a starter’s job (Heijne, 2010; CGB, 2010).
351   MWM2/CNV Dienstenbond, 2010.
352   Van Klaveren and Tijdens, 2005. Just over one third (36%) of the young supermarket workers surveyed were working stu-
dents, against one of ﬁ  ve (21%) in the other industries, also outside retail (calculations Kea Tijdens, based on WageIndicator 
data).Page ● 86
Maarten van Klaveren
(6.7%) of them worked in a supermarket.353 We found that their hourly wages were on average 20% less 
than elsewhere; this gap was largest for the 16-year-olds. The 18-year-olds formed the exception, gaining per 
hour somewhat more than those of the same age working in other industries.
The young supermarket workers on average had a 23 hours’ working week: considerably shorter than 
their peers elsewhere that made average weeks of 32 hours. As a result, a 19-year-old on average earned € 
130 per week in the supermarket (wages level 2004), against € 183 elsewhere, or 41% more.354 Obviously, 
earnings are not that decisive; are working hours? The survey data shows that much more than other juvenile 
workers, the youngsters in the supermarkets worked according to schedules, had split working days, and had 
their starting and ending times much more registered. Moreover, they worked more on Saturdays. By con-
trast, they worked much less night and Sunday shifts. Moreover, it was remarkable that youngsters working 
in the supermarkets wanted to work more hours than they actually do. This was especially so for boys, less 
for girls. The younger the supermarket workers, the more hours they preferred to work.
How important is commuting time? Indeed, youngsters working in the supermarkets spent less com-
muting time than their peers working elsewhere. Three-quarters of the young people employed in super-
market lived less than one-quarter of an hour from their workplace, compared to fewer than 50% of those 
working in other branches. Thus, we may conclude that the supermarkets are offering youngsters interesting 
workplaces outside the traditional opening hours but not at unappealing hours such as at night and or on 
Sunday, and that they also present young people with more opportunities to work closer to home, perhaps 
even in their own neighbourhood. Against these advantages, many young people obviously take the low 
supermarket wages for granted. 
3.6.  Supermarkets: wages, work organisation and job quality
3.6.1. Wages
Typical larger supermarkets show ﬁ  ve job levels and four hierarchical levels -- if a formal hierarchy is 
absent between shelf-stackers and checkout operators (the functional groups of the CLAs between paren-
theses):
  ● shelf stacker / prospective checkout operator / sales-assistant (A);
  ● checkout operator / sales-assistant (B);
353   Compared with ofﬁ  cial statistics, the supermarket workers were under-represented among the youngsters. Yet, this is not a 
substantial problem as we only compare between youngsters working in the supermarkets and those working elsewhere.
354   However, young people virtually pay no taxes on such low incomes. Page ● 87
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  ● assistant department manager / ﬁ  rst checkout operator (C);
  ● assistant store manager / department manager (D, E, F);
  ● store manager (F, G, H,  I).
In Table 22, we present the wage scales annexed with the supermarket CLAs for 2008-2010.355 We have 
indicated the functional levels relevant for our research project, A to I. These wage scales are characterized 
as follows:
  ● a rather ﬂ  at wage structure, with in the A to D range rather minor differences between the wage levels;
  ● short scales and thus rather low seniority rights: scales contain a maximum of ﬁ  ve yearly steps, with a 
largest difference of 80%;
  ● the youth scale A wage at age 15 (€ 528 monthly as of July 2008) starts 21.5% above the YMW as of 
January 1, 2009;
  ● the adult scale A wage (€ 1,688 as of July 2008) starts 19% above the SMW as of January 1, 2009, and 
5.5% under the low-wage threshold, that we estimated for 2009 at  € 1,780 (In Table 22, wages above 
this threshold are indicated in italics). 
We ﬁ  rst present the available statistical evidence on supermarket wages. In Chapter 2 we noted that in 
2002 according to ofﬁ  cial statistics 57% of the Dutch supermarket workers had wages below the low-pay 
threshold, by far the highest share among the industries targeted by the Dutch part of the RSF research 
project. The share of low-paid females (53%) working in supermarkets was somewhat lower, with the 
most likely explanation to be found in the large share of low-paid male shelf-stackers, bringing the share 
of the low-paid among the male supermarket workers at 60%. Across countries, the low-pay incidence in 
the Dutch supermarkets was also quite high; it was only surpassed by that in the UK supermarkets (64% in 
2001), while this incidence was considerably lower in the other four countries ; in German and the US it was 
even lower than in retail at large (Table 1). 
Calculations on Dutch WageIndicator data conﬁ  rmed that the target supermarket jobs are deﬁ  nitely low-
wage. Based on January 2004 - September 2006 data, the average gross hourly wage (level 2006) came at 
€8.54 for checkout operators, €9.63 for sales assistants, and €6.83 for shop assistants / shelf stackers -- the 
lowest averages for the occupations selected in the Dutch part of the RSF project. These averages still in-
cluded youth wage rates. Isolating the wages of the 25-44 of age, the WageIndicator outcomes for the three 
occupations in question, overall averaging €11.23, turned out to be close: averages of €11.28 for checkout 
355   In these ﬁ  gures compensations are not included. Compensations for working unusual hours are: Monday-Friday between 20-
21 PM 33.3%, between 21 PM-6 AM 50%, Saturdays between 18-24 PM  50%, Sundays 100%.Page ● 88
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operators, €11.11 for sales assistants, and €11.21 for shop assistants / shelf stackers. Nevertheless, these 
averages again were the lowest in this adult age category across the sub-sectors under study.356 Assuming that 
these adult employees, grouped together, were equally divided over the CLA scales A and B and that their 
tenures were divided in this age group like in retail at large (Table 15), their average CLA wage at the time 
might have been €10.55, 6% lower than the reported average of €11.23. The distance between the wages 
reported through the WageIndicator survey and the CLA wages was in 2004-2006 much larger for the 15-22 
of age. Assuming that they were all classiﬁ  ed in scale A, the reported average hourly wages of the 15-17, 18, 
19 and 20 of age were 15%, 16%, 20% and 15% above the respective CLA levels. The real wages seemed to 
have characteristics of efﬁ  ciency wages: employers tend pay somewhat more than the market-clearing wages 
in order to increase productivity and encourage worker commitment. Yet, by age the situation changed: the 
reported average hourly wages of the 21 - 24 of age were only 2 to 8% above the respective CLA – scale 
A levels.357. These outcomes once more suggest that the supermarket employers were mainly interested in 
employing the youngest youths in the checkout and shop assistant / shelf stacker jobs, and that the labour 
market position of in particular those in their early twenties was weak, with both conclusions holding for 
2004-06 and for 2008.358
We already presented some of the median gross hourly wages calculated on WageIndicator data for 2006-
2008 (Table 27). The median hourly wages found for the supermarkets and department stores were total 
€ 9.58 in 2006, € 9.79 in 2007 and € 9.96 in 2008. These wage medians were lower than the overall retail, 
consumer electronics and “other retail” medians found, but the ﬁ  gures detailed by age clarify that the low 
youth wage rates played major roles here. And even developments in these rates ask for some nuance. First, 
in 2008, except for the 15-17-year-olds, the youth rates in the supermarkets had become higher than those 
in other retail. Second, though the wage increases turn out rather volatile for some ages, notably for the 
youngest group, over 2007-2008 supermarket wages of the 15-22 of age as well as of the 23-aged showed 
a somewhat more consistent increase than wages in the “other” category. It is also interesting to note that 
the supermarket wage medians in two of three age categories over age 23 in 2007 and 2008 were higher 
356   Admittedly, the sample sizes for the 25-44 aged were rather small: checkout operators: n=191, sales assistants: n=59, shop 
assistants / shelf stackers: n=53, total n=303. Calculations: Kea Tijdens.
357   Again, under the (unlikely!) assumption that they all remained in scale A, step 0.
358   A reiteration of this exercise for 2008 was not fully comparable as we needed to use median WageIndicator rates for approach-
ing real wages, but the results suggest that the same mechanisms as described were still in place. In 2008, the reported median 
wages were respectively 39% (15-17 of age), 21% (18), 22% (19), 20% (20), and 7 -13% (21 – 23-year-olds) above the CLA 
levels.Page ● 89
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than the medians in the other retail branches; for whatever reason, the 35-44 aged made up the exception. 
We also presented the ﬁ  nding, based on WageIndicator data over 2007 / ﬁ  rst half of 2008 and again using 
median hourly wages, that nearly half (48%) of the respondents aged 23 and older working in supermarkets 
and department stores earned less than the low-wage threshold estimated for the Netherlands for these 
years, with a large divide according to working hours: a low-pay incidence of 36% among full-timers and 
74% among part-timers. Combination of the available ﬁ  gures, though at a different statistical basis, suggests 
that in the course of the 2000s the low-wage share in the supermarkets and department stores has fallen 
somewhat, contrary to that in retail at large. 
We now go into developments concerning the supermarket CLAs. In the ﬁ  rst phase of our ﬁ  eld re-
search, that is, in the 15 months following April 2004 after these CLAs expired, the supermarket workforce 
had to do without wage increases. Yet, as at the same time the Dutch government had frozen the SMW, the 
distance between CLA wages and SMW remained the same. Afterwards, the employers’ associations tried 
to keep unions on the “zero-line”, but their efforts failed: the nominal wage increase in the two 2004-2007 
supermarket CLAs was 3.5%. All four case food chains adhered to the supermarket CLAs, including the 
wage scales. During our ﬁ  eld research in 2005-2006, as far as we could trace the mutual differences between 
the paid wages were minimal. 
The supermarket CLAs running from April 2008 – April 2010 and agreed in September 2008 may mark 
a break in employers’ strategies, with some arrangements that suggest an effort to improve the image of 
the branch. First, the CLAs envisaged increasing wages by 6.75% in two years, slightly above the national 
average. Second, the CLAs recognized that the youth wage rates did not provide enough of an incentive 
for young workers, and introduced a form of experience rating for 17- and 18-year-olds. In the new pay 
scales tenure started to pay off and careering received a ﬁ  nancial stimulus. Third, though scales remain 
rather short, seniority rights were expanded: scales had a largest difference of 80% instead of only 11% in 
the 2004-2007 CLAs. These three elements may constitute steps toward a re-professionalization within the 
industry.
Compliance with the CLA in practice will remain the crucial factor. Currently, all adult CLA scales are 
above the estimated low-wage threshold; adult checkout operators / sales-assistants start in scale B at  € 
1,807, or 1.5% above the threshold (According to the 2004-2007 CLAs, they reached the threshold through 
the ﬁ  rst yearly step). This seems in ﬂ  at contradiction with our ﬁ  nding that for 2007 and the ﬁ  rst half of 
2008, a period partially overlapping with the term of the new CLA, based on hourly wage rates 48% of the Page ● 90
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WageIndicator respondents aged 23 and older working in supermarkets earned less than the low-wage thresh-
old. The main explanation for this outcome may well be employers’ curtailing of worked hours, in particular 
of the extra time worked after closing time. Consequently, in answering the WageIndicator survey, the re-
spondents may have divided their monthly wage by a relatively high number of effective hours worked, thus 
ending up with a relatively low hourly wage.359
As for the gender pay gap in the supermarkets and department stores, based on the median hourly 
wages calculated on the WageIndicator data for 2007 and January-June 2008 we found a substantial pay gap 
for those aged 23 and older (26.3%), but for those under age 23 a 3.2% wage advantage for girls / young 
women).360 These outcomes were rather similar to pay gap ﬁ  gures for the supermarkets based on the WageIn-
dicator survey for 2005 and 2006, though these were based on average wages. In these years, the gender wage 
gap was rather small for the age groups under 25 age, grew to 12-14% for the 25-29 of age, to 15-24% for 
the 30-39 of age, and to over 34% for the 40-64-year-olds.361 We already pointed to the lack of career op-
portunities for in particular part-time working women as a major explanatory factor for the gender pay gap 
in retailing at large; this explanation deﬁ  nitely holds for the supermarket branch. In the WageIndicator survey 
in 2007 / ﬁ  rst half of 2008, only 33% of those aged 23 and older working in supermarkets and department 
stores ticked to have ever been promoted in the current ﬁ  rm, a share that nearly doubled (61%) among 
their full-time colleagues. Asked whether they had good career opportunities, 40% of the part-timers ticked 
“yes”, against again 62% of their full-time colleagues.362 Female role models are lacking: female store manag-
ers remain quite rare in Dutch supermarkets. Their share in nearly all large supermarket chains continues to 
be less than 10%.363 It remains remarkable that women are nearly totally absent in higher management ranks 
in an industry strongly aiming at female customers.364 
359   We calculated that, even if respondents overestimated their monthly hours worked by 10%, the share of adults working in 
supermarkets and earning less than the low-wage threshold was still nearly 30%.
360   Cf. Van Klaveren et al, 2009, 430. 
361   Van Klaveren et al, 2007, 54.
362   It should be noted the shares for the other retail branches jointly as well as separately were consistently lower: in all other 
branches only 22% of the part-time workers aged 23 and older ticked to have ever been promoted in the current ﬁ  rm, against 
46% among their full-time colleagues. Asked whether they had good career opportunities, 25% of the part-timers in other 
retail ticked “yes”, against again 46% of their full-time colleagues. Sources: Van Klaveren et al, 2009, 430, and WageIndicator 
data (not shown). 
363   Sources: company websites, store visits. Roorda (2006, 142) observed that the only exception in this respect were the Jumbo 
supermarkets.
364   Cf. Roorda, 2006, 141.Page ● 91
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3.6.2.  Work organisation and Human Resource strategies
In dealing with issues of work organisation, managerial HR strategies and job quality, we will integrate 
results from our supermarket cases, thus placing “cases in context”. Therefore, in Scheme 2 we ﬁ  rst present 
an overview of these results. Subsequently we will treat work organization and HR strategies, job quality, 
and ﬁ  nally recruitment, training and careering in the supermarkets.
Scheme 2. Overview HR strategies, work organisation and job quality in Dutch supermarket cases
Supermarkets
SUP A SUP B SUP C SUP D
HR strategy HQ emphasis on training 
/careering





HR strategy store 
management
idem training OK, career-
ing not clear
idem idem
local labour market 
target job  
tight tight tight soft 
 
local unempl. rate 
2005 total/female
T: 10% , F: 10% T: 7%, F: 6% T: 5%, F: 5% T: 7.5%, F: 9%
recruitment problems 
for target job









rather informal, FF 
rather high
quality  of work 
(problems)











labour turnover target 
job / year
30% low-25% 25-35% 22%
pay according to ind. 
CLA
according to ind. 
CLA
according to ind. 
CLA 
according to ind. 
CLA
FF = functional ﬂ exibility
As we indicated earlier, in many supermarkets store management is burdened with considerable organi-
zational problems. The extremely high share of young part-timers plays a major role, jointly with employ-
ers’ strategies toward numerical ﬂ  exibility. Here, in tackling the scheduling issue, constraints of employers 
are confronted with those of workers.365 From the viewpoint of the organization of supermarket work, 
numerical ﬂ  exibility seems to have broadly reached its limits. Notably in the supermarkets in the cities in 
the Randstad conurbation, the share of the core staff –the “anchors” in everyday practice-- is only about 
8-10% (headcount). The employment structure of most large supermarkets, with majorities of part-timers 
and auxiliary workers, has given rise to growing criticism from the unions and the Labour Inspectorate, both 
pointing at potential dangerous situations in case of emergencies (robbery, ﬁ  re, et cetera). A union ofﬁ  cer 
we interviewed in 2006 added risks of lack of supervision of auxiliary workers, including internal fraud and 
365   Cf. Carré et al, 2010, 220.Page ● 92
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shop theft. He welcomed the idea of maintaining a core staff of minimal 30% of the workforce. At the 
same time he emphasized that smaller food chains and franchisers would encounter serious problems in re-
alizing such goals, since the price war had diminished their workforce to minimal levels and minimized their 
margins as well.366 In our interviews in four supermarkets, three (assistant) store managers uttered fears in 
this direction even before we were able to pose the relevant question. They also pointed at the hardships in 
guiding, scheduling and controlling an inexperienced, very young workforce, as well as to maintain certain 
levels of tidiness and order in the stores; they stressed the large efforts it took to recruit and train consider-
able amounts of newcomers. These managers said that these efforts distracted them from their main tasks 
in supplying foodstuff and in “regularly” scheduling the workforce. 
For store managers indeed combining the various local management tasks, including recruiting, training 
and guiding the young workforce and in particular scheduling, is a tough job, even more because, ﬁ  rst, they 
have to operate in centrally structured organizations that maintain strict personnel and ﬁ  nancial bench-
marks, and second, the supermarkets they run are –at least formally-- hierarchically structured. Only in two 
case supermarkets (C and D) had the store management been left some discretion concerning assortment 
and discounts, allowing managers to adapt to local preferences. In all four cases, store managers, within the 
discretion left by the ﬁ  nancial and personnel benchmarks, were allowed to make recruitment, promotion 
and dismissal decisions concerning frontline staff. Except for the smallest one, the supermarkets in our sam-
ple used optimal stafﬁ  ng computer programs, although as a matter of fact their reliance on IT applications 
respectively on shop-ﬂ  oor feedback varied widely. 
In supermarket A, with little shop-ﬂ  oor feedback, the store manager and his assistant judged producing 
working time schemes a “tough job”. It did not help that the workforce was highly fragmented, in working 
hours, but also culturally. In the focus group, check out operators complained a lot about mismatches be-
tween management decisions and their working time preferences. In supermarket B, of about the same size, 
the store manager was quite satisﬁ  ed in producing working time schemes, supported by a computer program 
and sometimes by a female ﬁ  rst (full-time) checkout operator, “the one who knows everything here”. In 
this second case, complaints of the checkout operators we interviewed concerning stafﬁ  ng problems were 
minor and deﬁ  nitely less pronounced than in A.
In chapter 2, we pointed at the importance of optimal stafﬁ  ng strategies in retail, notably in supermar-
kets. We also came across the 1996 Opening Hours (Shops) Act as a speciﬁ  c impetus for the development 
of such employer strategies. In 1997, the (then) FNV Service Union carried out a survey on the effects of 
366   Interview FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cer.Page ● 93
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the extended opening hours and compared the results with those of a survey from 1995.367 The percep-
tion of evening work was closely related to workers’ inﬂ  uence on work schedules: the less inﬂ  uence, the 
lower evening work was valued. Although in 1997 the willingness to work in evening shifts turned out to 
be higher than expected before the introduction of the new law, most supermarket workers regarded com-
pensations for evening and weekend work and a say in work scheduling as necessary prerequisites. Both 
had their rationale. First, most workers --except the young shelf stackers-- perceived evening and weekend 
work as “uncommon”. Second, discontent with short-notice changes in working times and work schedules 
was widespread. These perceptions aggravated employers’ labour supply problems, and calling on young 
workers proved to be only a temporary relief. We already noted that, under pressure of renewed recruiting 
problems, many supermarkets soon backtracked concerning their evening openings. Our case interviews 
suggested that in 2005-06 in urban areas the pool of potential young workers, notably students, was near 
exhaustion. (Assistant) store managers fully agreed with our suggestion that it was difﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nd young-
sters, in particular “time adjusters”, for evening work. Consequently, the scheduling process grew ever more 
complex.368 
Against this backdrop, it is not exaggerated to suggest that allowing functional ﬂ  exibility would be a re-
lief for scheduling, maybe --under the Dutch conditions-- even decisive for the success of any stafﬁ  ng strat-
egies. An analysis of the strategies that Albert Heijn in the late 1990s followed concerning organisation and 
scheduling working hours already pointed in this direction. AH’s store and team managers had got, within 
budget constraints, considerable discretion in organisational and stafﬁ  ng policies. Concerning scheduling, 
differentiation strategies could be traced: store managers avoided full-time workers with compensation 
rights and relied on uncompensated workers, working less than 12 hours, for stafﬁ  ng in the evenings. Work-
er strategies tended to work out in the same direction, as workers cooperating for quite some time stuck to 
old working time patterns. As a consequence, the “new” working hours were assigned to new workers. In 
case of fewer workers with compensation rights, managers chose more generic strategies. The introduction 
of functional ﬂ  exibility was a second element. With the introduction of the new opening hours, AH tried 
to change the store organisation towards team-based structures, in this way promoting job enrichment. This 
strategy seemed top pay off: establishments with the largest investments in courses and on-the-job training 
showed the best results. Yet, a number of stores did not acquire the budgets needed for such investments. 
367   Van der Linde, 1996; Miedema, 1998.
368   Evidence of such labour supply problems also in HBD, 2005b, 6. Moreover, we got indications that older full-time staff grow-
ingly opposed evening work because of shop theft and customer harassment.Page ● 94
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Moreover, in the checkout areas the required high speed of action was a major constraint.369 The analysis 
of the mechanisms at stake in a hierarchical organization revealed that these mechanisms constrained the 
spread of responsibilities, like solidarity in the peer group,370 but ﬁ  rst of all it clariﬁ  ed the need for more 
discretion of store management and for adequate budgets to invest in on-the-job training. 
Managers who apply optimal stafﬁ  ng strategies in hierarchical organisations may encounter a fair num-
ber of practical problems, as overtime in retailing for females illustrated. In October 2005, the frequency 
of overtime among females in retail was more than twice the national average: 6.5% against 3.1%.371 The 
unpredictability of consumer behaviour may play a role here, but our ﬁ  eld experience also provided ample 
proof that full reliance on numerical ﬂ  exibility often just does not work. The second last resort for man-
agement concerning numerical ﬂ  exibility in slack times is to exert pressure on the individual lowering of 
working hours, and curtailing the payment of all worked hours is the very last resort (and potential most 
conﬂ  ictive) in this respect. Most likely, in particular overtime payments are not included in headquarters’ 
benchmarks, which explains why saving on these payments obviously is a widespread practice. In all four su-
permarket cases we heard complaints related to working times and hours worked; about the inﬂ  exibility of 
the store management with respect to personal wishes concerning working hours (case A); about late notice 
concerning requested changes of working hours (cases C and D), and, both most common and assessed as 
most disadvantageous, about not being paid according to hours worked (cases B, C and D). A widespread 
nuisance was that employers even did not pay (or swap for time-off) for a special kind of overtime, that 
is, the quarter to half hour worked after closing time, mostly in times of pressure of business (in Dutch 
“afwerkkwartiertje”). Obviously, curtailing payment of worked hours was a widespread practice among store 
managers that helps them to live up to the benchmarks set by headquarters. This practice also contributes to 
the explanation why, based on hourly wage rates, a substantial share of adult supermarket workers indicates 
to earn below the low-wage threshold.
There are ample indications that probIems of scheduling and notiﬁ  cation of shifts remain widespread 
in the supermarket sub-sector. A 2005 internet survey based on the WageIndicator revealed relatively high 
discontent among supermarket workers with (manifold) changes in working time and (unexpected requests 
for) overtime, and a lack of workers’ say on working time, days-off and holidays.372 A recent representative 
369   Horbeek, 2003. 
370   Also in two of our supermarket cases some workers refused more responsibilities, especially if accepting them implied leav-
ing their peer group. Like interviews in the German supermarket cases revealed, consciously refraining from efforts to get 
promoted may go back mainly to a combination of maintaining a work-life balance and avoid the onerous management re-
sponsibilities linked to escalating performance benchmarks (cf. Voss-Dahm 2008). 
371   Source: CBS, Statline.
372   Dragstra and Van Rij, 2005.Page ● 95
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survey among supermarket staff 23 of age and younger, on behalf of the CNV Dienstenbond union, found 
that for one-third of the young workers in practice schedules deviated from those agreed. About 85% of the 
respondents did not receive pay if scheduled hours were not worked (in case workers were called off shortly 
before their service or send home earlier). Over one in four (28%) reported that the extra time worked after 
closing time was not paid for (or swapped for time-off).373 Most of these deviations were outright violations 
of the supermarket CLAs. An important regulation is that the CLAs require the employer to post schedules 
at least one week in advance.374 WageIndicator data for 2007 and the ﬁ  rst half of 2008 indicated that compli-
ance at this point was rather low: only 46% of the supermarket respondents ticked that they knew their 
schedule at least one week in advance.375 
Even if the store management has little discretion in stafﬁ  ng policies because of headquarters’ strict 
personnel benchmarks, they may ﬁ  nd some room for organisational discretion in view of recent market 
trends. We already indicated that about one-third of the auxiliary workers in supermarkets is functioning 
under an (informal) internal ﬂ  exibility regime and is also performing check out duties. Such multi-tasking is 
imposed by the immediate need to run the store and satisfy customers. Purely informal arrangements, how-
ever, can well work out negatively for employees. For example, in autumn 2006 supermarket managers were 
reported to classify ﬂ  exible checkout operators in the lowest CLA grade (A), arguing that they functioned 
as auxiliary workers. Albert Heijn’s top-level management interpreted the CLA rules in this direction, which 
led to a long-lasting conﬂ  ict with the FNV Bondgenoten union.376 Such management actions may be regarded 
as rather ill-considered, deﬁ  nitely in tight labour markets. Allowing some functional ﬂ  exibility is deﬁ  nitely 
needed if supermarkets chains commit themselves to minimizing lines for the checkout. Recent demands on 
improved service may add commercial arguments and allow local management more discretion to stimulate 
and reward functional ﬂ  exibility of frontline staff. Among the case supermarkets and their parent chains 
different strategies could be observed. Yet, in 2005-06 even “advanced” supermarket managers seemed to 
deny the necessity to pay for (workers’ efforts connected with) functional ﬂ  exibility. 
373   MWM2/CNV Dienstenbond, 2010.
374   Collective agreements in retailing in Germany and Denmark contain much tighter rules: they require retailers to post schedules 
respectively 26 and 16 weeks in advance (with in Denmark the possibility to change the work schedule with four weeks’ no-
tice – Esbjerg et al, 2008, 147). However, the German and Danish case studies revealed that breaches of these mandates were 
rather common, especially in smaller stores (Carré et al, 2010). The French national branch agreement for retail contains the 
same rule as in the Netherlands; the French researchers observed quie some workers being informed just a few hours ahead 
(Askenazy et al, 2008, 235-6).
375   The share of those knowing their schedule at least one week in advance was even much lower in the other retail sub-sectors, 
varying from 20% in furniture and consumer electronics stores to 29% in DIY stores.
376  Website FNV Bondgenoten / supermarkten, message of 15-09-2006. Page ● 96
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Supermarket A had no clear policies on customer ﬂ  uctuation and lines for the checkout. Frontline staff 
was slow to adapt to the number of customers lining up at checkouts as they opened. If this was inevitable, 
it was informally settled within cultural peer groups, often without informing store management. In contrast 
to this case, the store manager of supermarket B explained: “We maintain clear policies to keep lines short 
through the ﬂ  exible opening of new checkouts. If necessary, we ask staff from counters and from the ranks 
of experienced shelf-stackers to join. Yet, we don’t feel the need to formalize or reward these practices”. 
3.6.3. Job  quality
Regardless of the trend towards functional ﬂ  exibility, the typical supermarket checkout job has a nar-
row job proﬁ  le, and scores mainly on the executing tasks of the job description. Except for the small su-
permarket in our sample, in our case stores checkout operators had no preparing tasks, limited supporting 
tasks (cash control, simple maintenance of cash register), and very limited organizing tasks (contacts with 
ﬁ  rst cashier, participation in employees’ consultation). This target job scored low on autonomy, especially 
in those supermarkets where management had no policies to limit the lines before the checkout (A, D and 
to some extent C). It has to be noted that in our ﬁ  eld research we did not come across the (computerized) 
application of productivity norms for checkout operators, like found in the French ﬁ  eld research in retail-
ing.377 Yet, this lack of strict and formalised productivity measurement does not improve the job as such, it 
merely keeps one of the most ugly forms of psychological strain away. Helping with bagging is not a formal 
task element, although in all four stores checkout operators regarded that as “normal” on behalf of senior 
or handicapped customers.
In supermarkets, limited task variety and autonomy of checkout operators do have consequences for 
employees’ workload and work-related stress levels. This was already convincingly demonstrated in the 
early 1990s when union-initiated research compared the workload and work-related stress of supermarket 
checkout operators and department store cashiers. The latter were in jobs with a broader function, usually 
including showing merchandise. The outcomes were in line with expectations. Workloads and stress were 
consistently worse for the supermarket checkout operators, who experienced signiﬁ  cantly higher levels of 
headaches, tiredness, and other symptoms of work-related stress. The researchers pointed to the health risks 
of this short-cycled, repetitive work under heavy constraints. They advocated organizational development, 
job enrichment, and ergonomic improvements of check out equipment.378 Earlier, a government publica-
377   Askenazy et al, 2008, 234. Obviously, in the software used in our case supermarkets only standard  assumptions were used 
considering the productivity of checkout operators. 
378   Meerman and Huppes, 1993.Page ● 97
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tion had recommended the same kind of measures.379 As mentioned, in the 1990s a Dutch union project 
contributed to ergonomic improvements of cash registers and to better working conditions. Since then, in 
nearly all supermarkets in the Netherlands standard checkout equipment has been improved ergonomically, 
although modern equipment does not prevent ergonomic problems and RSI (repetitive strain injury) risks 
per se. In our ﬁ  eld work, we only noted minor complaints concerning the checkout design380; in one super-
market the focus group of checkout operators had substantial complaints about draught and incidental cold 
in the checkout area. We should emphasize that modern checkout equipment divides the weight of heavy 
loads more evenly, but the loads that a checkout operator has to manipulate repetitively remain high, most 
likely up to 300 – 500 kilograms per hour. Thus, the risks of injuries, in particular musculoskeletal disorder, 
remain considerable, and task variety, job rotation and regular pauses continue to be essential for the job 
quality of checkout operators.381 
In the 2003 and 2005 Dutch Surveys on Working Conditions, employees in the retail trade asked whether 
one always felt work pressure, scored below the national average.382 Our case experiences suggest that work 
pressure for checkout operators is more a matter of “often” or “sometimes”, that is, that pressure is greatest 
during peak hours and when there are long lines – a near-universal outcome, found in the other countries 
participating in our project too.383 Our cases also indicate an interesting positive relationship between higher 
service levels and improved job quality: shorter lines tend to diminish work pressure and work-related stress. 
Our focus groups emphasized that checkout operators are motivated by direct customer contacts, which 
are eased by short lines. Moreover, we found some evidence that customer harassment can be related to the 
incidence of long lines. In this respect, it is interesting to note that in the course of 2005-06 efforts to limit 
the lines clearly grew in importance in food retail competition.
In supermarkets A and C, checkout operators pointed to customer harassment as contributing consider-
ably to work pressure. In supermarket A situations with harassment were explicitly linked with long lines, 
but that was less clear in supermarket C. In the latter case, complaints included customers reacting with lack 
of understanding and irritation on the self-scanning equipment. In this store at the time of our research the 
orientation of this food chain towards a relatively high level of process innovation was not linked up with 
policies of training and accompanying staff in adopting new technology.
379   Pot et al, 1989. Also Looze and Sonneveld, 2000.
380   In contrast with notably the French case supermarkets: Askenazy et al, 2008, 238.
381   Cf. Shinnar et al, 2004. 
382   TNO Arbeid, 2004; Smulders and Van den Bossche, 2004; Houtman et al, 2006.
383   Cf. Askenazy et al, 2008, 238.Page ● 98
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A 2005 survey based on the WageIndicator allowed for a closer look at determinants of job satisfaction 
of retail employees. In the survey, supermarket staff displayed above-average dissatisfaction with their in-
ﬂ  uence on work schedules and with their opportunities to take days-off. The ﬁ  rst and foremost issue of 
their complaints, however, was job insecurity. Fears to be dismissed in the near future were way above the 
Dutch average for all ﬁ  ve staff categories distinguished. Supermarket employees in majority denied having 
good career opportunities; nearly three of four checkout operators responded this way. The outcomes were 
more negative than the national averages for six industries. The FNV union negotiator for the retail industry 
linked this result with the alarmingly bad perspectives for permanent employment in the supermarkets for the 
low-skilled, deﬁ  nitely in the heat of the price war: “Newcomers only get temporary contracts for one year, 
with an option for only another year. Then they are deﬁ  nitely kicked out. There is no longer an inﬂ  ow of 
low skilled. Students and 16-18 year old school-leavers on temporary contracts are replacing them”.384 In our 
supermarket cases job insecurity seemed to be less signiﬁ  cant: check out operators neither individually nor 
in focus groups clearly referred to the issue. The tight labour market situation in the Randstad conurbation 
(where we carried out three cases) at the time of our research may well have played a role here.
As mentioned, an issue of increasing employee worries is customer harassment. In the 2003 national 
Survey on Working Conditions, supermarkets and department stores were in the top-10 of industries in 
which employees wanted measures against customers’ aggression: a score of 36% (national average 20%), 
whereas 10% (national average 4%) answered that these measures were urgently needed.385 The customer 
harassment issue returned in all our employee interviews and focus groups in the supermarket branch. In 
two supermarkets the employees interviewed stressed the need for stricter measures.
3.6.4.  Recruitment, training and careering
We found that labour turnover among check out operators in the case supermarkets, although some-
what below the national average, was rather high and that recruitment and training were painstaking activi-
ties for store managers. Yet, the latter seemed to regard the high churning rates as merely “a fact of super-
market life”, the exception being case A. Here, in supermarket of a discounter chain an interesting link had 
been developed between recruitment and training which particularly seemed to beneﬁ  t migrant workers. 
This supermarket was located near a rather depressed area in a large town. The only labour supply sources 
were young people and older women, both of migrant origin. Both chain and store management had doubts 
384   Dragstra and Van Rij, 2005, 15.
385   TNO Arbeid, 2004, 3. Other occupational risks were comparatively moderate. The incidence of accidents was just below the 
national average (TNO Arbeid, 2004, 14). Page ● 99
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about the qualiﬁ  cations of most applicants; the store manager also mentioned problems with labour morale. 
The regular recruitment procedures had led to high rejection rates. For a few years, however, in-company 
training had been part of the recruitment procedure, and this had worked as a rather efﬁ  cient screening 
device. This training also helped in retaining staff. The newcomers, by accepting to be trained, felt that they 
were given special attention and were tied to the ﬁ  rm. Supermarket B, operating in the middle segment, also 
emphasized training and careering, although its practical efforts in this ﬁ  eld seemed less intense than in case 
A. To a certain extent, training here also featured as a means to screen and retain staff. In spite of these 
activities, there was an overall lack of policies toward upgrading incumbent staff skills. All four supermar-
kets had apprenticeship posts, covering 3 to 6% of their workforce, but except in case A accompanying the 
pupils was carried out rather haphazardly.
After the extremely tight labour market for retail jobs of 2001-2002, supermarkets in the Randstad con-
urbation in 2005-06 continued to be confronted with persistent labour shortages, for checkout operators 
especially if their geographical location vis-à-vis their labour supply was unfavourable. Interviewees in our 
cases explained that workers with small part-time jobs clearly favour short commuting times and may judge 
a one-way trip of thirty minutes to be too long. Against this backdrop, local unemployment rates as included 
in Scheme 2 do not give good indications of the labour market position of supermarket checkout operator 
jobs.386 The case interviews underlined that in the Randstad conurbation the reservoir of youngsters to be 
recruited as shelf stacker / prospective checkout operator was near exhaustion, certainly for evening work. 
Characteristically, headquarters’ HR departments --maybe with the exception of chain A-- did not show 
much interest in these labour supply problems. Again, their responsiveness to external changes was low. 
In this respect the behaviour of Dutch food retailers overwhelmingly seemed to resemble that of their US 
counterparts.387 Several factors may play a role here. First, within management in retail the HR function gen-
erally seems rather underdeveloped. Second, the lukewarm attitude of general management towards labour 
shortages may have to do with their orientation on perceived technological solutions for labour shortages, 
such as the introduction of self-scanning.
Promotion opportunities up from CLA levels A and B were already few, and efforts of major supermar-
ket chains in the course of the 2000s of delayering and eliminating the assistant store manager / department 
manager level had diminished these opportunities even more. Supermarkets growingly resemble an egg-
386   For example, although the regional unemployment rates for supermarket D were higher than for cases B and C, shortages of 
checkout operators were lower for D, contrary to A, B and C located in a rural area. 
387   Cf. Davis et al, 2009.Page ● 100
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timer model.388 At ﬁ  rst sight, external numerical ﬂ  exibility and short tenures logically do not work in favour 
of career building, but the argument can be put upside down: careering is also hampered by the typical, strict 
hierarchical supermarket organisation with large gaps between the (demanded) skill levels. For example, 
analysis of personal ads learned that the AH chain in 2008 required formal qualiﬁ  cations (and suitable work 
experience and personal characteristics) for (assistant) store managers; yet, surprisingly, no speciﬁ  c formal 
requirements were laid down for team leaders, though they are expected to perform important organiza-
tional tasks.389 The team-leadership, though theoretically qualifying for store manager, may in practice be an 
interesting but rather “dead end” job. 
We did not trace career ladders for the target job of checkout operator in the four case supermarkets. 
Obviously becoming a team leader was not advertised as a viable career step. As a result, vertical mobility 
had disappeared nearly totally, and we did not ﬁ  nd any women at the levels of assistant store managers and 
higher. This ﬁ  ts in the general picture that experienced women, acting as ﬁ  rst checkout operator, hardly 
get any opportunities to get promoted to (assistant) store manager—certainly not if they are working part-
time.390 In the early 1990s, Veenis even found in a survey covering 220 employees in 10 supermarkets of a 
large Dutch chain that variation in working hours was the main factor explaining gendered differences in job 
levels. Working part-time on behalf of family duties was the crucial bottleneck for careering.391 By then these 
outcomes could be generalized; it is rather unlikely that this picture has really changed, in spite of the grow-
ing underutilization of workers with completed secondary and higher education in the Dutch retail industry392 
388   For example, in autumn 2005 Albert Heijn announced to get rid of the store management assistant (MAS) function in their 
larger supermarkets, a decision that would hit 370 employees. The FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cer then in charge perceived 
this reorganisation as part of a larger process of AH ﬂ  attening their (comparatively hierarchical) store organisation. Yet, he 
wondered whether the larger AH supermarkets could do without management assistants (Jos Brocken, cited in De Volkskrant, 
05-09-2005, and in Bondgenoten Magazine, November 2005). Based on our case research, we expect that most of their tasks 
have been taken over by ﬁ  rst checkout operators. 
389   Dimitrova, 2008, 60.
390   Based on interviews with FNV Bondgenoten union ofﬁ  cials and focus groups.
391   Veenis, 2000, 111.
392   Notably in the Dutch and British cases, female part-time workers gave few signs of concern about the lack of career oppor-
tunities; instead they tended to emphasize positive aspects of the social life at work, including friendships with fellow workers. 
As the UK retail research team noted, such satisfaction may merely reﬂ  ect the ability of many workers to remain positive in 
the face of limited options (Mason and Osborne, 2008, 157).Page ● 101
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4.  The consumer electronics sub-sector 
4.1.  Introduction: another Price War?
Following the opinion of 85% of all retailers, a survey in early 2005 concluded, the supermarket price 
war got followers in a number of other retail sub-sectors, like in bookshops, in chemists and in consumer 
electronics. Especially retailers in the latter branch seemed to be worried.393 Newspapers and trade journals 
warned time and time again: now the all-out price war in consumer electronics is going to start. Yet, con-
sumer prices are constantly lowering in branches selling products that are permanent subjects of innovation 
-- which is the case par excellence with consumer electronics. A yardstick may be total sales. If total sales are 
going down or at least stagnate as negative price effects are surpassing positive volume effects, this may be 
the sign of a price war – and as we will see, this has been the case in consumer electronics in 2003 to 2005, 
and again in 2009. Nevertheless, the societal effects of a price war in consumer electronics retailing remain 
much smaller than those of a price war between food retail chains.
4.2.  Consumer electronics: industry performance 
4.2.1.  Consumer electronics: portfolio of the industry
First we have to clarify the deﬁ  nition of “consumer electronics retail.” According to agreement in the 
RSF retail team we deﬁ  ned in an early stage of our research this sub-sector as NACE 52.45: Retail sale of 
electrical household appliances and radio and television goods. This also included the retail sale of telecom 
equipment, audio/video tapes, cassettes, etcetera, sewing and knitting equipment, musical instruments but 
not that of (personal) computers and software and not that of photographical equipment. However, this 
deﬁ  nition was easier agreed than put into practice. In the 2000s, the boundaries between sellers of electri-
cal household appliances, radio and television goods, personal computers, laptops and cameras have been 
blurred. Major consumer electronics chains, such as MediaMarkt and BCC, do sell the full product range. 
On behalf of our case studies we attempted to select companies and establishments in which electrical 
household appliances, radio, television, CD and DVD sets, headsets, MP3 players, audio/video tapes and 
393   Retail Trends, 07-01-2005.Page ● 102
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cassettes counted for at least 50% of their sales. Moreover, in 2005-06 statistical deﬁ  nitions changed.394 
Following the current sub-sector division of both Statistics Netherlands and the Industrial Board, we now 
have to deﬁ  ne consumer electronics retail as including “white goods”, large household appliances such as 
washing machines, refrigerators and microwaves (SBI code 47541), “brown goods”, in majority audio and 
video apparatus (SBI 47431), and the general assortment of “white and brown goods”, covering mainly 
small household appliances (SBI 47432).395
We calculated the 2005 joint sales of the three sub-branches just mentioned at slightly over € 2.5 billion 
(excluding VAT), 19% below 2003 level. Thus, 2004 and 2005 had turned into quite bad years for consumer 
electronics retailers, obviously hit by diminishing consumer spending but also losing to other sales channels 
in the three sub-branches. Whereas consumer electronics stores covered 69% of total consumer electronics 
sales in 2003, this share had decreased to 62% in 2005. Their market share in large household appliances 
(white goods) even fell by 17%points, to 55%396 In 2006, with nearly 8% sales growth consumer electronics 
retailing strongly recovered, and with sales 6% up 2007 also saw a positive picture. For 2008, Statistics Neth-
erlands revealed a very slight growth in sales, while the Industrial Board still noted nearly 3% increase, bring-
ing total sales at nearly € 3.5 billion, or 28% above the 2003 level.397 In 2007 and 2008, consumer electronics 
retailing was able to maintain its market share compared with other channels at about 58 to 60%. The share 
of “non-retailers”, in 2005 accounting for 12% of all consumer electronics sales, remained approximately 
constant, with shares depending on product categories in 2007-08 varying between 11 and 17%; in 2007-08 
the large and growing category of internet/post-order shops398, ambulant retailers and other stores took 
12% to 15%; like in 2005, the market share of supermarkets in consumer electronics sales remained only 
2 to 3%.399 Finally, it should be noted that the year 2009 witnessed a renewed and serious fall in sales of 
consumer electronics retailing (about 11%); in particular the second quarter of 2009 was dramatic, with an 
absolute sales fallout in volume terms and a total decrease of 18% in sales compared to those in the corre-
sponding quarter of 2008. For an explanation, HBD pointed at the growing pressure on all non-food sales 
394   Before 2006, HBD complicated matters by including, in its yearly reports, retail sales of computers and software (in the Neth-
erlands NACE 52.49.4), but excluding the selling of audio/video tapes (NACE 52.45.3) as well as that of parts of electrical 
household appliances and radio and television goods (NACE 52.45.5). Initially, in our draft reports, we followed the demarca-
tion lines of HBD. 
395   Thus excluding “grey goods” retailing i.e. computer and telecom sales in stores.
396   HBD, 2004b, 2005c. We calculated that, if consumer electronics retailing had been able to maintain its market share, sales 
would have fallen by 10.5%. Thus, the loss of market share to other channels explained 55% of the total decrease of the sub-
sector’s sales.
397   CBS, Statline; HBD, 2009.
398   Internet sales are categorized on the basis of the source of sale. Thus Internet sales conducted through physical shops are 
separated from the ones handled by Internet shops.
399   Sources: HBD, 2005c; website HBD. Page ● 103
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due to overall shrinking consumer spending.400 
In 2008, there were 2,470 consumer electronics stores in the Netherlands. Looking at the numbers of 
the previous two years, a decrease of 80 outlets (3.2%) could be observed.401 The increase in the number 
of employees and the decrease in establishments resulted in a larger average workforce per establishment, 
from averaging 8.0 headcount and 5.5 FTE in 2006 up to 8.9 headcount and 6.1 FTE in 2008.402 Earlier, we 
estimated for 2003 the lower quartile (LQ), median and upper quartile (UQ) employment sizes (headcount) 
of the Dutch electronic consumer stores as follows:403
LQ    3 employees
median    5 employees
UQ 15  employees
Sales per consumer electronics store employee (FTE) in 2008 amounted to € 311,000, € 11,000 or 4.3% 
more than in 2005; this sales level was 36% higher than the average 2008 sales per FTE in retail at large and 
17% higher than the comparable ﬁ  gure for the supermarkets. The average surface of the consumer elec-
tronics establishments, 306 m2 in 2008, is 13% over the average for retail at large (267 m2), though less than 
half the average supermarket size (648m2).404 According to 2004 ﬁ  gures, consumer electronic shops were 
mostly located in main shopping centres (58%), where they were rather small (average 176 m2). Less than 
2% was located in large-scale shopping malls, and those stores were on average much larger (690 m2). 405 
Table 23 presents the development of sales in the consumer electronics sub-sector, separated in sales, 
price and volume trends. The table clearly reveals:
  ● the rapid downward trend in consumer electronics’ prices (based on 2000 = 100, 2009 = 48);
  ● the upward trend in volumes (based on 2000 = 100, 2009 = 201);
  ● the resulting downward move of total sales in 2003, with negative price effects surpassing positive 
volume effects, continuing in 2004 and 2005, followed by the 2006 recovery because of an accelera-
tion of volume growth that persisted in 2007 and 2008, though levelling off in the last year, and the 
slowdown of volume growth combined with continuous price falls in 2009; 
  ● the yearly sales cycle, with concentration of sales in November / December (Santa Claus, Christmas), 
which proved to be the case in extremis in 2009.
400 HBD,  2009.
401   HBD, 2009. Unfortunately, comparisons with the years before 2006 are impossible because of changes in statistical deﬁ  ni-
tions. Anyway, a long-term decrease of the number of white and brown goods stores can be observed, as in 1982 the Neth-
erlands still had 4,700 establishments selling these goods (De Volkskrant, 31-12-2005). 
402   Authors’ calculations based on CBS, Statline, and HBD, 2009.
403   Sources: CBS, Statline, and company websites.
404   Authors’ calculations based on HBD, 2009.
405   HBD, 2005c, 14.Page ● 104
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The main worry of consumer electronics retailers is not to be squeezed by the speeding up of new 
product cycles. Increasing volumes should allow their sales to stay ahead of the continuous decline of price. 
Efforts in this direction clearly failed in 2004-2005, and again in 2009. Avoiding the squeeze already turned 
out to be growingly difﬁ  cult, especially since the turn of the century, when digital equipment like DVD 
players matured (unlike video-recorders, hardly containing mechanical parts, thus broadening the range of 
manufacturers). In the ﬁ  ve-year periods 2000-2004 and 2005-2009 the decline of consumer electronics pric-
es deepened compared to 1995-1999,406 with price falls of 9% (1995-99), 33% (2000-04) and 32% (2005-09) 
respectively. By contrast, after 66% volume growth in 1995-99, with 30% growth in 2000-04 prices raised 
quicker than volumes. In 2005-09 this negative development reversed due to 48% volume growth. The 
development of the squeeze may have had its effects on the net margins of consumer electronics retailing. 
Scattered evidence suggests that in 1999-2002 the average net margin in the sub-sector was, at a level of 3%, 
even slightly higher than those of the supermarkets. For 2003 and 2004 HBD published average net margins 
of 2 and 1% for white and brown goods retailers, and knockout pricing led to the reduction of net margins 
to, on average, 0% in 2005. Surprisingly, and contrary to other evidence407, for 2005 HBD concluded to an 
average net margin of 6% for small ﬁ  rms, but to a negative average margin (–1%) for medium-sized and 
large white and brown goods retailers. The small ﬁ  rms’ category was reported to have comparatively lower 
supply costs than their larger competitors (69% against 76%) as well as a lower level of labour costs (10% 
against 12%).408 In spite of the recovery of volumes sold, margins in the second half of the 2000s remained 
quite low. For 2008, again, HBD published a net margin for the sub-sector at large of 1%.409
4.2.2.  Consumer electronics: overview of the industrial organization
A comparatively large part of the Dutch consumer electronics stores consists of independents. In 
2004, just over half of all stores were part of a centrally-run chain (with at least seven outlets) or of a buy-
ers’ group,410 while in Denmark, France, Germany and the UK this share was at least 65%.411 This share is 
remarkable, because buyers’ groups, merchandising for franchisers or independent sellers, are important in 
consumer electronics retail. They have to negotiate with the large, worldwide operating consumer electron-
ics manufacturers, such as Toshiba, Sony, and Samsung. Although competition between these manufactur-
406   Detailed ﬁ  gures not shown for 1995-1999; source: CBS, Statline.
407   For example ABN AMRO, 2005.
408   HBD, 2004b, 2005c; website HBD. Unfortunately, we only found such data for 2005.
409   HBD, 2009.
410   HBD, 2005c, 17.
411   DK: Esbjerg et al, 2008, 146; FR, GE, UK: authors’ calculations based on AIAS, 2008.Page ● 105
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ers is heavy, the general impression from the trade press412 is that the discounts they allow to retailers are 
within their control. Dependency relations between consumer electronics manufacturers and retailers have 
not been clearly reversed. Consumer electronics sellers are essentially sales-based (or sales-oriented) ﬁ  rms. 
Competition is fought on sales, especially regionally, with many baits and “cheapest buy” or “every day low 
pricing” price guarantees, but also on advertising service quality, a knowledgeable staff and reliable techni-
cal backing. Against this backdrop, it can be assumed that headquarters of consumer electronics chains al-
low for a considerably larger leeway of local management compared to that of supermarkets – and, within 
stores, even of a considerable leeway for individual salespersons. As we will show, our case study outcomes 
conﬁ  rm this assumption. 
In 2005-06, major electronics buyers’ groups with national coverage in the Netherlands were: 
  ● German-based Euronics International, a franchise chain with --under various names-- presence in 
Germany (RedZac, Master’s, Mega Company, Interfunk), the UK (Euronics), France (GITEM), and 
the Netherlands (owning ﬁ  ve sub-chains, with Elektro Vakman and Electro World as the largest, total-
ing 361 outlets in March 2006, against 418 in March 2005);
  ● German-based Electronic Partner, a franchise chain with presence in Germany, France, and in the 
Netherlands with the sub-chains EP, Service Partner and Sprinter (totaling 125 establishments in 
March 2006, against 210 in March 2005);
  ● Expert, a franchise chain with presence in Germany, France, Denmark, and in the Netherlands (192 
establishments in March 2006, against 205 in March 2005).
Perfekt and Elektro Specialisten (Rexel Nederland) were the main franchising / independent chains of 
small electronics stores in the country. Other chains with near-national coverage, however with own stores, 
were De Harense Smid and Scheer & Foppen. The regionally oriented De Block, Mikro Elektro, and Max-
well chains formed a medium-sized league.413
Table 25 presents an overview of the chains with each over 10 establishments in white and brown goods 
selling (excluding NACE 52.45.3 and 52.45.5). In March 2005, 14 chains jointly owned or controlled 21 sub-
chains, with 1,682 outlets. We counted 1,140 franchised outlets, two-thirds of all stores of these chains. One 
year later, in March 2006, these chains had only 1,531 outlets, including 999 franchised (65%). Compared 
to a year earlier, this implied 9% less stores, and even 12.5% less franchised stores. Notably the Dutch or-
ganisations of Euronics and Electronic Partner, with their mostly small franchisers, met serious problems, 
412   Like Media Detail (Dutch, for retailers) and HiFi Test TV Video (Dutch, for consumers).
413   Sources: HBD, 2004b, 2005c; company websitesPage ● 106
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as the ﬁ  gures mentioned above concerning the development of their amount of establishments between 
March 2005 and March 2006 clariﬁ  ed. Based on the information presented in Table 25 and a number of 
store visits, we estimated the shares of the leading chains for 2005 as follows: Euronics 16%, MediaMarkt 
10%, Expert 11%, BCC 7%, EP 7%, IMpact 6%, and Vendex KBB 6%. According to this ranking the top-5 
share in 2005 was 51%, and the top-7 share may have been 63%. Yet, positions are rapidly changing here. 
Some main contenders, such as Vendex KBB in 2006, left the sub-sector.414 In 2005 just over 65% of all 
these establishments were franchised, which is 20% more than the total for the large supermarket chains. 
In 2005-06, analysts predicted that the Dutch consumer electronics market would be dominated by the 
two chains with large parent ﬁ  rms, MediaMarkt and BCC, and by theend of 2009 we may conclude that 
this prediction to a large extent has been materialized. MediaMarkt and Saturn are the main consumer elec-
tronics subsidiaries of the huge German Metro Group. The expansion, since its entry in 1999, of the “red-
black danger” in the Dutch market has had major effects on competition in the sub-sector. In Spring 2006 
MediaMarkt opened its 22th Dutch outlet; on that occasion, the Metro Group announced that it planned to 
add another 20 MediaMarkt stores as well as 15 stores of the Saturn format in the ﬁ  ve years to follow. By 
the end of 2009, MediaMarkt had 27 establishments in the Netherlands.415 With surfaces of 4,500 – 8,000 
m2, these stores are the country’s largest in consumer electronics.416 MediaMarkt distinguishes itself with 
an aggressive marketing proﬁ  le and a broad assortment, and offers rapidly changing bargains of highly 
popular consumer electronics goods at substantial discounts. The local managers, co-owners of their stores, 
bear responsibility for assortment, pricing, marketing, and HR management.417 In 2007 the proﬁ  le of 
runner-up BCC was less clear, though the customer perception of its staff expertise was higher than that 
of MediaMarkt.418 In 2006 BCC, a subsidiary of the UK-based KESA Group, announced plans to double 
their number of Dutch stores to 80 in 2012, aiming at 15% market share.419 BCC recently took over stores 
of 1,000 – 2,000 m2, notably of De Harense Smid. This medium-sized chain obviously overestimated the 
proﬁ  tability of the Megapool stores, bought in 2002 when this market leader failed.420 For owners or fran-
414   In early 2004 Vendex KBB, the Dutch retail conglomerate that had expanded with its basis in the V & D department stores, 
had with 18% the largest market share in consumer electronics sales, employing in the Netherlands in ﬁ  ve chains a workforce 
of about 3,000. After the take-over, in 2004, of Vendex KBB by four US venture capital groups and the decision of the newly 
formed Maxeda Group to leave consumer electronics retail, the IMpact group was formed by a management buy-out. IMpact 
subsequently owned two chains, It’s / Modern Electronics and Prijstopper, operating in the medium and low-end segments. 
Finally, in 2006 Maxeda sold its last two chains in this ﬁ  eld, high-end Dixons and medium-positioned Dynabite (jointly 188 
stores, 1,120 employees), to Dexcom telecom (Stielstra, 2006).
415   Baltesen, 2006d; Van Alphen, 2005; company website Mediamarkt.
416   Except the three stores of Correct Electronics, located in peripheral zones in Rotterdam (situation 2006).
417   Cf. NRC-Handelsblad, 14-05-2004.
418   Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 236-7.
419   Baltesen, 2006e.
420   Various local newspaper messages; Baltesen, 2006e.Page ● 107
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chisers of small stores, belonging to a chain or buyers’ group may not be a guarantee for survival, if they are 
confronted with the size and marketing power of multinational retailers like MediaMarkt and BCC on their 
regional markets. Like in other retail sub-sectors, in particular price-aggressive formulas seem successful in 
penetrating the Dutch consumer electronics market.421
Concerning market positioning and consumer price levels, a comparison of the Dutch Consumers’ 
Union in winter 2003-04 revealed this relation between the price levels of major chains and the advised 
prices of the suppliers: League A: 0-10% higher than advised prices: Dixons, EP, Maxwell; League B: 1-5% 
lower: De Block, De Harense Smid, It’s, Scheer & Foppen; League C: 6-10% lower: BCC. The price levels 
of Electroworld, Expert and MediaMarkt were not measured, as prices varied widely between establish-
ments of these three chains: an indication of heavy regional competition. MediaMarkt stated that each store 
determines its prices autonomously. The prices of Electroworld and Expert were mostly equal to or higher 
than the advised; MediaMarkt price levels ﬂ  uctuated largely, between 5-15% under the advised prices till 
15% above.422 Yet, (perceived) price levels are not exclusively decisive in consumer electronics retail; in this 
sub-sector the perceptions of service quality and whether qualiﬁ  ed staff and reliable technical backing are 
available are of relevance for consumers’ decisions too.
The Internet has the potential to fundamentally alter competition in consumer electronics. In 2009, vari-
ous consumer electronics goods were on top of the list of goods on which Dutch customers oriented them-
selves on the Internet instead of in-store (brown goods 63%, white goods 55%, other consumer electronics 
65%), though buying via the Internet (on-line shopping) took place to a much lesser extent (brown goods 
20%, white goods 19%, other consumer electronics 49%). Internet sales of brown goods in 2008 made a 
major leap of 59%points in comparison with 2007, whereas the increase in white goods sales was 49%.423 As 
yet, the advance of Internet sales did not substantially change the market shares of the various channels sell-
ing consumer electronics in the Netherlands; currently less than 15% of sales takes place via Internet stores, 
and a substantial share of all current and forecast sales can be accounted to physical stores.424 Nevertheless, 
the possibility that Internet sales will pass over the physical sales channels should not be underestimated; 
this might have a major effect on future employment. It is worth noting that GfK’s Internet Market Monitor 
(Benelux) forecasts, based on surveying 7,000 respondents and data gathered from checkouts, that Internet 
421   Cf. Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 73.
422   Consumentengids, January 2004. The comparison covered consumer prices of camcorders, TV-sets, washing machines, and 
combi-microwaves. In a 2007 comparison between perceived and actual price levels of electrical goods, in the Netherlands 
BCC showed up as the cheapest seller, but consumers perceived MediaMarkt –with its price level clearly higher than BCC—as 
much cheaper (Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 392-3). 
423   Website HBD.
424   Website HBD.Page ● 108
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sales’ turnover in the Netherlands is to double from an estimated € 4 billion for 2009 to € 8 billion in 2015. 
The GfK data also reveals that one-third of all products are purchased after being compared on the Inter-
net.425 Our own experience learns that in the Netherlands searching speciﬁ  c consumer electronics offers on 
the Internet mostly remains a complicated and time-consuming affair.426
4.3.  Consumer electronics: institutions and labour relations 
4.3.1.  Social partners and Collective Labour Agreements 
All employees in Dutch consumer electronics retail are subject to the CLA for the electro-technical retail 
trade, also covering telecom and computer shops. Contract parties are the UNETO-VNI employers’ associ-
ation and the FNV- and CNV-afﬁ  liated unions mentioned earlier. In this CLA a standard 38-hours’ working 
week is laid down. Compliance with the CLA is much less relevant for employees in consumer electronics 
retail than for their colleagues in the supermarkets. As we will see in section 4.5.1, the wage ﬂ  oors laid down 
in the CLA are quite low, and various bonuses and compensations bring paid wages for salespersons 30% 
or more above CLA levels. 
The existence of low CLA scales in the sub-sector remains intriguing, in particular as they remain the 
basis for unemployment beneﬁ  ts; they may also imply a serious fall in earnings in slack times. Most likely 
the existence of such low scales stem from decades ago, when small, rather ailing local stores dominated the 
electronics retail subsector. Obviously, unions have not yet been able to translate the arrival of large ﬁ  rms 
into higher guaranteed wages. For FNV Bondgenoten, the lack of “critical mass” seems to have played a 
role too. In a large, amalgamated union, workers’ interests in a small sub-sector may have led to a certain 
neglect. In recent years efforts of FNV Bondgenoten to improve the position of the subsector have met 
some success. This union relatively early concentrated on education and training issues, which in turn has 
been stimulated by the policies of the employers’ organisation. Contrary to the more “political” behaviour 
of the supermarkets’ association, UNETO-VNI acts mainly as a professional association and concentrates 
on vocational training. Trust building based on joint interests recognised in the training area seems to domi-
nate, although this implied that the unions left the ﬁ  eld of wage formation largely to the employers’ discre-
tion for quite some time. This relationship is further corroborated by the admission criteria for companies 
which apply for an OFED’s membership, the sectors’ educational institution. To qualify, they are supposed 
425   Website GfK Benelux.
426   Cf. the same ﬁ  nding in Van der Kind and Quix, 2008, 100-101.Page ● 109
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to comply with the current CLA. 
4.3.2. Vocational  training
In consumer electronics, FNV Bondgenoten and CNV Dienstenbond on the one hand and UNETO-VNI 
on the other have joined in the Education & Development (O & O) Fund for electro-technical retail, OFE 
Detailhandel (Retail). OFE aims at improving skill levels in the sub-sector, by developing and ﬁ  nancing practi-
cally-oriented courses. These courses are offered for salespersons, managers and technicians. Funding is de-
rived from a levy on the wage-sum, though OFED members do not pay course charges. Funding can also be 
requested from the European Social Fund (ESF) through SOD or HBD, as it is the case for the other retail 
sub-sectors. OFE Retail closely cooperates with a number of ROCs throughout the Netherlands. Students 
can obtain partial certiﬁ  cates in, among other things: audio equipment; large household equipment; small 
household equipment and personal care articles; personal computers and multimedia equipment; telecom 
articles, and lighting articles. OFE Retail also offers, as forms of continuous education, short practical and 
speciﬁ  cally designed courses for (future) employees of the sub-sector. Examples are the two-days’ course 
“basic knowledge electro-technical retail” and the three-days’ course “effective retail selling”. OFE Retail 
offers in-company courses too.427 Moreover, all major chains themselves offer regular training, often in con-
junction with manufacturers, to keep product knowledge up-to-date. The HR managers of two consumer 
electronics chains that we interviewed stressed that the new product generations urge for continuous train-
ing. They indicated that the total training expenditure in their ﬁ  rms accounted for 3 – 4% of labour costs.
4.4.  Consumer electronics: external and internal labour 
markets
Consumer electronics retail is oriented towards a predominantly male, full-time workforce. Table 24 pre-
sents the available evidence on development of employment in the sub-sector from 1995-2008. After 40% 
growth between 1995 and 2000, employment stabilized until 2002 and decreased slowly from then on, as to 
recover in the time period 2006-2008. The gender composition changed: between 2000 and 2005 the share 
of female staff fell by 3.5%-points, on the same statistical basis. A new time series of Statistics Netherlands 
starting in 2006 indicated with 24.5% a nearly 13%points lower share of females, which according to these 
ﬁ  gures grew slightly to 25.0% in 2008: 5,500 females on a total workforce of 22,000. One has to take into 
account that female staff will to a considerable extent be found in headquarters’ ofﬁ  ces, which means that 
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we can estimate the female share in the consumer electronics stores on 18 to 20%. The four case stores de-
viated somewhat from this average and showed an even more male proﬁ  le, with males making up 86-100% 
of their headcount workforce (see Scheme 1). We noticed in two out of four cases some gender bias in job 
areas: female sales assistants were mostly selling household appliances, and not or much less TV and audio 
equipment. Obviously in these cases women / part-timers were locked in certain competence areas.
The FTE/headcount ratio, accounting for the development of full-time/part-time employment, also 
ﬂ  uctuated between in consumer electronics retailing 1995 and 2008. In 2002-2005 the number of employ-
ees (headcount) fell less than the number of FTEs: 8.8% against 12.5%, implying a lowering of the FTE/
headcount ratio from 70.3 to 67.3%, or growing part-timization.428 The available ﬁ  gures for 2006-2008 (new 
basis) showed a higher level of this ratio, which remained rather stable (2007: 75.6%429, 2008: 75.0% -- see 
Table 6B). The 2008 ﬁ  gure implies an average working week (excluding overtime) of 28.5 hours. Concern-
ing working hours, the shares of part-timers in the four case stores (20-40%) were more in line with the 
sub-sector average than those concerning the gender division. Obviously working part-time was slightly 
more widespread among the male workforce of the case stores than in consumer electronics retail at large. 
The causes of the diminishing shares of both females and full-time workers between notably 2000 and 
2005 are not quite clear. At ﬁ  rst sight, these two developments seem contradictory. Our case study evidence 
suggests that decreasing employment between 2002 and 2006 was disadvantageous for women. They most 
likely to a larger extent had temporary contracts that were not prolonged when business prospects became 
bleak. We found some indications that, when this ﬁ  ring policy was not sufﬁ  cient, management urged young-
er permanent staff members (females, but also males) to work shorter hours.
In our consumer electronics case stores, part-time work did not seem to be really integrated in HR 
policies. Otherwise than through the gender bias according to job areas we mentioned, we did not ﬁ  nd 
clear indications that part-time jobs were linked to certain occupations; it looked that they were rather 
randomly distributed, largely depending on the availability of staff, workers’ individual preferences, and ad 
hoc-management decisions. During our ﬁ  eld work, the weekly demand pattern seemed to explain about half 
the incidence of part-time work. Extra labour input to deal with the regular Saturday sales peak came mainly 
from high skilled “hands”, in majority higher vocational education (HBO) or university students in technical 
disciplines, hired only for that Saturday (and sometimes also for the weekly evening opening). All four case 
428   Authors’ calculations, based on CBS, Statline and website HBD. Based on HBD (2003 and 2005e) ﬁ  gures, we could estimate 
for 2001 - 2004 that about 60% of the consumer electronics workforce worked full-time on a permanent contract, 22% 
worked part-time on a permanent contract, and 16% worked part-time on a ﬂ  exible contract; about 2% worked full-time on 
a ﬂ  exible contract.
429   Authors’ calculations, based on CBS, Statline.Page ● 111
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stores employed such “Saturday hands”.430 
4.5.  Consumer electronics: wages, work organisation and job 
quality
4.5.1. Wages
In Table 25, we present the wage scales of the CLA concluded for the electro-technical retail trade, 
valid for the period 1 July 2007 – 1 January 2009. The CLA is applicable for grade levels A – F. The variety 
between these six job levels is caused by differences in task complexity, autonomy, derogation risks, and 
physical aspects. For levels A – D, educational level MAVO431 is required, and for level E HAVO / MBO.432 
The main characteristics of the wage scales are as follows:
  ● the formal youth wage scales are only applicable for the 15-20 years of age, the basic rate follows the 
statutory Youth Minimum Wage (YMW); an extra 5% is paid to those employees having passed the 
lower vocational education (VMBO) exam with level 2 electro-technical specialisation, and an extra 
10% for those with level 3 or 4 specialisation;
  ● yearly steps 0 and 1 under scales A - F are mainly meant for the 21- and 22-aged, for grade A they also 
follow the YMW;
  ● in fact, the adult SMW is applicable from scale B, step 2 (for 23-aged) on, in 2008 7.2% above the 
SMW level;433
  ● taking this into account, the scales for the relevant grades B and C are rather short, containing four 
and ﬁ  ve steps;
  ● including more differentiation in the scales for grades D, E and F, including seven to nine steps.
In the Dutch monograph, we called the scales in the earlier CLA for the electro-technical retail, valid by 
January 1, 2004, astonishingly low; we pointed out that by then only the end wages in steps 7 and 8 of scale 
E and those in steps 6 through 9 of scale F exceeded the low-wage threshold.434 Yet, based on the WageIndi-
cator data for 2004 to 2006, the average hourly wage of the respondents was 25-44 of age was €13.61, 72% 
above the 2006 adult SMW rate, and 22% above the average wage of the three occupations in the same 
430   Recruitment of such “hands” was eased by the fact that the three cities in which our case stores were located had institutes for 
higher vocational training with technical specialisations. This may also explain the somewhat larger part-time share than the 
sub-sector average in three of four case stores.
431   Medium level general secondary education.
432   Higher level general secondary education / medium level vocational education.
433   An increase compared to 2004, when this rate was only 0.5% above the SMW level. 
434   Van Klaveren, 2008a, 171.Page ● 112
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age group treated in the supermarket wage section.435 Moreover, assuming that these adult employees were 
equally divided over CLA scales B - F and that their tenure was similar in this age group with that in retail 
at large, their average CLA wage in 2006 would have been €9.92: no less than 37% lower than the reported 
average wage. In this respect, the distance of 20 to 35% between CLA and actual wages that interviewees 
and focus groups in the four case stores in 2005-06 estimated to exist is even rather modest. Where, we 
must take into account that on top of the CLA-based wages salespersons in larger electronics stores often 
receive a combination of individual and group-based performance pay and compensations for working 
overtime and unusual hours. In the two cases in which we received indications of the amount of bonuses 
and compensations,436 these varied from 10 to 35% of basic wages. This may mean that a substantial group 
of salespersons earned, including compensations, in 2006 € 15-19 gross hourly. Against this backdrop, it 
does no longer surprise that, as we indicated before, according to ofﬁ  cial statistics in 2002 in total 19% of all 
workers, as well as 19% for males and females alike, in Dutch consumer electronics retail earned below the 
low-wage threshold: a share that in total was only slightly higher than the national average, and for females 
even lower than the national share of low-paid women (21%).437 
Table 27 shows more detailed median gross hourly wages calculated on WageIndicator data for consumer 
electronics retail over the year 2006. First it should be noted that the frequency tables underlying this data 
suggest that also in 2006 less than 20% of the consumer electronics retail workforce was paid below the 
low-pay threshold. Second, that they suggest the incidence of a speciﬁ  c low-wage group of sales clerks – 
most likely men and women, working part-time, in small, ailing consumer electronics stores in small towns 
and villages. Further, Table 27 allows some conclusions on wages in the sub-sector by age, helped by the 
fact that, contrary to the 2004-06 ﬁ  gures, this data included a considerable share (48.5%) of respondents 
15-22 of age. Except for the 19-year-olds, the median wages for the young workers in consumer electronics 
were lower than the wages of youngsters working in the supermarkets and department stores. A possible 
explanation may be found in the likelihood that the “hands” just discussed made up a large share of these 
young workers; quite likely, their wish to work in an electronics store and link that job with their technical 
studies may have moderated their wage demands. Moreover, this group may hardly or not be entitled to per-
formance pay and other compensations. It seems more difﬁ  cult to explain that the median wage of the 24-
34-aged was also (though slightly) lower than that of their peers in the supermarkets. By contrast, according 
435   Based on the WageIndicator data for 2004 to 2006, the average gross hourly wage in consumer electronics retail was € 12.42 
(level 2006). In this outcome, the inﬂ  uence of youngsters under the youth wage scales was limited, as only 19% of the re-
spondents were 15-22 of age.
436   One from individual employees, one from a focus group.
437   Authors’ calculations from CBS Microdata EWL/EBB 2002. Cf. Van Klaveren, 2008b, 135.Page ● 113
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to this data especially the 44 of age and older working in consumer electronics had a clear wage advantage 
over their peers working in the supermarkets and department stores. The ability of these experienced work-
ers to gain bonuses may play a role here.
In recent years in particular FNV Bondgenoten has undertaken efforts to improve the position of the 
subsector, and between 2004 and 2008 the union succeeded in raising nominal wages in the electrical retail 
CLA more than the national and retail averages. Wages in the A and B scales of the CLA increased by 12.5 
and 13.5%, and in the C to F scales even by nearly 16%. In the current electrical retail CLA, the wage rates 
exceeding the low-wage threshold doubled from six to 12; the CLA now includes wage rates in steps 6 and 
7 in scale D, in steps 5 to 8 of scale E, and in steps 4 through 9 of scale F. Nevertheless, in 2008 the highest 
attainable wages per scale remained relatively low; for comparable occupations they were 18% (scale D, was 
23% in 2004) till 22% (scale F, was 32% in 2004) behind those of the supermarket CLAs. Obviously, in sales 
and lower management jobs in consumer electronics bringing home higher wages than in comparable super-
market jobs still depends on performance pay and compensations for working overtime and unusual hours.
4.5.2.  Work organisation and Human Resource strategies
Again, in dealing with issues of work organisation, managerial HR strategies and job quality in con-
sumer electronics retail, we will integrate results from our case studies. After presenting in Scheme 3 an 
overview of these results, we will treat work organization and HR strategies, job quality, and ﬁ  nally recruit-
ment, training and careering in this sub-sector.Page ● 114
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Scheme 3. Overview HR strategies, work organisation and the job quality in Dutch consumer electronics  
 cases
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In contrast with the supermarkets, functional ﬂ  exibility is well developed and openly practiced in con-
sumer electronics retail. In our cases it was not an object of much debate. In their daily functioning, sales 
clerks have built-in functional ﬂ  exibility. Their professional attitudes often inspire them to stand in for 
colleagues, a practice strengthened by the importance of (higher) sales, not only for the store but for their 
personal incomes. The rewards of ﬂ  exibility practices for both management and sales clerks are usually 
clear. The interviewees emphasized that these practices offer opportunities to learn in adjoining technical 
ﬁ  elds. Even in the large stores, A and B, where sales clerks had to function for a some time as checkout op-
erators (which could be interpreted as a demotion), they tended to accept such tasks as a simple matter of 
mutual support. Such attitudes and codes are characteristic of a professional environment. Indeed, next to 
the fact that electronics retailers are sales-based ﬁ  rms that leave considerable leeway to store managers and 
salespersons decision-making concerning sales, they function to a large degree as professional organizations. 
However, like in many professional organizations the boundaries of ﬂ  exibility especially in the larger stores 
tended to be rather unclear, and for the sales clerks at stake such insecurity may ﬁ  nally end up in high levels 
of workload and work-related stress. As said, the HR policies of the main consumer electronics retailers Page ● 115
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hardly played a role in protecting their employees against excessive ﬂ  exibility. 
4.5.3. Job  quality
The typical salesperson in consumer electronics retail has a broad job proﬁ  le, or a “full” job, besides 
executing tasks (demonstrating, selling, advising) including preparing, supporting, and organizing tasks. The 
salespersons interviewed especially valued the direct contacts with suppliers. Although these contacts were 
sometimes risky and possible sources of tension between colleagues, they allowed sales clerks considerable 
discretion in pricing and promoting articles and could be the basis for bonuses. Thus, under normal condi-
tions workers in this target job enjoyed considerable autonomy. Again, in the WageIndicator survey in 2007 
and January-June 2008 characteristically a high share of respondents (70%) working in shifts in consumer 
electronics (and furniture) stores indicated that they could swap shifts with colleagues.
On the sales side interviewees indicated more problems. As a major problem they mentioned problems 
to keep their technical skills at par with the continuous stream of innovations. It was suggested that in 
some ﬁ  elds a lack of up-to-date technical knowledge may well lead to the feeling of being overtrumped by 
customers, especially in the ﬁ  eld of like in MP3 players and I-pods by youngsters. According to our inter-
viewees, these painful situations happened more than once if suppliers launched new products and product 
knowledge in sales initially proved to be insufﬁ  cient. In such situations already high work pressure could 
easily deteriorate into work stress. This danger was especially mentioned in the largest consumer electron-
ics store (A); the employees in question tended to blame the suppliers. Various interviewees stressed that 
information gaps concerning product innovations could easily undermine their credibility as salespersons.
“If suppliers’ information concerning new products will not improve systematically, we seriously run 
the risk to remain simple story-tellers producing elegant humbug. The Internet will provide our customers 
with better information. This problem also concerns the reputation of the company. We cannot do without 
technical know-how” (senior salesperson, store B) 
Two (assistant) store managers pointed at the opportunities Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) or tablet 
PC’s would give employees to offer speciﬁ  c tailored technical and price information to customers. Obvi-
ously, by then their parent ﬁ  rms were preparing the introduction of such sales-support systems.438
Other complaints that may inﬂ  uence job quality and job satisfaction, notably noted in electronics stores 
A and D (the largest and the smallest store!), were related to customer harassment, and frequent shop theft 
(case D). In both cases as a particular category the behaviour of secondary school pupils ‘”surprising” the 
438   In the literature the adoption of such a system by US electronics chain Circuit City is often used as an example (cf. Van der 
Kind and Quix, 2008, 91).Page ● 116
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store during lunch hour and causing a lot of nuisance, was mentioned. The complaints most frequently 
registered were about working at unsocial hours (cases B, C, and D). Yet, such practices seemed to be per-
ceived merely as as a disadvantage linked to being employed as sales clerk, but in case D, the smallest store, 
complaints had a more serious undertone and were obviously connected with understafﬁ  ng. Here, the em-
ployees interviewed regarded the total of the various constraints a serious threat for their well-being.
We gathered from our consumer electronics cases that the work pressure felt by salespersons is nor-
mally “sound” and challenging. In some situations work pressure can become more structural and lead to 
work stress. Our interviewees suggested that this was the case when suppliers launched new products and 
product knowledge in sales proved to be insufﬁ  cient. In that event, the high autonomy of salespersons may 
turn into a disadvantage. We found hardly any complaints about the large share in wages of bonuses and 
overtime / unusual hours compensations, despite their possible negative effects on remuneration in slack 
times as well as on unemployment beneﬁ  ts. Another potential negative effect of the bonus system that we 
brought up in the interviews, mutual competition and the danger of heavy rivalry among colleagues, did 
not ring many bells either. Some interviewees said to recognize this danger, but obviously they did not take 
it quite seriously.
4.5.4.  Recruitment, training and careering
Recruitment processes in consumer electronics were less formalized than those in the supermarket – 
most likely for a considerable part due to the smaller size of both the chains and the stores at stake, but also 
for some part diue to the rapidly changing “product content” and the related uncertainty concerning skill 
demands of sales staff. That staff seems urrently mostly recruited ﬁ  rst on the basis of (perceived) sales skills 
and interest in sales activities, and only second on the basis of technical knowledge. Basic personal inter-
est in technology is a key yardstick, but the rapid technological development of the last decade has made 
speciﬁ  c technical knowledge, for example in the audio or video ﬁ  elds, growingly obsolete. Accordingly, the 
importance of formal qualiﬁ  cations has diminished. Yet, this latter trend may have substantially weakened 
the competitive position of consumer electronics in the labour market, in particular in the larger cities. 
For example, the “Saturday hands” mentioned before were offered more hours’ or permanent contracts 
when they came near graduation at the technical colleges where they studied, but by then the consumer 
electronics stores often had to compete with ICT ﬁ  rms, normally offering considerably higher (guaranteed) 
wages. More generally, the ICT sector was described as a major competititor in the labour market for senior 
salespersons. The managers in store A explicitly said that the consumer electronics CLA was “ﬁ  nancially a Page ● 117
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shame” and a serious impediment for recruiting capable candidates; one said to hope that candidates before 
their job interviews had not observed the CLA wage scales; “If they have done so, they may be outright 
incompetent or in despair”, as one interviewee added.
Training facilities in consumer electronics retail are substantial and ongoing, and often (though less than 
we expected) linked with training offers from manufacturers to keep product knowledge up-to-date. The 
employers’ association already in 2004 worried about the supply of higher qualiﬁ  ed specialists. Yet, a survey 
after the need for stafﬁ  ng did not reveal many worries among its constituency.439 Our case ﬁ  ndings conﬁ  rm 
this rather careless attitude, with only in case A managers envisaging serious shortages in the near future, 
notably for senior salespersons. Management in the other three stores obviously trusted their capacity to 
attract knowledgeable salespersons, mainly based on the good reputation of the parent chains, though we 
could not help but register some doubts here as well. All three had to admit that the numbers of trainees and 
apprentices in the sub-sector remained low. The assistant store manager in case store B came to conclude 
that attracting good salespersons “becomes more and more a question of a lucky shot”.
439   HBD, 2004g.Page ● 118
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5.  Summary and evaluation 
Although in some respects the evidence presented here shows a mixed picture, the main outcomes point 
in the same direction. Notably the supermarket price war has been a catalyst for developments already under 
way, developments worrying retail workers and their interest representation. Following the trail of load road, 
cost-minimizing market strategies, low road HRM options have predominantly been chosen: management 
strategies of the large supply-based chains have focused on lowering wages and augmenting the numerical 
ﬂ  exibility of labour. Management tools based on supply chain management were deployed, hampering ef-
forts to escape from a low road job quality for in particular frontline supermarket staff. Without suggesting 
a too rosy picture, consumer electronics retailing functioned as a contrast indeed, not least because this busi-
ness is sales-based and knowledgeable salespersons have to be regarded as valuable assets.
Working time and scheduling issues stood out prominently in workplace relations in the supermarkets. 
According to our cases, store managers tried to live up to headquarters’ benchmarks not in the least by 
curtailing on paid working hours. Recurrent issues of complaint concerned employer decisions concern-
ing working times and days-off, as well as low stafﬁ  ng levels and employers not paying according to hours 
worked. Discontent on these matters rose during the price war. In consumer electronics retail, the working 
time issue was much less prominent, partly because of the lower share of part-timers, partly because of the 
higher wages, partly because of the compensations paid for working overtime or unusual hours.
Within the sub-sectors, more than the high – low end strategies contrast the local labour market situ-
ation, that is, the tight – soft labour market contrast seemed to be of relevance for variations in job qual-
ity, at least for variations in training opportunities but also in (informal) shop-ﬂ  oor co-operation patterns. 
Here, causal relationships contrasted with those assumed. Supermarkets in the low market segment might 
have felt forced to offer not just simple jobs but jobs linked up with training, in order to recruit and retain 
staff. Former high-end supermarket chains, relying on their good reputation, may well be have been lazy in 
this respect. The assumption seems justiﬁ  ed that they have gambled on the dissemination of labour-saving 
technology.
The signiﬁ  cant and enduring over-representation of young part-time workers in the retail workforce 
may prove costly both to employers –because of high labour turnover, greater staff scheduling needs, less 
professional service—and to workers – who are less likely to earn a living wage or build a career. Its low-
wage proﬁ  le has exposed the industry to growing competition in the labour market, especially from the care Page ● 120
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sector, where wages and working conditions became recently in the process of being improved thanks to 
political support for the issue. Many youngsters do not see working in retail as a viable basis for economic 
independence, partly because of the rather poor image of vocational training institutions in the industry. 
Though the Industrial Board relatively early signalled the demographic background of labour supply prob-
lems, it was for quite some time unable to counteract the connected trends toward low road and low-wage, 
and to improve the industry’s poor image. 
The general trend of wage moderation in the Netherlands, the low consumer-spending share, the strong 
focus on low prices and the economic effects of ﬂ  uctuating incomes have made retail a low-wage industry. 
Clearly, institutions have also played an important role. Apart from the general wage formation mechanism 
(i.e. wage moderation), the broad range of young workers’ minimum wages has contributed to the per-
sistence of low pay, while the system of student grants and allowable student earnings has stimulated the 
strong expansion of the part-time workforce. Increasingly, the long tail of YMWs is not providing enough 
of an incentive for young workers: at age 19, for instance, new recruits are entitled to the same minimum 
wages with several years of work experience. The 2008-2010 supermarket CLAs have begun to recognize 
the problem and introduced some form of work experience rating. This may be the start of re-profession-
alization within the industry, which seems highly advisable in the light of demographic trends unfavourable 
to the youth of tomorrow. The effects of the current crisis remain to be seen. However, the lesson of earlier 
economic slowdowns, when incomes declined in the Netherlands as did retail employment, does not bode 
well for the future. Page ● 121
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Appendix: Tables
Table 1  Retail industry characteristics in Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (GE), the Netherlands  
  (NL), United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), latest available information
variable yardstick year DK FR GE NL UK US
Share low-wage share retail workers with 






Share retail in total 
employment
all (headcount) 2005 7.4 7.4 8.7 9.0 10.5 10.3
all (FTE) 2005 6.4 7.2 7.6 7.7 8.8 9.3
self-employed, coop. family 
members (FTE)
2005 12.3 10.7 12.1 12.1 6.2 8.2
employees (FTE) 2005 5.8 6.7 6.8 6.8 9.2 9.4
Part-time (retail) 
employment 
part-time in retail empl. 2007 49.9 27.7 52.0 70.4 50.4 27.9
part-time in total employ-
ment
2007 24.1 17.2 25.8 46.8 25.5 18.6
ratio: retail share part-time 
to total part-time
2007 2.1 1.6 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.5
ratio: food share part-time 
to retail part-time





ratio: electronics share part-
time to retail part-time








lower quartile (LQ) 2002 3 3 6-19 3 4 3
median 2002 5 8 20+ 6 7 6
upper quartile (UQ) 2002 10 21 20+ 10+ 116 12
Productivity  value added per hour 
worked in Euros (PPP 
conversion)
2005 21.94 29.55 26.36 23.34 24.59 25.41
Employment by 
gender
share of females in retail 
employment (headcount)
2006 57.0 63.3 70.6 60.9 61.5 49.4
share of females in total 
employment (headcount)
2006 46.4 46.3 45.4 44.9 46.7 48.1
ratio: retail share female to 
total share female
2006 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.0
Employment by age share of employees under 
age 25 in retail (headcount)
2006 48.5 19.3 15.6 44.7 34.0 28.6
share of employees under 
age 25 in total (headcount)
2006 13.6 8.9 10.7 15.3 14.0 13.6
ratio: retail share under age 
25  to total share under 
age 25 
2006 3.6 2.2 1.5 2.9 2.4 2.1





50 2 14 12 12 7
collective bargaining cover-
age
2005 68 NA 51 98 18 7Page ● 136
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variable yardstick year DK FR GE NL UK US
Food retail share retail workers with 
hourly wage < 2/3 median 





percentage of retail em-
ployment
2003 26 34 29 32 36 16
average number of employ-
ees per establishment
2003 14 95 27 36 39 26




NA 50 71 83 67 44




70 72 77 55 76 53
share top-5 ﬁ  rms in sales 05-06 95 85 69 87 75 31
variable yardstick year DK FR GE NL UK US
Consumer electron-
ics retail
share retail workers with 
hourly wage < 2/3 median 
2003 15 3 24 19 
(2002)
NA 18
percentage of retail em-
ployment
2003 2.9 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.0 3.4
average number of employ-
ees per establishment
2003 6 5 NA 8 14 11




NA 18 23 37 30 24




17 40 37 25 30 30
share top-5 ﬁ  rms in sales 2005-
06
71 42 47 51 44 44
NA = Not Available
Sources: 
Retail, share low-wage: DK: Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008b, 72; FR: Askenazy et al, 2008, 220; GE: Voss-Dahm, 2008, 258; NL: 
Van Klaveren, 2008b, 135; UK: U.K. Ofﬁ  ce for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Survey of  Hours and Earnings 2005. 
London (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=13101); US: authors’ calculation from US Bureau of  
Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey, March. Washington D.C. (http://www.bls.gov/cps);
Retail, share in employment: all: authors’ calculations on data from EU KLEMS (http://www.euklems.net) (courtesy Wiemer Sal-
verda);
Retail, part-time employment: from IAQ calculations on EU Labour Force Survey (courtesy Dorothea Voss-Dahm); European Com-
mission, 2008;  US BLS, Current Population Survey microdata; US BLS, Employment and Earnings Online, Table A-18 
(http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn200801.pdf); retail sub-sectors from: FR: Askenazy et al, 2008, 221; GE: Bundesa-
gentur fuer Arbeit (BA, Federal Employment Service) Beschaeftigtenpanel 2005 (Employee Panel). Nuernberg, special evalu-
ation for IAQ; NL: CBS (Statistics Netherlands), Statline Database; information HBD (www.hbd.nl); UK: U.K. ONS, 
Annual Survey of  Hours and Earnings 2005; US: US BLS, Current Population Survey;
Retail, establishment size: DK: Danmark Statistik, Statbank Denmark Data. Copenhagen (http://www.dst.dk/HomeUK.aspx); 
FR: Institut National de la Statistique et Etudes Economiques (INSEE) Trade Database. Paris (http://www.insee.fr/en); 
GE: BA Beschaeftigtenpanel, special evaluation for IAQ; NL: CBS, Statline Database: Bedrijfsgrootte; UK: U.K. ONS, 
Annual Business Inquiry 2002; EU: Eurostat data 2003 (Sura, 2006); US: US BLS, Economic Census 2002 
Retail, productivity: all: authors’ calculations on data from EU KLEMS (courtesy Chris Tilly);
Retail, employment by gender and age: EU: authors’ calculations on EU Labour Force Survey; European Commission, 2007; US: US 
BLS, Current Population Survey;
Retail, labour turnover: EU: Eurostat calculation on EU Labour Force Survey on behalf  of  IAQ, and special evaluation BA on 
Beschaeftigtenpanel on behalf  of  IAQ; US BLS, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, June 2005
Retail, unionization / collective bargaining: (basic data for) DK: Esbjerg et al, 2008; FR: Askenazy et al, 2008; GE: Voss-Dahm, 
2008; NL: this volume; UK: Mason and Osborne, 2008; US: US BLS, Union Members in 2007, News Release, January 
25, 2008; EU: Tijdens et al, 2007
Food retail, share low-wage: see above under Retail
Food retail, percentage of  retail jobs, average number of  employees per establishment, share part-time in employment, and share of  
females: (basic data for) DK: Esbjerg et al, 2008; FR: Askenazy et al, 2008; GE: Voss-Dahm, 2008; NL: this volume, 
Chapter 3; UK: Mason and Osborne, 2008; US: US BLS, Current Employment Statistics, 2003; County Business Patterns, 
2003
Food retail, share of  top-5 ﬁ  rms in sales: DK: Esbjerg et al, 2008, 143; FR: Askenazy et al, 2008, 214; GE: Metro Group, 2006b, 
16; NL: this volume, Chapter 3 and Table 17 (Superunie counted as one); UK: Burt and Sparks, 2006b; US: US Bureau of  
the Census, Economic Census 2002 (ﬁ  gure for top-4 ﬁ  rms only)
Consumer electronics retail, share low-wage: see above under RetailPage ● 137
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Consumer electronics retail, percentage of  retail jobs, average number of  employees per establishment, share part-time in employment, and 
share of  females: see above under Food retail;
Consumer electronics retail, share of  top-5 ﬁ  rms in sales: DK: Esbjerg et al, 2008, 146; FR, GE, UK: AIAS, MNE Database, 
2008; NL: this volume, Chapter 4; US: US Bureau of  the Census, Economic Census 2002 (ﬁ  gure for top-4 ﬁ  rms only)
Table 2. Main indicators concerning retail in the Netherlands, 2007-08
Total
Number of companies (01-01-09) 80,570
Number of     establishments (01-01-09) 109,000
Sales (2008)  € 84.2 billion
Average number of employees per enterprise (head-
count 2007)
8.6
Average number of employees per establishment 
(headcount 2007)
6.4
Number of employees – FTE (2007) 390,300




small companies (<10 empl.)  124,900
share small companies 17.9%
medium-sized companies (10-100 empl.) 189,400
share medium-sized companies 27.1%
large companies (> 100 empl.) 383,600
share large companies 55.0%
Number of employers and co-operating family mem-
bers – headcount (2007)
113,200
Total employed (2007) 767,200
Sales per employee (FTE) (excl VAT) (2008) € 228,000
Sales per sq mtr store surface (excl VAT) (2008) € 3,000
Gross value added per employee (2008) € 24,270
Gross value added per FTE (2008) € 43,910
Investment per employee (2008) € 3,640
Investment per FTE (2008) € 6,590
Gross proﬁ  t margin (2007)  34%
Sales speed (2007) 4.9
Sources: HBD, Jaarboek Detailhandel 2009; CBS, StatlinePage ● 138
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x 1,000 x 1,000 x 1,000 %
1947 257 168 89 34.6
1960 295 174 121 41.0
1975 454 320 124 27.3
1990 578 469 109 18.9
2000 721 625 106 14.7
2003 746 639 107 14.3
2004 726 621 105 14.5
2005 735 629 106 14.4
2006 778 661 117 15.0
2007 823 693 130 15.8
2008 836 702 134 16.0
Sources: 1947-2006: CBS, Censuses 1947, 1960; ; LFS 1975; EBB 1990; EWL; 2004-2008 Kerncijfers detailhandel 
(outside Statline)
Table 4. Employment in Dutch supermarkets and consumer electronics retail (employees, headcount and  
  percentage of total wage-earner employment in retail), 1947-2008
supermarkets consumer 
electronics
x 1,000 % x 1,000 %
1947 0  *) 0 0,8 1.0
1960 6,6  *)  5.4 2,1 0.7
1975  58,0 *) 18.1 6,0 *) 1.9
1990 124,0 *) 26.4 16,0 *) 3.4
2000 201,7 32.2 22,7 3.6
2004 198,4 32.4 20,9 3.4
2005 200,7 32.9 20,8 3.4
2006 227,6 35.0 20,5 3.2
2007 237,6 34.5 22,1 3.2
2008 242,8 34.9 21,9 3.2
Sources: CBS, Censuses 1947, 1960; Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1975; EBB 1990; EWL, 2000, 2004-2008, yearly 
averages
*) authors’ estimatesPage ● 139
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Table 5. Developments in employment (employees, FTE and headcount) and sales in Dutch retail, 2000- 









FTE headc. FTE headc. FTE headc.
2000 2.1 2.1 - 0.5 2.5 1.7 4.1 4.8
2001 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.1 1.5 1.3 6.3
2002 - 0.2 1.3 - 1.7 0.3 1.5 0.3 3.1
2003 - 5.9  - 0.4 - 3.8 - 0.2 - 6.3 - 0.6 - 2.1
2004 -2.6 - 2.0 - 0.3 - 0.3 - 3.3 - 2.3 - 2.2
2005 0.1 1.3 0.3 3.8 0.1 - 1.1 - 0.4
2006 3.0 5.0 NA 4.1 NA 5.3 5.2
2007 3.8 5.0 NA 0.8 NA 5.7 4.1
2008 1.2 1.1 NA 0.8 NA 1.8 2.6
2009 0.6 0.4 NA NA NA NA -5.0
Source: CBS, Statline (Enquete werkgelegenheid en lonen, Maandcijfers, Maandstatistiek detailhandel); Arbeidsrekeningen
NA = Not AvailablePage ● 140
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Table 6A. Employment in Dutch retail by sub-sectors (employees, headcount), 1995- 2008
 
1995 2000 2005 2007 2008
x1000 % x1000 % x1000 % x1000 % x1000 %
Supermarkets 162,9 32.2 201,7 32.3 200,7 32.9 237,6 34.1 242,8 34.5
Department stores 38,9 7.6 40,1 6.4 34,1 5.6 36,2 5.2 36,3 5.2
Food stores 45,0 8.9 41,8 6.7 39,7 6.5 42,9 6.2 44,4 6.3
Pharm., perf., cosmet. 29,7 5.9 41,7 6.7 49,4 8.1 57,6 8.3 57,9 8.2
Clothing, textiles 57,7 11.4 74,9 12.0 70,6 11.6 84,0 12.1 86,4 12.3
Shoes, leather 18,3 3.6 20,0 3.2 19,3 3.2 23,6 3.4 23,0 3.3
Furniture, household  38,9 7.7 47,4 7.6 42,7 7.0 44,1 6.3 43,7 6.2
Consumer electronics 15,9 3.1 22,7 3.6 20,8 3.4 21,8 3.1 21,9 3.1
Tools, DIY stores 19,9 3.9 32,2 5.1 32,6 5.3 37,3 5.4 36,8 5.2
Books etc. 9,1 1.8 11 1.8 9,6 1.6 11,0 1.6 10,5 1.5
Misc 1 (photo, optic, 
sports,bikes,camp.) 24,4 4.8 32,6 5.2 30,4 5.0 32,6 4.7 30,7 4.4
Misc 2 (garden, toys) 45,6 9.0 39,5 6.3 39,2 6.4 43,0 6.2 44,3 6.3
Second-hand, antique 2,2 0.4 3,2 0.5 3,3 0.5 3,7 0.5 4,2 0.6
Retail not in shops 10,5 2.1 13,1 2.1 14,8 2.4 16,5 2.4 15,6 2.2
Repair for private  2,2 0.4 3,4 05 2,8 0.5 3,8 0.5 3,7 0.5
Total headcount 505,8 100 625,3 100 610,0 100 696,0 100 702,3 100
Total in FTE 331,4 381,4   356,2   387,9   392,1
FTE/headcount  ratio 65.5 61.0  58.4  55.7  55.8
Source: CBS, StatLine (1995-2005: EWL; 2007-2008: Kerncijfers detailhandel)
Table 6B. Employment in Dutch retail by sub-sectors (employees, headcount and FTE), 2008 (yearly 
 average,  preliminary)
 
headcount FTE FTE/head-
count ratio x 1,000 % x1,000 %
Supermarkets 242,8 34.5 103,6 26.4 42.7
Department stores 36,3 5.2 20,3 5.2 55.9
Food stores 44,4 6.3 24,6 6.3 55.4
Pharm., perfum., cosmetics 57,9 8.2 35,4 9.0 61.1
Clothing, textiles 86,4 12.3 51,5 13.1 59.6
Shoes, leather 23,0 3.3 12,7 3.3 55.2
Furniture, household art. 43,7 6.2 29,5 7.5 67.5
Consumer electronics 22,0 3.1 16,5 4.2 75.0
Tools, DIY stores 36,8 5.2 26,2 6.7 71.1
Books etc. 10,5 1.5 6,4 1.6 61.0
Misc 1 (photo, optical, sports, 
bikes, camping) 30,7 4.4 21,9 5.6 71.3
Misc 2 (gardening, toys) 44,3 6.3 28,1 7.2 63.4
Second-hand, antique 4,2 0.6 2,9 0.7 69.0
Retail not in shops 15,6 2.2 9,9 2.5 63.5
Repair for private persons 3,7 0.5 2,8 0.7 75.6
Total headcount 702,3 100.0 392,1 100.0 55.8Page ● 141
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Source: CBS, StatLine
Table 7. Gender distribution in Dutch retail by sub-sectors (headcount), December 2008 (preliminary)
males females
x 1,000 % x 1,000 %
Supermarkets 105,2 44.8 129,8 55.2
Other non-specialised  8,2 21.8 29,5 78.2
Food stores 14,0 31.6 30,3 68.4
Pharm., perf., cosmetics 8,5 14.1 51,7 85.9
Clothing, textiles 12,7 15.0 71,9 85.0
Shoes, leather 3,7 17.3 17,7 82.7
Furniture, household art. 17,5 39.7 26,6 60.3
Consumer electronics 16,5 75.0 5,5 25.0
Tools, DIY stores 22,8 63.2 13,3 36.8
Books etc. 2,5 23.1 8,3 76.9
Other 1 (photogr., optic., sports, 
bikes, camping) 16,1 48.6 17,0 51.4
Other 2 (gardening, toys) 16,0 36.8 27,5 63.2
Second-hand, antique 1,8 51.4 1,7 48.6
Retail not in shops 7,4 44.6 9,2 55.4
Repair for private persons 2,8 71.8 1,1 28.2
Total 255,9 36.7 442,1 63.3
Source: CBS, Statline
Table 8. Age distribution of employees in Dutch retail (headcount), 1995-2005
1995 2000 2005
x 1,000 % x 1,000 % x 1,000 %
Male
<-19 39,3 7.8 62,0 9.8 68,0 11.1
20-24 48,0 9.6 43,0 6.9 42,6 7.0
25-29 32,0 6.3 24,6 3.9 23,4 3.8
30-34 23,0 4.5 22,8 3.6 20,1 3.3
35-39 16,1 3.2 20,1 3.2 19,6 3.2
40-44 12,5 2.5 14,5 2.3 15,9 2.6
45-49 12,7 2.5 11,4 1.8 12,8 2.1
50-55 9,1 1.8 15,3 2.4 12,0 2.0
55-60 5,8 1.1 8,5 1.4 10,3 1.7
60-65 2,2 0.4 3,2 0.5 4,1 0.7
Female
<-19 62,0 12.3 98,8 15.8 94,3 15.5
20-24 72,6 14.3 66,4 10.6 62,1 10.2
25-29 49,0 9.7 48,5 7.7 37,0 6.1
30-34 30,4 6.0 44,3 7.1 36,6 6.0
35-39 21,0 4.2 34,4 5.5 37,0 6.1
40-44 19,7 3.9 32,0 5.1 34,3 5.6
45-49 24,7 4.9 29,0 4.6 30,0 4.9Page ● 142
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50-54 15,1 3.0 26,1 4.2 24,2 4.0
55-59 7,0 1.4 11,7 1.9 19,6 3.2
60-64 1,5 0.3 2,8 0.4 5,1 0.8
Total 505,9 100.0 625,9 100.0 610,0 100.0
Source: CBS, Statline (Enquete werkgelegenheid en lonen)
Table 9. Age distribution in Dutch retail by sub-sectors (headcount), 2004
Age < 23 23-35 36-45 >45 Total
Supermarkets 61 15 12 12 100
Other food stores 29 23 20 28 100
Clothing and textiles 24 28 19 29 100
Personal care 24 33 20 23 100
Furniture excl. household art. 11 26 24 39 100
Household articles 39 28 16 18 100
Consumer electronics 23 41 20 16 100
Do-It-Yourself stores 30 28 21 21 100
Education and leisure, department 
stores
36 25 18 22 100
Retail not in shops 19 26 28 27 100
Total 38 25 17 20 100
Source: MKB-Nederland (2007) Detailhandelsmonitor 2007, based on CBS and CPB data
Table 10A. Job levels in Dutch retail by gender (headcount), 2005
total males females
x 1,000 % x 1,000 % x 1,000 %
job level 1 47 9 32 14 15 5
job level 2 299 55 94 40 206 66
job level 3 163 30 85 37 77 25
job level 4 27 5 18 8 8 3
job level 5 6 1 3 1 3 1
total 542 100 232 100 309 100
average 2.35 2.43 2.28
Source: CBS, Statline
Table 10B. Development of job levels in Dutch retail by gender (headcount, in %), 1996-2005
males females
1996 2000 2005 1996 2000 2005
job level 1 9 13 14 4 4 5
job level 2 34 35 40 65 64 66
job levels 3-5 57 52 46 31 32 29
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
x 1,000 199 207 232 264 299 309
Average 2.61 2.52 2.43 2.31 2.31 2.28
Source: CBS, StatlinePage ● 143
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Table 11A. Development of employment in retail (headcount) by educational and occupational levels, 
  Netherlands, 1996-2005, x 1,000
Occ. level yr 1 2 4 6 8 total
Educ. level
Lower education 1996 18 121 35 5 - 179
2000 25 143 38 5 - 211
2005 26 139 33 4 - 202
Secondary education 1996 10 108 121 16 - 255
2000 12 112 119 15 - 258
2005 19 141 111 10 - 281
Higher education 1996 - 9 9 5 4 27
2000 - 8 11 8 5 32
2005 - 17 19 12 4 52
Source: CBS, Statline
Table 11B. Development of employment (headcount) by educational and occupational levels, Netherlands, 
 1996-2005
Occ. level    1 2 4 6 8 total
Educ. level
Lower education 1996 10 68 19 3 - 100
2000 12 68 18 2 - 100
2005 13 69 16 2 - 100
Secondary education 1996 44 24 7 6 - 100
2000 5 43 46 6 - 100
2005 7 50 39 4 - 100
Higher education 1996 - 33 33 19 15 100
2000 - 25 34 25 16 100
2005 - 33 36 23 8 100
Source: CBS, Statline
Table 12. Distribution of weekly working hours in Dutch retail by gender (headcount), 2005
male female total
x 1,000 % x 1,000 % x 1,000 %
< 12 hours 67,5 29.5 118,8 31.2 186,3 30.5
12-<20 hours 23,6 10.3 82,7 21.7 106,3 17.4
20-<25 hours 11,4 5.0 51,9 13.6 63,3 10.4
25-<30 hours 4,2 1.8 20,1 5.3 24,3 4.0
30-<35 hours 9,3 4.1 32,8 8.6 42,1 6.9
>=35 hours 113,0 49.3 74,7 19.6 187,7 30.8
Total 229,1 100.0 380,9 100.0 610,0 100.0
Source: CBS, Statline (Enquete werkgelegenheid en lonen)Page ● 144
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Table 13. Distribution of weekly working hours in Dutch retail by gender and age, 1995-2005 
< 12 hours / week 12 -< 20 hours / week >= 20 hours / week
Age 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
male 15-<20 61 57 65 20 23 18 19 20 17
20-<25 33 28 34 13 17 15 54 55 51
25-<30 6 5 9 3 5 6 91 90 85
30-<35 1 3 5 1 2 3 97 95 92
35-<40 1 3 3 1 3 2 98 94 95
40-<45 2 2 4 2 3 4 96 95 92
45-<50 4 4 5 1 4 5 95 92 90
50-<55 6 7 5 3 5 5 91 88 90
55-<60 7 118344 9 0 8 5 8 8
60-<65 14 38 26 9 13 12 73 49 62
total 22 25 30 8 12 10 70 63 60
female 15-<20 60 55 66 17 23 17 23 22 17
20-<25 24 27 35 10 14 15 66 59 50
25-<30 9 8 11 12 15 13 79 77 76
30-<35 18 14 13 18 21 24 64 65 63
35-<40 23 22 16 25 28 30 52 50 54
40-<45 20 20 15 25 28 30 55 52 55
45-<50 16 20 18 24 27 26 60 53 56
50-<55 18 21 14 30 27 31 52 52 55
55-<60 24 25 19 20 21 30 56 54 51
60-<65 40 46 37 13 21 27 47 33 36
total 27 29 31 17 22 22 54 49 47
total 25 27 31 14 18 17 61 55 52
Source: CBS, Statline (Enquete werkgelegenheid en lonen)Page ● 145
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Table 14. FTE/headcount ratios in Dutch retail by gender and age (headcount), 1995-2005 
1995 2000 2005
male 15-<20 34 35 33
20-<25 62 63 59
25-<30 92 89 86
30-<35 97 94 88
35-<40 98 95 93
40-<45 95 94 91
45-<50 94 92 89
50-<55 92 88 90
55-<60 88 85 86
60-<65 77 59 63
total 75 70 66
female 15-<20 37 38 34
20-<25 68 64 57
25-<30 77 77 74
30-<35 65 66 65
35-<40 56 56 58
40-<45 57 56 58
45-<50 61 55 57
50-<55 56 56 57
55-<60 56 54 55
60-<65 53 43 45
total 60 56 54
total 66 61 58
Source: CBS, Statline (Enquete werkgelegenheid en lonen)Page ● 146
Maarten van Klaveren
Table 15. Distribution of tenure in Dutch retail by gender and age (headcount), 1995-2005 
1995 Tenure 0 years Tenure 1-<5 years Tenure >=5 years
2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
male 15-<20 5 1 5 5 5 1 4 9 4 5 4 9000
20-<25 25 29 19 68 67 58 7 42 3
25-<30 17 26 15 48 51 45 35 23 40
30-<3 5 10 17 16 36 41 39 54 42 45
35-<40 72 31 22 13 03 27 24 75 6
40-<45 7 10 8 19 24 31 74 66 61
45-<50 71 01 02 12 52 27 26 56 8
50-<55 4 8 6 20 23 23 76 69 71
55-<60 3863 1 2 2 3 8 4 8 0 7 1
60-<65 0 13 7 32 21 24 68 66 69
total 20 30 25 44 34 42 36 36 33
female 15-<20 5 1 5 7 5 2 4 9 4 3 4 8000
20-<25 24 32 24 61 59 58 15 9 18
25-<30 12 21 17 43 45 44 45 34 39
30-<35 16 18 14 39 38 33 45 44 53
35-<40 12 24 11 48 42 33 40 34 56
40-<45 13 28 10 44 41 38 43 31 52
45-<50 9 22 9 38 39 37 53 39 54
50-<55 6 10 7 27 35 29 66 55 64
55-<60 4 8 3 23 25 22 73 67 75
60-<65 7 11 4 20 18 27 73 71 69
total 23 32 23 46 43 41 31 25 36
total 22 31 24 45 36 41 33 27 35
Source: CBS, Statline (Enquete werkgelegenheid en lonen)Page ● 147
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Table 16. Development of sales (total, price and volume) of Dutch supermarkets, 2000-2009 (2000 = 100)
Sales supermarkets
total price volume
2000 100 100 100
2001 107 107 101
2002 113 110 102
2003 116 112 104
2004 116 109 106
2004 – I 112 110 102
2004 – II 118 110 107
2004 – III 115 109 105
2004 – IV 120 108 111
2005 116 108 107
2005 – I 111 109 102
2005 – II 116 109 107
2005 – III 116 108 107
2005 – IV 121 108 112
2006 121 110 110
2006 – I 114 110 104
2006 – II 123 110 112
2006 – III 122 110 110
2006 – IV 123 110 112
2007 127 112 113
2007 – I 121 111 109
2007 – II 128 111 115
2007 – III 124 111 111
2007 – IV 133 113 118
2008 136 117 116
2008 – I 131 115 114
2008 – II 137 117 117
2008 – III 134 117 114
2008 – IV 142 119 120
2009 139 120 115
2009 - I 133 121 110
2009 / II 141 121 116
2009 / III 136 118 114
2009 / IV 143 118 121
Source: CBS, Statline (Maandstatistiek detailhandel)Page ● 148
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Table 17. Market shares of supermarket chains in the Netherlands, (mid-) 2002-2006
owner chain characteristics 
2002
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Ahold Albert Heijn, AH to 
go
high-end 24.5 23.1 25.3 26.4 27.3
Schuitema C1000 middle / high-end 14.2 14.8 14.7 14.8 14.6
Superunie Coopcodis, Deen, 
Vomar, Dekamarkt, 
PLUS, Spar, Jumbo 
a.o.
mostly regional chains 21.4 24.0 24.2 24.1 25.0





Super De Boer: mid-
dle
20.8 17.3 14.4 13.8 11.2
Aldi Aldi-markt discounter 7.6 7.8 7.5 8.4 8.9
Share of top-5 
(Superunie one)
88.5 87.0 86.1 87.5 87.0
Sperwer (largest 
Superunie member)
PLUS/Spar national chains of 
owners, middle
6.4 6.5 6.5 5.9 5.9
Share of top-5 
(Superunie sep.)
73.5 69.5 68.4 69.3 67.9
Samenw. Dirk van 
den Broek Bedri-
jven
Dirk van den Broek, 
Bas van der Heijden, 
Digros
discounters 6.2 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.1
Lidl Lidl discounter 2.7 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.4
Share of top-7 
(Superunie one)
97.4 97.5 96.9 98.0 97.5
Share of top-7 
(Superunie sep.)
82.4 80.0 79.2 79.8 78.4
Share of discount-
ers
16.5 18.3 18.3 18.9 19.4
Sources: miscellaneousPage ● 149
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Table 18. Chains and numbers of supermarket establishments in the Netherlands, March 2006 (>=20 
 establishments)








Aldi (GE) Aldi Nederland Aldimarkt www.aldi.nl  463 (388) 0 12
Boon Sliedrecht / 
Markant *)
Boon Sliedrecht MCD www.mcd-super-
markt.nl 
25 (26) 25 3
CoopCodis *) CoopCodis CoopCodis, Coop-
compact
www.coop.nl 180  (199) 15 10
Deen Supermarkt.
*)
Deen Supermarkten Deen Supermarkt www.deen.nl  57 (36) ? 1   
Samenw. D.van 
den Broek Bedr
D. van den Broek 
Supermarkten




47 (45) 0 8
Samenw. D.van 
den Broek Bedr
Digros Digros www.digros.nl 17  (16) 0 1
Samenw. D.van 
den Broek Bedr




26 (26) 0 1
Envema *) Nettorama Nettorama www.nettorama.nl   29 (24) ? 7
Hoogvliet Super *) Hoogvliet Hoogvliet www.hoogvliet.
com 
49 (40) ? 4
Jan Linders *) Jan Linders Jan Linders www.janlinders.nl  48 (45) ? 3
Kijkgrijp 
Dekamarkt *)




82 (85) ? 2
Kon. Ahold Albert Heijn Albert Heyn www.ah.nl  700 (705) 212 12
Kon. Ahold Albert Heijn AH to Go www.ah.nl  35 (28) 0 6
(Kon. Ahold/)
Schuitema




Super de Boer Super de Boer www.superdeboer.
nl, 
300 (392) 191 12
Legro Van Tol Grooth. Troefmarkt www.troefmarkt.
nl
112 (133) 112 9
Schwarz (GE) Lidl Nederland Lidl www.lidl.nl  242 (199) 0 12
Plus Retail /  *) 
Sperwer Nationaal
Spar Holding Spar www.spar.nl  288 (325) 288 12
Sperwer Nation-
aal *)
Plus Retail PLUS www.plussuper-
markt.nl 
215(220) 215 12
Poiesz Beheer *) Poiesz Superm. Poiesz www.poiesz-su-
permarkten.nl 
41 (39) 0 2
Sanders Superm. 
*)
Sander Superm. Sanders www.sanders-
supermarkt.nl 
19 (20) 0 1
Sligro *) Em-Té Supermarkt. Em-Té www.em-te.nl 18 (17) 0 1
Sligro/Markant *) Prisma Food Retail Attent www.prismafood.
nl 
56 (56) 56 9
Sligro/Markant *) Prisma Food Retail Golff www.prismafood.
nl 
57 (62) 62 8
Sligro/Markant *) Prisma Food Retail Meermarkt www.prismafood.
nl 
76 (76) 76 10




81 (83) 83 9
Van Eerd Beheer*) Jumbo Supermarkt. Jumbo, Pryma www.jumbosuper-
markt.nl 
94 (70) 34 12
Vomar Holding *) Vomar Voordeelm. Vomar Voordeelm. www.vomar.nl  50 (41) 0 3
Walmarkt *) Bonimarkten Bonimarkt www.bonisuper-
markt.nl 
32 (32) 0 6
Total 4,158 (4,266) 1,850? 12
Source: company websites; www.denationalefranchisegids.nl/ﬁ  rstfranchise/Food.htm
 *) member of  Superunie (all 16 members as of  March 2006 are represented in the table)Page ● 150
Maarten van Klaveren
Table 19. Development of employment (employees) in Dutch supermarkets, (December) 1995-2008, 
  x 1,000 headcount
total male female % female
1995 163,0 71,2 91,8 56.3
1996 172,5 75,6 96,9 56.2
1997 183,8 79,8 104,0 56.6
1998 191,1 84,1 107,0 56.0
1999 197,2 83,6 113,6 57.6
2000 201,7 85,3 116,4 57.7
2001 208,0 89,7 118,2 56.8
2002 205,4 88,3 117,1 57.0
2003 204,0 89,3 114,7 56.2
2004 198,8 88,3 110,5 55.6
2005 200,6 90,0 110,6 55.1
2006 200,5 102,5 118,0 53.5
2007 229,8 103,0 126,8 55.2
2008 235,0 105,2 129,8 55.2
Source: CBS, Statline
Table 20. Occupations and age groups in Dutch supermarkets, Sept. 2004-Sept. 2006 (%)
Age 15-19 20-22 23-24 25-44 45-65 Total n =
checkout operator 36 20 7 30 7 100 654
sales assistant 14 29 9 39 9 100 160
shop assistant, 
shelf stacker
54 20 4 18 4 100 322
total 38 21 6 28 7 100 -
n =  432 244 72 314 74 - 1,136
Source: WageIndicator-data
Table 21. Educational levels in Dutch supermarkets, Sept. 2004-Sept. 2006 (%)










1/2 BO 5 3 5 8
3M A V O 2 2 2 3 1 9 2 0
VBO/voc.edu 7 8 7 5
4 HAVO/VWO 18 16 9 27
5 MBO 31 31 45 25
6/7 HBO/WO 17 16 15 16
total 100.0 100 100 100
n = 1,138 656 160 322
Source: WageIndicator-dataPage ● 151
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Table 22. Wage scales in Dutch supermarket CLAs 2008-2010, monthly, per 01-04-2008 (rounded on €1)




18 788 931 1106 1281
18/1 944 1124 1304
19/0 920 1033 1223 1413
19/1 1047 1243 1440
19/2 1062 1264 1466
20/0 1071 1202 1374 1546 1946
20/1 1219 1397 1575 1987
20/2 1236 1420 1603 2028
21/0 1247 1389 1556 1722 2008
21/1 1409 1582 1754 2051
21/2 1428 1607 1786 2093
21/3 1448 1633 1818 2135
22/0 1448 1604 1752 1900 2068
22/1 1627 1781 1935 2111
22/2 1649 1810 1970 2155
22/3 1672 1839 2006 2198
23/0 1688 1807 1892 1977 2089 2321 2663 3054 3503
23/1 1833 1924 2015 2136
23/2 1856 1956 2054 2181
23/3 1884 1988 2092 2227
23/4 1910 2020 2129 2272
23/5 1935 2051 2167 2318 2576 2954 3389 3887
Wage levels above the low-wage threshold for 2008 are given in italics
Functions:
A  prospective sales assistant; shelf stacker; prospective checkout operator
B  sales assistant; checkout operator
C 1st sales assistant; 1st checkout operator
D  department supervisor A; shop assistant responsible for department
E  department supervisor B; assistant store manager II
F  assistant store manager I; store manager V
G  store manager IV
H  store manager III
I  store manager IIPage ● 152
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Table 23. Development of sales (total, price and volume) in Dutch consumer electronics retail (NACE 
  52.45a), 2000-2008 (2000 = 100)
total price volume
2000 100 100 100
2001 107 96 112
2002 110 89 124
2003 106 82 128
2004 98 75 130
2004- I 98 77 127
2004 - II 101 75 135
2004 - III 94 74 126
2004 - IV 106 73 146
2005 95 70 136
2005 - I 88 72 122
2005 - II 87 71 123
2005 - III 95 69 137
2005 - IV 110 68 161
2006 102 66 115
2006 - I 97 67 144
2006 - II 97 67 145
2006 - III 100 66 152
2006 - IV 116 66 181
2007 108 61 176
2007 - I 102 63 161
2007 - II 102 62 166
2007 - III 106 60 175
2007 - IV 121 59 204
2008 108 57 191
2008 - I 103 58 177
2008 - II 106 57 186
2008 - III 106 56 190
2008 - IV 117 55 213
2009 96 48 201
2009 - I 96 48 199
2009 – II 87 48 183
2009 – III 93 48 195
2009 - IV 109 48 226
Source: CBS, Statline (Maandstatistiek detailhandel)Page ● 153
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Table 24. Chains and numbers of consumer electronics establishments in the Netherlands, March 2006 (> 
 10  establishments)






KESA BCC Electrospec.z. BCC www.bcc.nl  38 0 7
De Block Holding Block’s Technisch 
Handelsbedrijf
De Block www.block.nl   29 0 3
De Harense Smid 
Houdster
De Harense Smid 
Houdster





EP, Service Partner, 
Sprinter
www.ep.nl  125 125 12
Expert Holding Nederlandse Expert 
Groep
Expert www.expert.nl  192 192 12







Maxwell Holding Maxwell Maxwell www.maxwell.nl  26 26 3
MediaMarkt / Metro 
Group (GE)
MediaMarkt MediaMarkt www.mediamarkt.nl   22 0 8
Mikro Electro Beheer Mikro Electro Mikro-Electro www.micro-electro.
nl 
 20 0 3
De Perfekt Organ. De Perfekt Organis. Perfekt www.tisperfekt.nl  135 135 11










Euronics Int’l (GE) United Retail Electro World www.electroworld.nl  100 100 11
Euronics Int’l (GE) United Retail Euramco www.euramco.nl  19 19 12
Euronics Int’l (GE) / 
United Retail
Elektro Vakman Elektro Vakman www.elektrovak-
man.nl 
168 168 12
Euronics Int’l (GE) United Retail Witgoedspecialist www.witgoedspe-
cialist.nl 
46 46 12
Vendex KBB *) Dixons Groep  Dixons www.dixons.nl  144 0 12
Vendex KBB *) V & D Warenhuizen Dynabite www.dynabite.nl  44 0 10
IMpact man./Van 
Lanschot Bank
Impact Retail It’s www.im-pact.nl  112 0 9
IMpact man./Van 
Lanschot Bank
Impact Retail Modern Electronics www.modernelec-
tronics.nl 
- **) 0 11
IMpact man./Van 
Lanschot Bank
Impact Retail Prijstopper www.prijstopper.nl  15 0 6
Total 1,525  999 12
Sources: HBD, Franchise- en ﬁ  lialenregister 2004/2005; company websites; www.denationalefranchisegids.nl/ﬁ  rstfranchise/
Food.htm
*) since June 14, 2006 Maxeda, owned by KKR/Cinven/Permira/Alpinvest
**) amalgamated with It’sPage ● 154
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Table 24. Development of employment (headcount) in Dutch consumer electronics retail, (December) 
  1995-2008, x 1,000
total male female % female
1995 16,2 10,0 6,2 38.3
1996 16,8 10,3 6,5 38.7
1997 17,4 10,4 7,1 40.8
1998 18,6 11,5 7,1 38.2
1999 19,9 12,0 8,0 40.2
2000 22,7 13,6 9,2 40.5
2001 22,7 13,7 9,0 39.6
2002 22,8 14,0 8,8 38.6
2003 22,1 13,4 8,4 38.0
2004 20,9 12,9 8,0 38.3
2005 20,8 13,1 7,7 37.0
2006 20,5 15,5 5,0 24.4
2007 21,8 16,3 5,5 25.2
2008 22,0 16,5 5,5 25,0
Source: CBS, Statline 
Table 25. Wage scales in Dutch CLA 2007-2009 for electro-technical retail, monthly, per 01-05-2008 
  (rounded on €1)






18 608 638 668
19 701 725 771
20 821 850 903
Grade A B C D E F
0 970 1066 1109 1153 1199 1247
1 1135 1250 1299 1352 1406 1461
2 1335 1470 1529 1590 1653 1719
3 1575 1638 1703 1703 1772
4 1559 1622 1686 1754 1825
5 1670 1738 1807 1879
6 1789 1861 1936
7 1843 1918 1994
8 1976 2054
9 2116
Wage levels above the low-wage threshold for 2008 are given in italics.Page ● 155
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Table 26. Average gross hourly wages (Euro) by working hours’ category, age and gender, including gender 
  pay gap, Dutch wholesale and retail (headcount), 2008 
total full-time part-time
total male female gap total male female gap total male female gap
15-<20 5.28 5.36 5.21 2.8% 5.33 5.40 5.20 3.7% 5.27 5.34 5.2 2.4%
20-<25 10.04 10.28 9.76 5.1% 10.25 10.42 9.97 4.3% 9.69 9.90 9.53 3.7%
25-<30 13.92 14.40 13.25 8.0% 14.16 14.43 13.63 5.5% 12.99 14.14 12.53 11.4%
30-<3 5 16.73 17.68 15.14 14.4% 17.33 17.72 16.12 9.0% 14.75 17.12 14.15 17.3%
35-<40 18.96 20.61 15.79 23.4% 20.11 20.73 17.29 16.6% 15.68 19.14 14.82 22.6%
40-<45 20.28 22.70 15.46 31.9% 21.95 22.92 17.13 25.3% 15.58 20.08 14.47 28.0%
45-<50 20.52 23.62 14.78 37.4% 22.57 23.92 16.31 31.8% 15.08 20.18 13.90 31.1%
50-<55 20.38 23.57 14.59 38.1% 22.55 23.90 16.22 32.1% 14.94 20.11 13.70 31.9%
55-<60 20.46 23.29 14.48 37.8% 22.56 23.71 16.01 32.5% 15.26 19.82 13.73 30.8%
60-<65 20.95 23.15 14.62 36.8% 22.95 23.98 16.20 32.4% 16.58 19.79 13.77 30.4%
total 16.49 18.59 13.04 29.9% 18.40 19.62 14.35 26.9% 12.31 12.85 12.08 6.0%
Source: CBS, Statline
Table 27. Median gross hourly wages (Euro) in Dutch retail, supermarkets/department stores and consumer 










other ret. total supers/
dss
other ret.
15-17 3.60 3.62 2.84 5.02 5.01 5.04 5.20 5.16 5.28
18 4.90 4.93 3.25 6.28 6.01 6.45 5.70 5.81 5.16
19 5.39 5.38 5.39 6.26 6.25 6.34 6.65 6.87 6.38
20 6.58 6.76 5.61 7.22 7.17 7.43 7.51 8.00 7.18
21 7.08 7.23 6.49 8.19 8.45 7.86 7.62 8.13 7.06
22 8.36 8.42 6.84 8.74 9.55 8.55 9.36 9.99 8.96
23 9.52 9.89 8.16 10.07 9.91 10.30 9.67 10.39 9.54
24-<35 11.39 11.50 11.32 12.12 12.57 11.88 11.81 12.43 11.55
35-<45 11.87 11.72 12.14 13.28 13.20 13.43 13.27 13.27 13.28
> 44 12.43 12.20 14.75 13.79 14.70 13.48 13.53 13.92 13.37
total 9.80 9.58 10.80 10.69 9.79 11.29 10.79 9.96 11.27
n =  1,982 1,673 309 2,932 1,014 1,918 3,667 1,312 2,355
of which 
< age 23
59.4% 61.2% 48.5% 33.7% 51.6% 24.2% 34.7% 54.5% 23.6%
Source: WageIndicator data
*) only supermarkets/department stores and consumer electronicsPage ● 156
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Table 28. Average working week (excl. overtime) by working hours’ category, age and gender, Dutch 
  wholesale and retail (headcount), 2008 
total full-time part-time
total males females total males females total males females
15-<20 12.5 13.7 11.6 39.4 39.7 38.7 10.5 10.7 10.3
20-<25 25.1 27.2 23.0 38.9 39.3 38.4 15.6 15.3 15.8
25-<30 33.3 35.9 30.4 39.0 39.3 38.5 21.3 20.2 21.8
30-<3 5 33.1 37.6 27.5 39.1 39.3 38.6 21.9 24.4 21.4
35-<40 32.0 37.7 24.8 39.2 39.3 38.5 21.0 25.5 20.2
40-<45 31.7 37.6 24.2 39.2 39.3 38.5 20.6 24.7 19.8
45-<50 31.4 37.3 24.3 39.1 39.3 38.4 20.6 23.7 20.0
50-<55 30.9 36.9 23.8 39.0 39.2 38.3 20.3 22.9 19.7
55-<60 30.0 35.8 22.4 39.0 39.1 38.5 19.2 21.0 18.6
60-<65 27.0 30.6 20.1 39.1 39.2 38.4 16.2 16.3 16.1
total 27.2 31.7 22.1 39.1 39.3 38.5 16.4 15.4 16.9
Source: CBS, StatlinePage ● 157
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